SUPPLEMENTS TO

MNEMOSYNE

GERALD PROIETTI

XENOPHON'S SPARTA

AN INTRODUCTION

E. J. BRILL

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GERALD PROIETTI

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BY

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for my father
and the memory
of my mother

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PREFACE

This study was begun as only the first part of what was to be a commentary on the whole of the *Hellenica*. But the narrative treatment of Lysander in Books I-III proved to be both subtler and more important for understanding the whole than expected; that narrative also directed my attention to Xenophon's *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* in order to explain the predicament of Sparta at the end of the Peloponnesian War and in the years following. The present study is therefore limited to those two texts, focusing on that portrayal of Lysander's career and the insight Xenophon thereby provides into the Spartan polity.

We have reason today to read Xenophon's writings on Sparta with care. The central concern of most international political discourse is the search for a stable condition of peace that will, above all, provide for the freedom of all nations. Both World Wars ended with all but unanimous declarations of this principle and the establishment of international organizations seeking to maintain it, but the emergence of two "superpowers," each accusing the other of imperial designs, has darkened those hopes. Xenophon's *Hellenica* remains the only extensive contemporary account—and in many parts it is even an eyewitness account—of a time in Greece when many believed that they were nearer than ever to attaining such a stable condition of peace with autonomy for their cities.

After the Greeks had united to repulse the invasions of the King of the Persian Empire, who sought to bring them all under his rule, two competing powers emerged among them, the alliance or submission of most of the others falling either to Athens or to Sparta. Then, in what Thucydides described as the greatest war up to that time, Sparta and her allies fought almost without interruption for twenty-seven years to prevent the domination of all Greece by the Athenian Empire. Thucydides' writing broke off abruptly in the twenty-first year of that war. But the narrative was taken up and completed by Xenophon. In the end, the Spartan confederacy destroyed the Athenian navy and starved the Athenians into surrendering.

> And after that Lysander sailed into the Peiraeus, the exiles returned, and they tore down the walls to the accompaniment of flute-girls, with much enthusiasm, thinking that day to be for Hellas the beginning of freedom. (*Hellenica* II.ii.23)[1]

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[1] All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. For translations from the *Hellenica* I have often consulted the best English version, that of C.L. Brownson in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., 1947). It will be noticed that I have frequently sacrificed grace for the sake of literalness.

This moment of great hope was owing primarily to the Greeks' faith in the Spartans. Respected for the courage, strength and discipline of her army (virtues instilled especially in her leading class of citizens through their austere communal upbringing) as well as for the relative restraint with which most of her highest officials conducted foreign affairs (a restraint caused in fact by the need of these oligarchs to maintain constant vigilance at home against subject populations), Sparta was recognized as the leader of Greece at the end of the Peloponnesian War. It was expected that this leadership would not result in a new empire but rather would be a shield against future transgressors of the freedom of the Greek cities—that now, as at the end of the Persian Wars, the Spartans would return home and be content to exercise imperial power in settling affairs only among their allies in the Peloponnese.[2]

This expectation seems to have been fulfilled in part, for Book III of the *Hellenica* shows the Spartans avenging violations of the cities' autonomy. They sent an expedition against the Persian King's satrap to liberate the Hellenic cities in Asia Minor, and even their campaign against the Eleans was in the name of liberating the small cities in that part of the Peloponnese. But their hegemony soon bore all the marks of a new empire over all of Greece. Oligarchies (often evolving into tyrannies), supported by Spartan garrisons, were imposed on many of them; and "liberation" became in fact a mere pretext for giving vent to their citizens' private ambitions and their subjects' rebellious impulses (this applies especially to their assaults on the empire of the Persian King) and for punishing any city's present or past offenses against Sparta. Consequently, new alliances were formed against Sparta and eventually reduced her nearly to ruins.

In the absence of a strong superintendent, however, the Greek cities fell prey to one another's ambitions, both petty and grand. Xenophon's history ends abruptly in the midst of the resulting chaos. But we know that these circumstances soon made the cities all together the prey of the Macedonians, and Greek freedom was at an end.

Considering the parallels one might draw here to actual circumstances and events as well as future possibilities in international affairs in the twentieth century, we must wonder more precisely how it is that Sparta, from such auspicious beginnings after the Peloponnesian War, experienced such a moral and military decline.

Beyond this immediate concern there are larger practical and theoretical questions, which might best be indicated by reference to two philosophers who helped to give shape to the modern world and who both were deeply impressed by certain aspects of the ancient world:

[2] Cf. Thucydides I.75-76, 89, 95; III.10.

Machiavelli and Rousseau. In a famous dictum in *The Prince*, Machiavelli rejected the republics "imagined" by the ancient philosophers, republics "that have never been seen or known to exist in truth." He omits consideration there of the fact that Sparta was the living model on which the ancients sought to improve in their "imagined" republics: Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* (the old Persian regime in I.ii) and Plato in the *Republic* and *Laws* as well as Aristotle in the *Politics*; yet we see in the beginning of Machiavelli's longer theoretical work, the *Discourses on Livy* (I.2-6), that Machiavelli was deeply impressed by the longevity of the Spartan regime shaped by Lycurgus. This seeming discrepancy may be explained by the fact that in the latter context, although impressed by Sparta, Machiavelli decides that its laws were fatally flawed in that they did not enable Sparta to control a larger empire when the need came to do so; whereas Rome was very well suited to meet this contingency. By deciding in favor of Rome, Machiavelli implicitly opposed the judgment of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, who rejected imperialism as a political principle. Machiavelli's crucial observation is that Sparta, "having subdued nearly all Greece, showed upon one slightest accident her weak foundation; for following the rebellion of Thebes, caused by Pelopidas, the other cities rebelled and utterly ruined that republic" (*Discourses* I.6). He uses Sparta, then, precisely as an example of what happens to a republic whose cultivation of human virtue does not take adequate account of the virtually inescapable forces at work in this world compelling all peoples, sooner or later, to go to war, and impelling victors toward empire. (Perhaps he thereby denies its viability as a working model or point of departure for an "imagined" republic.) Machiavelli's immediate source for the statement quoted above seems to be Polybius (VI.48-50). But the course of events he describes is precisely that narrated at length in the bulk of the *Hellenica*. To understand this seminal political philosopher of modernity as well as the ancient philosophers who were impressed somehow by Sparta, we might do well to seek from Xenophon a fuller understanding of the Spartan polity and the reasons for its decline.

If Machiavelli was less interested in Sparta than the Socratic philosophers were, Rousseau was *more* interested. Declaiming against the decadence wrought by the liberal individualism of "moderns" such as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, Rousseau—albeit with occasional reservations—frequently cited Sparta as an illustrious example of a sound regime, especially with regard to the Spartans' cultivation of political virtues through their communal institutions.[3] Less than two

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3 See especially the *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, Chapter 2: "The Spirit of Ancient Institutions."

hundred years later, several regimes in our own century have claimed to have carried these principles, as revised by Karl Marx, toward their true conclusion by instituting the rule of communist parties. In each case, however, within a remarkably short time we have witnessed compromising alterations of their principles on a large scale. Depending on one's point of view, these will be called compromises in the pace of communist development, with temporary, pragmatic concessions in the face of economic and social exigencies—or, alternatively, decadence and decline in moral and political standards or pretensions. In any case, the following would not be inaccurate statements of some of the changes in the communist parties' membership (supposing that in the early years following each revolution there were many "true believers"):

> Before, they preferred companionship with their comrades, sharing their limited goods, to ruling and being flattered and corrupted. And formerly they dreaded being seen with wealth; but now there are some who even pride themselves on their acquisition of it. And formerly, for this very reason, they drove foreigners away and didn't permit travel abroad, so that their citizens would not be saturated with luxury and easy-living; but now we see their leading citizens vying to enjoy continuously the perquisites of foreign missions. And there was a time when they concerned themselves with being worthy to lead; but now they exert themselves much more in order to obtain office than to be worthy of it.

Yet this is nothing other than a fairly literal translation of part of Chapter xiv of Xenophon's treatise on the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*. Sparta's decline had domestic moral and political aspects as well as the "international" aspects mentioned above. The theoretical and practical importance of studying it are so much the greater for us.

Xenophon's interest in Sparta is manifest in many of his writings. The *Hellenica* focuses primarily on the Spartans' involvement externally in Greek affairs, while including also some telling stories about their internal political problems. The *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* seems to be written somewhat in conjunction with that longer narrative, since at the beginning and near the end of the treatise we find observations linking the two (*Lac.* i.1 and xiv.6). He composed separately an encomium of the man who seems to be easily the main hero of the *Hellenica*, the Spartan King Agesilaus. And the *Cyropaedia*, which is written more as a legend than as a factual narrative, clearly borrows heavily from the Spartan polity (see above) and from the image of Agesilaus. Thus some two thirds of Xenophon's writings on political affairs somehow emerge from his evidently keen interest in Sparta as a political phenomenon.

It is especially this attention to Sparta, however, that has caused Xenophon to be held in much contempt by modern scholars. In the *Helle-*

nica he gives no clear statement about his purpose. It seems to begin, as we have noted, where Thucydides' narrative of the Peloponnesian War broke off, continuing to the end of that war and then proceeding to narrate "things Hellenic" that occurred after the war during Xenophon's life. Certain features of the narrative, especially in the part that seems to complete Thucydides' enterprise (I.i.1-II.ii.23 or iii.10), reflect Thucydides' style. Beginning from these facts, modern scholars have assumed that Xenophon wished simply to continue Thucydides' work in more or less the form of a chronicle,[4] and later extended the original design so as to write a general "history of his own times."[5] With a prudent caution scholars have scrutinized the writing and compared it with other ancient accounts of the period to try to regain the clearest possible view of events as they happened—that is, to discern in what respects Xenophon's account of those events might lack fulness or have been otherwise affected by the author's particular defects of intelligence or care, his prejudices, or his limited perspective. Their examination of the *Hellenica* revealed to them many flaws in this regard: Xenophon's chronology, for example, is not as consistent as Thucydides'—indeed, the *Hellenica* does not begin exactly where Thucydides' narrative ended, so that Xenophon's abrupt beginning is quite bewildering.[6] Worse, the *Hellenica* lacks balance: "important" facts are either entirely omitted or included too briefly, while seemingly trivial events are narrated at great length: Xenophon does not manifest a clear understanding of the broad flow of human events, their causes and consequences.[7] Worse still, Xenophon does not seem to be as even-handed as Thucydides in his presentation of the various Greek cities: he seems unable to conceal a predilection for Sparta and especially a prejudicial admiration for certain Spartan leaders. Many of the omissions and imbalances, in fact, are attributed to this predilection.[8] Xenophon is therefore judged as lacking Thucydides' grandeur of vision not just as artist, as a composer of historical narrative, but as scientific historian or political scientist. These are usually held to be unconscious failings that betray an author of

[4] See W.P. Henry, *Greek Historical Writing* (Chicago, 1966), p. 12.

[5] G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900), p.xxxiii; the phrase is typical of scholars' estimations of Xenophon's intentions. (Some hold that Books III-VII were composed first, with Books I-II added later to link this history with Thucydides': thus H.R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon von Athen* [Stuttgart, 1966, offprint from Pauly's *Realencyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Band IX A_2], col. 1679, 1700.)

[6] This has even led to doubts as to whether Xenophon meant to continue Thucydides' history: Henry, p. 13 ff.

[7] Among many others: Underhill, pp. xii-xxxv; J. Hatzfeld, ed. and trans., *Helléniques* by Xenophon (Paris, 1936), Introduction, pp. 9-18; Henry, pp. 1-10.

[8] See Underhill, pp. xxi-xxiii.

limited intellect who was therefore all too susceptible to the prejudices of his aristocratic class.[9]

More recently, some scholars have wondered whether the *Hellenica* can properly be called a "history" in the modern sense at all. They found that what looked like an ill-ordered narrative from the point of view of general history might in fact be governed by some other order: much as in his other writings, Xenophon shows a more particular interest in leadership, especially military leadership, and in those men and those actions that exemplify both good and bad leadership.[10] This discovery, however, did little to improve Xenophon's reputation. For this interest of his, like his evident interest in hunting and horsemanship, still is seen as the more or less irrational predilection of an ancient aristocrat; his writing still seems to be unsystematic, with omissions, rough transitions of thought and inconsistencies; and his scope is found to be limited by his *Gesichtskreis*, the horizon of his personal experiences: in the *Hellenica*, especially after the first two books, Xenophon seldom strays far from Spartan affairs.[11] (After his journey with Cyrus the younger and the long march back to Greece described in the *Anabasis*, Xenophon spent much of his life in the company and under the protection of the Spartans and particularly of Agesilaus.)

But Xenophon's focus on Spartan affairs in the *Hellenica* is much more consistent than any of the modern scholars has observed. For in Books III-VI, while he does go out of his way to narrate—and sometimes at length—events at which he could not have been present himself, Xenophon *never* writes of an event that does not concern Sparta either directly or, on occasion, indirectly—the only possible exceptions to this being two digressions which he explicitly calls digressions (VI.i.2-19 and iv.27-37). It is implausible to attribute such a degree of consistency to the limitations of a supposed *Gesichtskreis*. We would do better to suppose that Xenophon intended to treat Sparta *thematically* in this writing. His

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[9] Throughout a lengthy and impassioned study, one young scholar seems to have been unable to decide whether the failings he found in the *Hellenica* (by comparison with Thucydides' history) were the results of mere stupidity or outright vice (E.M. Soulis, *Xenophon and Thucydides* [Athens, 1972]). We pass in silence over the spate of studies which sought to determine, by analyzing differences of form and diction among different parts of the *Hellenica*, the respective times in Xenophon's life when those parts must have been composed and the probable sources of his knowledge of events. See Henry's thorough critique (*op. cit.*).

[10] Breitenbach, col. 1698-1701; P. Krafft, "Vier Beispiele des Xenophontischen in Xenophons *Hellenica,*" *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 110 (1967), 103-150; K. von Fritz, review of Henry in *Gnomon* XL (1968), 564 ff.; and C.H. Grayson, "Did Xenophon Intend to Write History?" in *The Ancient Historian and His Materials*, ed. B. Levick (Westmead, 1975), pp. 31-43.

[11] Thus the encyclopedist Breitenbach, col. 1699-1700.

silences about certain Spartan affairs (known to us through other ancient writings) prove nothing, except perhaps that Xenophon did not consider them important or appropriate for his purposes. Those silences certainly prove nothing as to Xenophon's supposed prejudices, since he omits much that would be flattering and includes much that is unflattering to Sparta and to his supposed Spartan heroes.[12]

Might not Xenophon's interest in Sparta have been as philosophic as Rousseau's and Machiavelli's? The *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* begins with amazement at the power and fame attained by such a small city and looks into the causes of this phenomenon; and in the next-to-last chapter of that treatise, turning from an exposition of their laws to the observation that these laws are currently neglected (see the quotation above), Xenophon concludes:

> And therefore the Hellenes formerly, going to Lacedaemon, entreated them to take the lead against those who were held to be doing injustice; but now many call one another forth to prevent *them* from ruling in turn. But there is certainly no need to wonder that these blameworthy things have arisen among them, since they are manifestly obedient neither to the god nor to the laws of Lycurgus. (*Lac.* xiv.6-7)

And the interval between "formerly" and "now" can only refer to the period of time covered by the *Hellenica*, particularly Books III-VI.[13]

But this treatise on the Spartan polity, too, has long borne the contempt of modern scholars, who, with few exceptions, read it as a poorly composed and biased encomium of traditional Sparta with an anomalous censure of contemporary Sparta tacked on near the end. It is difficult to understand why this reading still prevails today, since in 1939 Leo Strauss, in his first published study of Xenophon, explained lucidly and persuasively the satirical character of this writing.[14] (Perhaps the essay, published in a journal of social science, has not yet come to the attention of classical scholars.) Where others had accepted Xenophon's apparent praises as being simply sincere and unqualified, Strauss showed very clearly his wry manner of referring quietly to the notoriously loose morals of the Spartan women in regard to sex and wine, the absence of any education of the women's souls, and the lack of a true education of the soul also for the Spartan boys and men. Where Xenophon seems to be praising Spartan virtues, Strauss demonstrated his veiled criticisms of the

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[12] See note 8 above.

[13] Hatzfeld, in the Introduction to his edition of the *Hellenica*, denies that Xenophon had any intent "to write the history of the greatness and of the decline of Sparta" (pp. 16-17). Yet he sees such a history portrayed in the *facts* which Xenophon writes (apparently in spite of himself).

[14] "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6 (1939), 502-536.

superficial character of those virtues: instead of being educated in justice, wisdom, and true moderation, the Spartan citizens were trained in fearful and arbitrary obedience, shame, hypocrisy, and mere continence.[15]

At the beginning of the compendious Introduction to his *Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon*, G.E. Underhill documents the wide gulf that separates ancient from modern historians of antiquity in their estimation of the merits of Xenophon's works. "The chorus of antiquity in favour of Xenophon as a historian is universal . . ."—they constantly ranked him alongside Herodotus and Thucydides—while the modern (meaning nineteenth-century) authorities almost universally condemn him. (Underhill himself catalogues evidence which redeems Xenophon from the harsher charges of pro-Spartan bias by the latter, but in the end agrees with their damning assessment of his intellectual capacity and his commitment to a consistent purpose in writing the work.)[16] What can account for this difference? Were the ancients simply ignorant of gross defects owing to an ignorance of the proper methods to apply to the reading of histories?

Although long discourses on the subject of scholars' discourses are tedious, it may be useful to make a few observations about conclusions drawn by scholars of the last century with regard to the *Hellenica* and about the procedures which have led to these conclusions. This may be useful especially in that these or similar observations might be made of modern scholarship on other ancient historians as well—even of those still held generally in esteem.

First, we return to the question of Xenophon's narrowness in focusing primarily on Spartan affairs, at the expense, it is supposed, of discussing the affairs of other peoples. This, we repeat, is usually attributed in the last century to his subrational predilection for things Spartan.

It is a common observation that an historian must in any case be selective. Thucydides, for example, was selective. While he takes note of events outside of Greece or in parts of Greece not directly involved in the Peloponnesian War, still Thucydides' writing has a focus: what is biggest or most developed and therefore most enlightening—Athens, the Athenian Empire, and the power that rivalled it and rose to lead the opposition to it, Sparta. These were the cities which most dominated or influenced political affairs in Greece in that time.

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[15] See also W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany, N.Y., 1977), pp. 65-75.

[16] Underhill pp. ix-xii. (It is not within Underhill's purpose to consider the larger question of assessing Xenophon's works as a whole; but see Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny* (Ithaca, New York, 1963), pp. 23-27.

Is this not also what Xenophon appears, *prima facie*, to have done in the *Hellenica*? In the period of time covered in the first two books, Athens and Sparta were still far and away the chief political powers in Hellas; but following the Athenian disaster at Aegospotami and the siege, starvation and surrender of the city itself, Sparta became the dominant military and political power in Hellas and remained so for years. Perhaps it is not by an emotional preference, then, that Sparta becomes the focus of Books III-VI of the *Hellenica*, until its domination, too, is broken.

This is not to ignore the very overt displays of admiration or favor that Xenophon makes as he writes in many of these passages, particularly with regard to Agesilaus. But why should we assume again that *these* emerge spontaneously from a subrational predilection? We could begin by keeping in mind the simple fact that Xenophon spent much of his life in the company and under the protection of the Spartans and particularly of Agesilaus. This fact alone should make us read more slowly as he describes the actions and interactions of the highest powers-that-be in a city so powerful and so guarded and protective of its own as Sparta was.—But why should we assume even that considerable cause for tact to have been his primary consideration? Are we unable to imagine other rhetorical reasons?[17]

On the issue of Xenophon's intentions in writing the *Hellenica*, another question arises: in the first two books one finds a more or less regular, annalistic division of the narrative and occasional, brief accounts of events occurring elsewhere, especially in Sicily and in Persia, seemingly unrelated to the Peloponnesian War; yet these narrative features are notably absent from the remainder of the work. Both features are reminiscent of Thucydides' style. Scholars have concluded therefore that the first part of the *Hellenica* was written more under the influence of Thucydides' work and reflects a broader "historical" vision and a more clearly defined historiographical intention, while the rest was written less under that influence, probably later in Xenophon's life. In other words, it is assumed that there could be no *conscious purpose* in Xenophon's writing differently in the two parts of his work. But is such a purpose unthinkable? (For example, to speak very tentatively: Might Xenophon have been critical of Thucydides' understanding of things and therewith also of his historiographical principles and methods? Might he therefore have composed what appears at first to be a completion of Thucydides' enterprise yet departs from or criticizes Thucydides' methods or prin-

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[17] See Leo Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing," in *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Westport, Connecticut, 1952); see also Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon" (*op. cit.*).

ciples in subtle but telling ways? And might the sudden departure from Thucydides' methods in the subsequent part of his history be intended to mark the new beginning of a narrative which is now wholly Xenophontic?)

Another, more "technical" difficulty arises in the case of the *Hellenica* which seems to obstruct any "literary" reading such as I shall advocate: many philologists have believed that the occasional, brief accounts of seemingly extraneous events in the first part of the work are "interpolations" inserted by later hands. If there are good reasons for this belief, we would have to wonder how we could approach the text as if it were an integral whole when we cannot be sure what the genuine text is; and this a literary approach itself might not be well suited to determine reliably. Indeed, the procedures which I shall employ assume, tentatively but with tenacity, that everything in the extant text is by the author himself. It is not my intention to resolve such questions here. In any case, sound philological insights must be used as an aid to any literary approach. But we frequently see passages in ancient texts rejected as being inauthentic simply because they did not fit the critic's assumptions about the author's purpose in the work (and these are "literary" grounds), with no other philological evidence or only feeble circumstantial evidence adduced. In many instances, we find that if one revises one's view of the author's purposes, the so-called "interpolations" turn out to have an integral function.

(For a case outside of Xenophon which involves several of the problems mentioned here, I refer the reader to Michael Palmer's excellent study of long passages in Thucydides that had often been criticized as "digressions" having dubious relevance to their contexts.[18])

All of these problems in the modern scholarship on Xenophon have this in common: that they are lapses of exploratory imagination. The question arises whether there is a common cause of them in some peculiarly modern academic attitudes about reading histories.

One indication of the problem: some scholars of ancient history have suggested to me that any literary interpretation of the *Hellenica* would fall under the purview of scholarship on ancient literature—in other words, that the *Hellenica* would become "literature" in the hands of one set of readers and "history" in the hands of another. While the text may serve as a source of "historical" information, or "facts," the author's use of art in presenting an interpretation of the facts is to be studied by those who deal with the arts of composition, or "literature."

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[18] Michael Palmer, "Alcibiades and the Question of Tyranny in Thucydides," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XV:1 (March, 1982).

Yet is not every modern as well as every ancient historical study composed with some interpretation—at the very least, in the assessment of what events are important or significant enough to be discussed (ἀξιόλογος, in Xenophon's usage[19]) and which are insignificant? The primary purpose in our studying history is to gain understanding of human affairs in general as well as to understand how certain sequences of events have led gradually to the situation in which we find ourselves today. But this inevitably requires that we, like the ancient historians, attempt to sift the significant out of the rubbish-heaps of the insignificant.

Perhaps, then, we are uncomfortable or ambivalent about any intrusion of ancient historians into their presentation of facts: we wish to sift from the manuscripts just as we wish to sift through archaeological ruins, to find as much as possible of all that existed at one time, and then to determine for ourselves what was significant and what was not, independent of the judgment interposed by the ancient transmitters.

However, while attempting to compensate for putative biases on the part of ancient authors, might we merely have replaced them with a new set of biases? Have we sufficiently considered the validity of the questions implicit in our methods? In most of the modern historical scholarship which I have encountered, the criteria (usually not stated) for determining what is important or significant seem to be the "size" of an event or the likelihood of its being typical of a large number of events or the quantity of other events it may be said to have caused in turn. These criteria might well be apt for the purpose of understanding how certain sequences of events have led gradually to the situation in which we find ourselves today. But can we be sure that they are fully adequate to guide us to a deeper understanding of the real nature of human doings and sufferings and thoughts and utterances? What if the nature of things is not simply reflected in "big" events or common events or consequential events?

When Xenophon spends some time narrating a "minor" event, I have always found, if I exercised sufficient caution and patience as well as whatever acumen I could muster, that something in it sheds important light on the "bigger" events of its context.

As this last remark itself betrays, I do not mean that the distinction between big and small in human affairs has no place in intelligent inquiry. We recall that Xenophon's explicit reason for looking into the Spartan laws was the surprisingly great power and renown (i.e. "size," in a sense) of that city given its small size; we recall also the opening lines of Thucydides' writing: bigness sometimes bespeaks maturity of develop-

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[19] E.g. *Hell.* II.iii.56.

ment. (Not always: cf. Thucydides II.97 and its context.) In any case, bigness is striking, so to speak, and bigness in human affairs seems often to bespeak some virtue at work which is worth thinking about. But perhaps in itself bigness is of no moral or metaphysical or theological significance and therefore is not inherently interesting—in other words, bigness is not necessarily greatness.[20] And perhaps we should say the same of commonness (or "statistical significance").

As has been indicated, historical scholars have not failed to consider the question of what the ancient historian regarded as important; but this has commonly been done for two further "historical" purposes: first, to employ a prudent vigilance with regard to the influence that some mere prejudice may have had in the composition of a purportedly truthful writing; and second, by the same process, to uncover this itself as a further historical fact—what a certain more or less thinking person of that time thought about the events passing before him. Unfortunately, the latter has generally depended upon the former: that is, the overall assessment of the author's mind usually emerges from the results of the critical reading of particular, isolated passages done by those seeking to reconstruct a more objective account of the particular events in question. But the great efforts required for the latter studies deflect these readers from any intensive effort to understand how the parts of the writing might add up to some whole. And what most commonly lies ready at hand to explain peculiarities in many particular passages?—probable ancient prejudices owing to social class or cultural horizon. Thus have modern historicist prejudices provided all-too-ready an explanation of the ancient author's mind: whatever specific reasons the author may have had for writing the work, he may readily be understood to have been a creature of his environment, and superficial evidence is never lacking to make some case for this.

When we approach a text with insufficient subtlety in this way, we risk giving insufficient credence to the possibility that the author was capable of seeing beyond the mental horizons of his city, his nation, his class, or his times. I cannot here undertake to examine the larger theoretical problems involved in this question. Others have done so more ably than I could.[21] But if there is no inherent impossibility of an ancient author's having attained a trans-"historical" perspective on the events passing before him, then it is quite possible that we, in failing to investigate with rigor and humility the full meaning of his writings according to his own intentions, are losing something of great value.

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[20] Cf. Plato, *Republic* 528e-530c and C.S. Lewis, *Miracles* (New York, 1960), "A Chapter of Red Herrings," pp. 48-54.

[21] See, for example, Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953).

(It may be further observed that the modern historical methods have redounded to the harm of the very purposes of those methods: The historical scholars' attempts to uncover or sift out what really happened in the past frequently are affected by their estimation of the respectability of the ancient historians who related those facts. If that estimation is incorrect, their sifting of the facts may be incorrect. How often today we see historians disparage Xenophon's version of the facts simply because they assume him to be biased and of doubtful intelligence!)

In sum, the modern academic separation of "history" and "literature" (which is different in critical respects from the ancient separation of history and poetry), together with other modern predispositions, has had unhappy effects on our understanding of an author who was once highly esteemed.

In suggesting a "literary approach" to reading Xenophon, I mean "literary" in the general sense of "letters": reading the text as a "work of the mind"—reading "history," according to the original sense of the word, as "inquiry," to attempt to understand the author's integral purposes. (It should be mentioned that in what we have been calling his "historical" writings, Xenophon nowhere—to my recollection—uses the word "history" [ἱστορίη] or any of its direct kin.) More specifically, my exploratory literary approach has meant a constant effort to determine: whether there is a theme or themes which might give the whole writing in question a unity of purpose and design; whether the discernible sections of the work prove to be integral as parts of that whole; and whether the particular passages thus might gain a larger significance than they might seem to have had at first reading. Many authors provide explicit statements of purpose (Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, for example), and in reading them one may proceed, always tentatively, on the assumption that the stated intention is the true and sustained intention, and look to see the function of the parts within that frame of the whole. In other cases (for example, Plato's dialogues), a purpose seems to be suggested or stated, or at least a certain theme emerges clearly for investigation, yet this is not given directly by the author himself but rather by one or more personae within the work. In still other cases (dramas, typically) the intention is still less apparent, and the reader needs to discern for himself what that might be. Xenophon's *Hellenica* seems to be of this kind. In these cases, the approach that seems most natural is to begin by examining the parts and looking to see how those parts might combine to form a unified whole. Needless to say, there is no simple sequence to be followed in this determination. It must rather be a judicious consideration of possible connections among the parts as

one reads, with constant awareness of certain features of the work as a whole (which, in the case of the *Hellenica*, we have mentioned above).[22]

At the risk of sounding excessively simple: What is needed above all is a sense of wonder and humility, a constant readiness to notice and follow an author's leads, and a constant openness to the possibility that we have not yet grasped the author's deepest intent, no matter how deeply we feel that we have penetrated already. By no means does this require relinquishing a sense of doubt or a spirit of criticism. But narrowly focused methods of criticism will interfere with one's mental receptivity just as effectively as ignorance itself or carelessness. To avoid the pitfalls of narrowly focused methods of criticism, one must avoid the complacent sense that all past thought, the high as well as the low, has been sufficiently understood, or that its limits have been probed.

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[22] See also Strauss, "Persecution and the Art of Writing" (*op. cit.*), pp. 29-30.

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This study was first written as my doctoral thesis in the Department of Political Science at Boston College. My teachers there made me aware of how much may be at stake in the study of classical authors. That awareness, although only dimly reflected in this study, provided the general impetus for it. More particularly, my sense of what it means to read a classical author seriously and my inclination to take Xenophon seriously are owing to Christopher Bruell's seminars on Aristotle, Plato, and Thucydides as well as on Xenophon. Mr. Bruell also offered the seminal observation out of which this study grew—that Lysander had reason for acting in fatal haste at Haliartus—and, as the chairman of my dissertation committee, made helpful remarks on earlier drafts of these chapters.

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CHAPTER ONE

SPARTA VS. ALCIBIADES
(*HELLENICA* I.i-iv)

The first four chapters of the *Hellenica* show the Spartans in circumstances that are not at all promising. After the obscure mention of their naval victory in the first sentence, their fortunes decline rapidly. One does not have to read far into Xenophon's account to find the single most important and immediate cause of those fortunes.

The Athenian generals (unnamed) went out with twenty ships to intercept a group of fourteen ships sailing into the Hellespont under Dorieus (presumably to join the Spartan fleet). But Dorieus was able to escape to the land, and, having fought him there "from the ships and the land," the Athenians finally sailed off "having accomplished nothing." Mindarus (the Spartan admiral) meanwhile was sailing out to rescue Dorieus. Apparently with no element of surprise, the Athenians came out against him (perhaps this time with the whole fleet). The ensuing battle lasted all day, with no decisive outcome in sight either way, until "Alcibiades sails up[1] with eighteen ships; then a flight of the Peloponnesians to Abydus occurred." But because they were able to take refuge in in Abydus—that is, because the battle was fought in some proximity to their base—Pharnabazus was able to come to their defense with his cavalry and infantry, fighting in the very shallows off the shore (*Hell.* I.i.2-7).

One might suppose that it was merely because Alcibiades' eighteen ships gave the Athenians a fresh numerical advantage that the Spartans were suddenly put to flight. On this view, Alcibiades' entrance into the *Hellenica* is not especially impressive. But every other aspect of this battle contrasts sharply with the combination of speed, daring, and mastery of Alcibiades' command in the next battle, near Cyzicus. As if to emphasize the difference which the presence of Alcibiades alone makes, Xenophon first tells us that

> the Athenians in Sestus, perceiving that Mindarus was about to sail against them with sixty ships [to their forty], ran away during the night to Cardia" (i.11)

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[1] Up to this point, all verbs have been in the past tense. Here Xenophon employs the more vivid historical present.

—in contrast with Alcibiades, who just before this "ran away during the night" in a daring escape from his imprisonment in Sardis (i.10)—and then tells us that Alcibiades met the Athenians there and ordered them to sail back around to meet him in Sestus, whence he intended to sail against the same sixty ships with those same forty supplemented only by the five triremes and one skiff that he had picked up in his escape. His tacit assumption that he could defeat the superior numbers of the Peloponnesian fleet should surprise us by its boldness, but Xenophon's narrative scarcely gives us time to reflect upon that, for the intention is mentioned, as if in passing, in a brief, almost parenthetical clause (i.12). Just as Alcibiades was about to get under way, he was joined by the forty ships under Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Without stopping to organize all the ships together, he "tells" the other generals to remove their tall masts—presumably to hinder the enemy's espial of his approach—and then to catch up with him. Assembling the eighty-six ships at Parium, he led them out again that very night,

> and on the next day about breakfast time they came to Proconnesus. There they learned that Mindarus was in Cyzicus and also Pharnabazus with the infantry. This day, then, they remained there, but on the next Alcibiades called an assembly and urged them that it was necessary to fight on the sea, fight on land, fight on the walls; "for we have no money," he said, "but the enemy have plenty of it from the King." (i.13-14)

As if the narrative had been caught up in the rush and gotten ahead of itself, Xenophon then pauses for a moment to insert an important detail that had been left out:

> The day before, when they came to anchor, he gathered together all the boats, even the little ones, close to himself, so that no one should report to the enemy the number of his ships, and he made proclamation that whoever should be caught sailing across to the opposite shore, death would be the penalty. (i.15)

But this detail proves to be of a piece with what follows. For "after the assembly, having prepared as for battle, he set out for Cyzicus while it was raining heavily." Alcibiades employs even the rain to conceal himself from the enemy. The effect of his sudden appearance before the enemy is stunning, an effect much heightened by the sudden clearing of the sky and shining of the sun (i.16).

The ensuing battle, which includes two different flights of the Peloponnesians, becomes almost a total rout. We are not told how many besides Mindarus are killed, but

> as for the ships, the Athenians departed taking all of them to Proconnesus except those of the Syracusans; those the Syracusans themselves burned down. (i.18)

We are reminded shortly thereafter that Pharnabazus' army was in Cyzicus; but apparently because Alcibiades' attack was so sudden and because he intercepted the Peloponnesian fleet "far from the harbor," that army was unable to give the rescue support it had provided at Abydus.[2]

All of these details in the first few pages of the *Hellenica* are worthy of attention. Xenophon will not include such details for most of Alcibiades' subsequent exploits. But by including them for this first one he gives us a good idea of how Alcibiades proceeds in general, how he conquers almost everywhere by virtue of his ceaseless energy and formidable command of military strategy. And in this particular case the details leave us with a vivid impression of how Alcibiades, entering the scene like a whirlwind, has in effect turned the tide in the war almost single-handed.[3] Once the Spartan fleet has been captured in this one stroke, Alcibiades easily overwhelms the coastal cities on the Propontis. He thereby increases his revenues for waging war and opens up the route for boats to bring vital food supplies to Athens from the Euxine Sea. The strategic importance of the latter is attested at the end of the first chapter by Agis' urgings to the Spartans that this supply line must be cut if the Athenians are ever to be subdued (i.35-36).

The Athenians make further gains in the two following chapters. In both chapters Alcibiades' successes are in brilliant contrast to the losses or mediocre successes of the other Athenian generals—generals who are themselves of no mean abilities. Thrasyllus attempts to score some victories of his own against Tissaphernes in I.ii, but he is repulsed and ends up humbly joining his troops to the main army under Alcibiades.[4] This humiliation is emphasized by Xenophon's inclusion, toward the end of the chapter, of an anecdote which otherwise would appear to be superfluous (ii.15-17).

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[2] Some useful questions are raised about the plausibility of certain parts of Xenophon's account by Paul Pédech ("Batailles navales dans les historiens grecs," *Revue des Études Grecques* 82 [1969], 43-55) and R.J. Littman ("The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 99 [1968], 265-272) through comparison with Diodorus' and Plutarch's accounts. Pédech observes that Xenophon's version "attributes exclusively to Alcibiades the initiative and the conduct of the operations: he is, opposite Mindarus, the sole hero of this episode. . . ." (p. 17; cf. Littman, pp. 271-272. For both scholars this itself is evidence of a distortion of the truth.) But some of the contradictions they find within and between the different accounts are conjectural, and these studies are in any case premature, since neither author investigates the logographic purpose governing any of the works in question but treat them all as chronicles.

[3] Cf. Leo Strauss, "Greek Historians," *Review of Metaphysics* 21 (1968), 664.

[4] See A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 73 (1953), 2-9, especially pp. 4-5.

In I.iii, Alcibiades first manages to bully the Bithynian Thracians into surrendering the booty that the Chalcedonians (for fear of losing it) had smuggled over to them (iii.2-3). Then, after walling in Chalcedon "from sea to sea," he saves the day for Thrasyllus, who had become stuck in a long, pitched battle against the Lacedaemonian harmost (iii.4-6). After thus bringing Pharnabazus to a temporary truce over Chalcedon and getting Athenian ambassadors sent off to the King, Alcibiades[5] captures Byzantium from the Spartans through the complicity of a few of its citizens.

Alcibiades chose this time to make a triumphal return to the city that had earlier banished him. In the words of Underhill:

> . . . no moment could have seemed more propitious. He had restored the Athenian dominion over the Bosporous, Propontis, and Hellespont, . . . had concluded a favorable treaty with Pharnabazus, and had sent an embassy to the Persian King in the hope of bringing him over to the side of Athens.[6]

Upon his sailing into Athens, a form of "apology" (I.iv.13) is made for Alcibiades by the greater part of the throng that gathered in the Peiraeus to gaze in wonder at him,[7] and he himself made a defensive speech in the council and the assembly;

> . . . and with no one contradicting these things, since the assembly would not have tolerated it, he was proclaimed the plenipotentiary commander of all, as being capable of restoring the former power of the city. (iv.20)

Xenophon and the mob in Athens seem to be in agreement, for the moment at least, that it is Alcibiades who is largely responsible for the reversal of the Athenians' fortunes from their deepest point of hopelessness in Thucydides VIII.96.[8]

Throughout these first chapters of the *Hellenica* the Spartans are conspicuously half-hearted in their attempts to counteract Alcibiades' activities. After the admiral Mindarus is killed at Cyzicus, the troops with him take flight and seem to abandon everything to the Athenians (I.i.18). Hippocrates, the "secretary" or vice-admiral, sends a pathetically laconic message of despondence to Sparta, but even this was captured and sent to Athens (i.23). Pharnabazus urges the Peloponne-

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[5] He is the only general named at I.iii.20; see also II.ii.1.

[6] G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900), note on I.iv.8.

[7] Cf. *Memorabilia* I.ii.13, where Xenophon as the author says of Alcibiades and Critias: "For my part, if they did anything bad with regard to the city, I shall make no defense . . ."

[8] L.F. Herbst, *Die Schlacht bei den Arginusen* (Hamburg, 1855), pp. 1-2.

sian and confederate armies not to lose heart, gives them pay and supplies, and orders as many ships to be built as had been lost in the battle (i.24-25), thus seeming to restore the Spartans almost at once to their former strength. And in i.32 we are told that the Laconian Pasippidas had been collecting a new fleet from among the allies and that, upon his removal on suspicion of treason, Cratesippidas was sent out to take command of this fleet. Yet we hear nothing more of the latter until his replacement is mentioned in I.v.1—which seems to come at least two years later—and only then are we told that he had been (or become) officially the admiral. Meanwhile, when Clearchus (who is merely the local harmost or governor) wishes to draw the Athenians away from their siege of Byzantium, he must go out to collect the ships that have been left here and there in the Hellespont by Pasippidas and by Agesandridas, who had been an officer under Mindarus: no mention is made of Cratesippidas. Clearchus takes it upon himself to receive the ships being built at Antandrus, to order the building of more, and to request money from Pharnabazus to pay his soldiers (I.iii.17).

The attitude of the Spartans toward naval warfare during this period is displayed in a detail mentioned by Xenophon at the end of I.i, in regard to Clearchus' original mission: After Agis had found it impossible to try to take Athens through blockades and attacks by land and urged the Spartans to send Clearchus to gain control of the sea route through the Bosporous, they did so—but, evidently hoping to gain control of the narrows by land, they sent with him fifteen ships that were "for transporting soldiers rather than swift-sailing" (i.36). Consequently, when these fifteen ships entered the Hellespont, three of them were taken in an encounter with only nine Attic ships. This should have been foreseen by the Spartans; for Xenophon adds that these Attic ships "were always there guarding the (grain) boats." The remaining Spartan ships fled for safety to Sestus and thence to Byzantium.[9] This neglect of naval strategy proves very costly to the Spartans: the loss of Byzantium is attributable to that neglect, as is clear from Clearchus' late and vain attempt to remedy the situation.

Such a policy or want of policy was also unlikely to win any popularity among the allies. One of the Byzantine "traitors," Anaxilaus,

> being later brought to trial for his life in Lacedaemon because of the betrayal, was acquitted when he gave his defense: that he had not betrayed the city but saved it, seeing children and women dying from hunger, and being a Byzantine, not a Lacedaemonian; for Clearchus was giving what food there was to the soldiers of the Lacedaemonians; because of these

[9] See W.P. Henry, *Greek Historical Writing* (Chicago, 1967), p. 48.

> things, therefore, he had let in the enemy, he said, not for the sake of money or because he hated the Lacedaemonians . . . (I.iii.19)

What is more, the last words quoted may have been intentionally ambiguous: he is *not* reported as saying that he does *not* hate the Lacedaemonians, only that this was not his immediate motive for the betrayal. After all, Xenophon characterizes Clearchus in the *Anabasis* as one who

> never had men following him out of friendship and good will; but those who were with him either under the order of a city or constrained by need or by some other necessity, from those he obtained rigorous obedience. (*Anab.* II.vi.13)

There is other evidence that the Spartans were not held in high regard by the allies even apart from the impositions owing to military difficulties. When Pharnabazus was having a new fleet of ships built after the battle at Cyzicus and in the meantime was employing the sailors to guard his lands upon the sea,

> . . . the Syracusans, (working) along with the Antandrians, finished part of the wall, and of all those in the guard they were the most gratifying. Because of these things the Syracusans have both status as benefactors and citizenship in Antandrus. (*Hell.* I.i.26; cf. ii.10)

Xenophon's mention of this popularity of the Syracusan soldiers stands in tacit contrast to his silence about the Lacedaemonians in this regard.

We began by attributing Sparta's rapidly declining fortunes in this war to the return of Alcibiades to active command on the side of the Athenians. Overwhelming though his presence may be, it no longer seems fully sufficient to explain the Spartan predicament.

The Spartans appear, in fact, to have a great advantage. For from the very beginning of the *Hellenica* we see the Athenians compelled to go out constantly in search of money. The first words following the first battle are:

> Then all but forty of the ships went off hither and thither to collect money outside the Hellespont; and Thrasyllus, one of the generals, sailed to Athens to report these things and to request an army and ships. (I.i.8)

"And after that" Alcibiades went to Tissaphernes to try to win his support. But "saying that the King ordered him to make war against the Athenians," Tissaphernes had him arrested and imprisoned. Having thereupon escaped and prepared to do battle, Alcibiades gave an exhortative speech to his soldiers, as we observed earlier. This was the first speech in the *Hellenica*. We note now that Xenophon did not give the actual or "reconstructed" text of the whole speech. Instead, he sum-

marized the substance of the speech, partly by giving the gist of it in a few words and partly by directly quoting particularly significant words. (We may assume that the actual speech was much longer since Alcibiades had called an assembly especially for this purpose.) We quote again:

> . . . he told them that it was necessary to fight on the sea, to fight on land, to fight on the walls. "For we have no money," he said, "but the enemy have plenty of it from the King." (i.14)

Again, this Athenian—and, especially, Alcibiadean—preoccupation with the search for money is visible often in these first three chapters.[10]

After that first battle at Cyzicus, as we have also observed before, Pharnabazus resupplied and employed the soldiers of the Peloponnesian and allied armies while ordering and funding the rebuilding of their fleet,

> having told them not to lose heart on account of wood, since there was a lot of it in the King's land . . . (i.24)

From the start of the *Hellenica*, then, the Spartans have available to them the vast wealth of the Persian King through Pharnabazus, even if Tissaphernes is using them with duplicity.[11] Their failure to use these resources, to engage energetically in the war and to be less burdensome to their allies, therefore seems to be inexcusable.

Signs that the course of the war is about to take a turn appear in I.iv. The hopeful Athenian ambassadors on their way to the King's court meet hitherto unmentioned[12] Lacedaemonian ambassadors returning from that very place, who "said that the Lacedaemonians had effected all that they had requested from the King." With them they also meet Cyrus, who is to have greater power than Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes and has explicit (or so it seems) instructions to wage war on the side of the Lacedaemonians (iv. 2-3). Cyrus instructs Pharnabazus to detain the Athenian ambassadors in order that they neither proceed on to see the King nor return to Athens with the news of these developments.

By placing the brief narrative of these incidents just before Alcibiades' return to Athens, Xenophon suspends a dark cloud over the Athenians' great expectations. The Athenians themselves and (presumably) Alcibiades do not yet know of these things, but there are other forbidding signs: just before sailing into Athens, Alcibiades learns that the Spartans themselves are fitting out ships at Gytheium; and then

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[10] In addition to the passages already mentioned: I.i.12, 20, 21, 22; ii.4, 17; iii.2-4, 8, 9.

[11] Cf. I.i.9 with i.31, 32 and v.9.

[12] See J. Hatzfeld's note, *Helléniques* by Xenophon (Paris, 1936), I, p. 160.

> he sailed into the Peiraeus on the day that the city was conducting the Plynteria, when the statue of Athena was covered up with veils—which some augured to be unfavorable both for him and for the city. For no one of the Athenians would dare to engage in any serious business on that day. (iv.12)

In spite of these portents, however, the expectations of the Athenians at the end of I.iv do not seem at all out of place. For Alcibiades has from the beginning of the book been able to collect and maintain large armaments even without money from Athens and notwithstanding Pharnabazus' support of the Spartans. At times he even supported his troops at the King's expense anyway, by plundering his lands with them (I.ii.17). Not only does Pharnabazus' former support render the Spartans' failures difficult to excuse, therefore, but the promise of still more money from Cyrus cannot be expected to make a decisive difference in the war.[13]

In a passage in I.i that seems to be a digression,[14] Hermocrates, speaking in defense of himself and the other generals,[15] gives in a nutshell the causes of victory in battle:

> . . . but if anyone should find fault with them, they said that they (the soldiers) should give an account, "calling to mind how many naval battles you have won by yourselves [i.e. apart from the Spartans] and ships you have taken, and in how many cases along with the other allies you have been undefeated, having the strongest order (τάξιν) through our virtue (ἀρετήν) and through your having the ready heart (προθυμίαν) both on land and at sea." (i.28)

In the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon "records" the conversation in which the most outstanding of all the commanders in Xenophon's writings receives his final instructions in the art of commanding from his father. In the course of that conversation Cyrus remembers having been told by Cambyses "that readiness of heart makes all the difference, in every work, over loss of heart" (*Cyr.* I.vi.13). But it is understood by both father and son that to inspire and maintain this enthusiasm—along with all the other moral and physical dispositions of the soldiers—is the function of the commander (*Cyr.* I.vi.19). Thus in the present passage: by explaining briefly one practice of Hermocrates that earned him the admiration and devotion of his officers as well as a reputation among all for prudent judgment (*Hell.* I.i.30-31), Xenophon indicates that the Syracusan soldiers'

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[13] Cf. P.A. Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement," Diss. Yale University 1977, p. 1.

[14] Cf. Henry's complaint, p. 9.

[15] He appears to make his speech—'Ερμοκράτους προηγοροῦντος, i.27—but all the other verbs of speaking here are in the third person plural.

readiness of heart was *caused* at least in part by Hermocrates' virtue. The order that brings victory may depend above all on good commanders.

After the battle at Cyzicus, Pharnabazus had urged the Peloponnesian soldiers "not to lose heart" (μὴ ἀθυμεῖν, i.24). We were not told whether the soldiers responded to this prompting, and, as we observed, the officials in Sparta apparently did not respond to it for some time. About the same time that Pharnabazus was urging this and Hermocrates was addressing the Syracusan soldiers,[16] the Athenians became "still more heartened" (ἔτι προθυμότεροι) toward the war because of Agis' retreat from their very walls almost without a fight (i.34). The "still more" indicates an earlier cause of encouragement, namely the victories at Abydus and, much more importantly, at Cyzicus. But the principal cause of this Athenian enthusiasm, then, is the virtue of Alcibiades, whose ability to order the fleet brought about the enemy's ruin. It may be simply the Spartans' lack of an able commander, then, that is to blame for their disheartening and disheartened condition. The only possible match for Alcibiades thus far has been Hermocrates. He, however, being a Syracusan, could not be given the command over the forces of the Spartan confederacy. Besides, just when he might have been of most use to the Spartans, after the death of the admiral Mindarus and the loss of the fleet, he was banished by the Syracusan demos (i.27). The high hopes of the Athenians at the end of I.iv seem quite justified, the shadows of Cyrus and the gods notwithstanding.

[16] Note the time indicators at I.i.27, 32 and 33.

CHAPTER TWO

LYSANDER'S VICTORIES, CALLICRATIDAS' DEFEAT (*HELLENICA* I.v-II.i.28)

In the brief Chapter I.v of the *Hellenica*, events suddenly take a more ominous turn for the Athenians. Cyrus is prevailed upon to raise the pay of the sailors in the Spartan confederacy from three to four obols per day.

> And he both paid up what was owed them and even gave them a month's pay in advance, so that the soldiery would be much more ready at heart. But the Athenians, hearing this, lost heart . . . (v.7-8)

Then a reckless lieutenant, left in charge of the fleet at Samos by Alcibiades, loses fifteen ships and a few men to the Spartans in a brief skirmish. Alcibiades is blamed by the Athenians both at home and in the camp, and so departs to his fortress in the Chersonese, while the Athenians choose ten new generals. Conon takes over the now disheartened fleet and reorganizes it so as to restore its effectiveness.

These changes have very visible causes. Alcibiades makes a simple error in judgment by trusting in the obedience of Antiochus (v.11). And Cyrus' as well as the King's determination to support more vigorously the Spartan alliance is a development given no little prominence by Xenophon; but, again, this by itself would not necessarily make a decisive difference. The single most important cause, without which neither of the above would likely have proved decisive, is the arrival of Lysander as the new Spartan admiral.

The first thing that Lysander does in Ephesus is to wait for the arrival of Cyrus in Sardis. Then, together with the Lacedaemonian ambassadors, he requests of Cyrus that the pay for their sailors be doubled to an Attic drachma,

> instructing him that, should this be the pay, the sailors of the Athenians will leave their ships, and he will be spending less money. (v.4)

Although he had made extravagant promises, and although he now praises the strategic principle, Cyrus balks at the price by pleading his restriction to the present rate by order of the King.

> And Lysander remained silent at that time; but after dinner, when Cyrus, drinking to him, asked what he might do to gratify him most, Lysander told him, "If you would add to the pay for each sailor an obol." And from this the pay was four obols, having previously been three. (v.6-7)

The significance of this passage becomes clearer later, but Hatzfeld's note here is apt: "This bargaining is very much in the Eastern style..."[1]

Having obtained this advantage over the Athenians, Lysander had his fleet put in order (συνετέτακτο, v.10) and remained inactive until he was drawn into battle by the over-bold Antiochus. Xenophon details the stages leading up to this battle to show how, as a result,

> . . . they fought in order (ἐν τάξει) on the one side, but the Athenians with their ships scattered, until they fled, having lost fifteen ships. (v.14)[2]

But Lysander's most prudent and consequential act in this passage is his decision *not* to give battle to Alcibiades when the latter promptly and defiantly challenged him to do so: Lysander refused "because he was outnumbered by many ships" (v.15). Had he lost a battle at this time, all the renewed hopes of the Spartans and their allies would have been ruined at one stroke, and the Persians' support might not have been enough to restore those hopes a second time. It seems to have been especially the news of the King's alliance with them that had renewed their willingness to take up naval warfare actively again after the disaster at Cyzicus, and this now was the first occasion where they would have fought in a major encounter with that support.

Still, the victory that Lysander actually won at Notium was by no means stunning. The Athenian fleet remained, large, active, and formidable. When Lysander turned over the ships to the new admiral,

> he said to Callicratidas that he gave them over as master of the sea and victor of a naval battle. Callicratidas bade him sail from Ephesus along the left of Samos, where the ships of the Athenians were, to give over the ships to him in Miletus, and then he would agree as to his being master of the sea. But Lysander said that he would not be a busybody when another was in command . . . (I.vi.2-3)

This is only the first phase of the eclipse that Lysander's honor suffers in I.vi.

It would be hard to conceive a more classic protrait of a Spartan than the one Xenophon provides of Callicratidas in this chapter.[3] (Perhaps

[1] J. Hatzfeld, ed. and trans., *Helléniques* by Xenophon (Paris, 1936), I, note on I.v.7.

[2] Paul Pédech ("Batailles navales dans les historiens grecs," *Revue des Études Grecques* 82 [1969], 43-55) compares Xenophon's account with the accounts in Diodorus and in the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia" papyrus and finds the latter two more plausible especially in that they attribute to Antiochus a strategic intention which failed in its execution. But Xenophon supplies all the facts necessary to infer such an intention. Pédech fails to consider whether it was important to Xenophon's narrative that this be brought into the foreground. Cf. H.R. Breitenbach, "Die Seeschlacht bei Notion (407/06)," *Historia* 20 (1971), 152-171.

[3] Even his first directly quoted words reflect this: "I am content to stay at home" (ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρκεῖ οἴκοι μένειν, I.vi.5). Cf. *Lac.* xiv.2, 4; also Thucydides I.70.4.

partly for this reason, commentators have almost universally believed that Xenophon admired him greatly.[4]) Much of that portrait is formed through a point-by-point contrast with the character of Lysander.

We immediately discover that Lysander's boast was not an isolated outburst of deluded vanity, that he has concrete ambitions. He has established a following of "friends" who subvert Callicratidas' command,

> not only by serving him without enthusiasm (ἀπροθύμως), but also by noising it about in the cities that the Lacedaemonians very greatly erred in changing their admirals, often, in place of those who were becoming suitable and were just then coming to understand naval matters and to know well how to deal with human beings, sending out those who had no experience of the sea and were unknown to the people there, and that because of this they risked suffering some ill. (vi.4)[5]

But Callicratidas directly confronts Lysander's partisans and cows them with a thinly veiled threat to report them to the authorities in Sparta (vi.5). In a short speech to the Lacedaemonians present there, he stresses the obligation he is under to execute vigorously the commands given him by the city. He does not pretend that he does this simply because it is lawful or right; for he admits that his own motive is love of honor (πρὸς

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[4] Thus G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900), p. xxiv-v (oddly enough, in the context of proving that Xenophon's "partiality for Sparta" does not". . . warp his judgement and spoil his history, in this section at any rate . . ."):

> . . . Xenophon never has a word of praise for Lysander, although he was the victor at Aegospotami and the main cause of the downfall of Athens; and he evidently has a much greater admiration for the unsuccessful Callicratidas, between whose unselfish and patriotic behaviour and Lysander's meanness and ambition a tacit contrast is manifestly implied.

So also H.D. Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*," in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), p. 217:

> Xenophon shows warm admiration for Callicratidas, whose forthrightness, chivalry and impatience of subservience to Persia he found far more attractive than the shrewd realism of Lysander. . . .

W.E. Higgins, however, is a notable exception: *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany, N.Y., 1977), pp. 11-12, 105.

[5] Following the editors Dindorf, Schneider, and Brownson, I have adopted the emendation of Jacobs (ἀντ' ἐπιτηδείων). The addition of this simple and very plausible letter, together with the reading of εὖ for οὐ with Cobet, saves the whole passage from obscurity (both grammatically and in meaning) and renders it logical—although, as Underhill points out (n. *ad loc.*), there is still a conjunction wanting before κινδυνεύοιεν. Even without these emendations, however, the sense of the passage is roughly similar:

> . . . erred in changing their generals, since often unsuitable ones came who were just then learning naval matters and did not know how to deal with human beings, (and by) sending out those who had no experience of the sea and were unknown to the people there, they risked suffering some ill because of this.

ἃ ἐγώ τε φιλοτιμοῦμαι).[6] Nor does he seek to justify the city's practice of regularly changing commanders without regard to the advantages of experience. (Offering reasons, after all, immediately compromises the demands of obedience, for the reasons may not sound impressive in many circumstances, and they become open to critical examination.) It suffices that "the city" has sent him to command as admiral. His subordinates may challenge his authority, but only at the risk of incurring swift punishment from a city that was famous for enjoining strict obedience to all superior authorities. The reaction immediately following his speech is telling: "no one daring to say anything other than (that they should) obey those at home and do what he had come for . . ." (vi.6). By proclaiming his own obedience to lawful authority, Callicratidas thus enforces the adherence of his subordinates to this first of all Spartan virtues,[7] while Lysander's friends—and we may assume Lysander's complicity in this[8]—had attempted to subvert it. (In view of the importance of absolute obedience in the Spartan polity, perhaps Xenophon's calling it *factious* subversion—καταστασιαζόμενος, vi.4—is pointed.)

Callicratidas then goes to Cyrus' court to request money to pay his sailors, as Lysander had done. He can not, however, brook the indignity of having to wait for Cyrus and pay court to him as Lysander had done.

> But Callicratidas, vexed at being put off and angered by the continual attendance at Cyrus' gates, and saying that the Hellenes were most wretched in that they flatter barbarians for the sake of money . . . he sailed off to Miletus. (vi.7)

This proud indignation of Callicratidas is a luxury that the Spartans can little afford. Given what we have learned from Alcibiades and from the past fortunes of the Spartans, we suspect that such a posture could lead to Sparta's defeat in this war. Yet it is undoubtedly the only posture a Spartan could take and still be fully noble in the Spartan sense of the word. For

> . . . in Sparta Lycurgus forbade the free (men) from having contact with anything to do with money-making; but whatever provides freedom for cities—he ordered that they believe *these* to be their sole functions. (*Lac.* vii.2)

We begin to see that the Spartan failure (in *Hell.* I.i-iii) to use effectively the wealth available to them was the result not of discouragement or sim-

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[6] Cf. *Lac.* iv.

[7] *Lac.* ii.2, 10; iv.6; viii.1-5. Cf. *Mem.* IV.iv.15.

[8] Lysander's probable complicity is revealed only later and in a single detail, however: see the discussion (below) of Callicratidas' accusation against him in the speech to the Milesians. Otherwise the scheming for his reappointment appears to be the work of his admirers and beneficiaries.

ple ignorance but of a noble denial of the necessity of money and a noble ignorance of its uses. It remains to be seen whether or not Callicratidas' action will be detrimental to Sparta. After all, the foremost architect of the Athenian navy's successes is now gone.

Callicratidas cannot avoid altogether the need of money to supply his ships and pay his soldiers. To make good the loss of Cyrus' support, he has recourse to two other sources. First, he sends some ships off to Sparta for money (I.vi.8). As Underhill notes, "Xenophon nowhere relates the result of their mission."[9] Next, to provide money until those ships should return, he calls together the Milesians and "requests" it from them.[10] Their reaction to his brief speech is similar to the reaction of the Lacedaemonians to his first speech:

> When he said these things, many stood up—and especially the ones accused of opposing him, having become frightened—and proposed the funding of money, even declaring private pledges themselves. (vi.12)

This reaction is somewhat surprising, however, since Callicratidas' speech did not appear to contain any threats, either veiled or open, but rather an exhortation and a promise of gratitude. To understand the fear that it inspires, it is necessary to consider the implications of what he had said. And indeed, on closer inspection the speech proves to be a paradigm of that peculiar Spartan blend of high-minded self-deception and artless imposition.

The speech opens with a humble declaration of the necessity he is under "to obey the rulers at home;" but we have seen that this is in fact the source of his power. Since that principle should apply only to the Lacedaemonians under his command, however, Callicratidas must seek some other appeal to these Milesian allies. He finds it in their hatred or fear of an enemy; but, strangely, that enemy is not Athens:

> . . . you I expect to be most ready at heart (προθυμοτάτους) because, living among the barbarians, you have already suffered the most evils at their hands. (vi.8)[11]

He does not explicitly call the barbarians the enemy, though, and in the next breath urges the Milesians' active support in harming "the

[9] Underhill, note on I.vi.8.

[10] On Callicratidas' shift of his headquarters from Ephesus to Miletus, see P.A. Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement," Diss. Yale University 1977, p. 28; and Detlef Lotze, *Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964), p. 15.

[11] Hatzfeld observes here: "This can only refer to the capture of Miletus by the Persians in 494 [nearly 90 years earlier]. One might be surprised to see this disaster recalled at a moment when the Persians were supporting against Athens the efforts of Sparta and her allies . . . ."

enemy," meaning the Athenians. The remainder of this brief speech indicates that his arousing of animosity against the Persians is both spontaneous and calculated: spontaneous because he cannot brook the ignominy of courting their favor and the loss of independence that this implies on the part of the Greeks (vi.10, 11);[12] and calculated in that the Milesians are perhaps thus made less unwilling to pay for the war. Callicratidas promises gratitude and seems to promise repayment of whatever the Milesians contribute. To this end he mentions twice the money that he is expecting from Sparta. He also invokes the aid of the gods. We know, however, that the Milesians have had experience of harboring the Spartans when the latter were without constant support from the Persians: money never came from Sparta, and there had been danger that the unpaid sailors would turn to robbing their hosts.[13] There has already been a similar case in the *Hellenica*: the Spartans under Clearchus in Byzantium (I.iii.14-21). Perhaps this, too, helps to explain the response that this speech elicits.

Still, it does not explain why certain Milesians in particular, namely Lysander's friends, were *frightened*. What can explain that is Callicratidas' startling accusation of what amounts to treachery on Lysander's part: he had given back to Cyrus the money they had, "on the grounds that it was surplus" (I.vi.10). If this charge is true—it is characteristic of Xenophon to put into the mouth of someone else charges that are true but offensive to certain Spartans—it shows the lengths to which some Spartans can be driven in their "rivalry for virtue" (*Lac.* iv), or more correctly their rivalry for *honor*, for certainly in this case the rivalry has led to an action grossly contrary to the public good. Callicratidas does not present it as a punishable offense. But his contrasting assertion of his own obedience to "the rulers at home," together with the repeated mention of the ships that are on their way to Sparta, has the same effect as the similar statements in his earlier speech to the Lacedaemonian soldiers and officers. We have already seen in the *Hellenica* a foreigner on trial in Sparta for his life for betraying the Spartan cause (I.iii.19). The present reaction of these Milesians to Callicratidas' speech reveals even more the stern authority that Sparta as a city exercised over her allies almost as much as over her own citizens. The speech as a whole also reveals what must inevitably happen if help from the King is rejected: Callicratidas gives it a noble and hopeful face,

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[12] Callicratidas' speech concludes as follows: "But with the gods let us show the barbarians that even without being in awe (θαυμάζειν) of them we are able to revenge ourselves upon our enemies." Cf. n. 32 below.

[13] Thucydides VIII.57, 83, 99.

but it can only mean in effect that the allies must be squeezed, that Sparta's "leadership" of them must be more oppressive.

To this very unlaconic commentary on a laconic speech we add a final note: There is some irony in the fact that, although not technically, Callicratidas is in effect disobeying the ruling authorities in Sparta. For the latter had long sought and finally won an alliance with the Persian King in order to obtain his financial support, and now, in one stroke, Callicratidas has of his own will not merely threatened to use his influence in Sparta to break that alliance (I.vi.7) but actually begun to use his temporary power to break it. The deeper irony in this is that, in doing so, Callicratidas is being truer to Spartan principles than the rulers of Sparta themselves. The necessities of a large-scale, non-hoplite war have forced something un-Spartan upon Sparta.

When Lysander obtained an increase in support from Cyrus, we recall, the sailors were given not only their back pay but also a month's advance, "so as to make the soldiery much readier at heart" (I.v.7). Now that Callicratidas has refused to court that support and has obtained money from the allied Milesians and Chians instead, he is either unable or unwilling to give the sailors more than a single payment of five drachmae, equivalent roughly to a week's pay, "for expenses *en route* (ἐφοδιασάμενος, I.vi.12)—the word for "pay" is not used in this passage. No reaction from the sailors is mentioned. And instead of having or taking the time to organize, equip, and attend to repairs for the fleet (cf. I.v.10), Callicratidas either chooses or is compelled (or some of both) to sail immediately against a city allied to the Athenians, storm it, take it by main force, and allow the soldiers to plunder "all the wealth" (I.vi.12-14). The specified ambiguities are perhaps intentional on Xenophon's part. As usual, he narrates one thing after another without comment, leaving it to the reader to draw the connection between them. But it is clear that Callicratidas' want of ample funds compels him to wage war vigorously and with a constant eye to extracting money either by force or by threats from unwilling donors, much as Alcibiades and the Athenians have been compelled to do.[14] Callicratidas himself seems to have understood this in speaking to the Milesians: *because* (ἐπεί) they no longer have money from Cyrus

> it is necessary for you to take the lead among the other allies so that we might harm the enemy as quickly and as much as possible until the men come from Lacedaemon whom I sent to bring money. (vi.9-10)

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[14] Again, Alcibiades' statement of this principle to his troops at Cyzicus follows his failure to get money from Tissaphernes (I.i.9-14). Cf. *Cyr.* I.vi.9-10. See also *Lac.* xii.5 and the note thereon by F. Ollier, ed., *La République des Lacédémoniens* by Xenophon (Lyon, 1934), p. 64.

On the other hand, waging war at the enemy's expense is to the Spartans, especially, the noblest means of supporting oneself.[15]

Upon capturing their city, however, Callicratidas makes a display of treating the Methymnians with the dignity that he claims is due to all Hellenes. First he orders that all the captives, presumably including all the citizens of Methymna,[16] be brought into the agora; then,

> when the allies demanded that he put up for sale even the Methymnians, he said that, at least while *he* was in command, not one Hellene, insofar as it was in his power, would be sold into slavery. (vi.14)

Callicratidas thus consistently, almost single-mindedly asserts that the difference between Hellenes and barbarians is more important than the

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[15] *Hell.* V.i.17; *Ages.* i.8; cf. *Lac.* ii.6-9; also *Cyr.* III.iii.16 and *Oec.* xi.8.

[16] There is some uncertainty as to how this passage is to be read. Schneider (ed., *Opera Quae Extant* by Xenophon [Oxford, 1810], note *ad loc.*) seems to argue that the first use of the term ἀνδράποδα does not mean "captives," i.e. does *not* include the Methymnian citizens, whom we might expect to have temporarily been made prisoners also, but refers to all the *slaves* of the city, both free-born and slave-born; and that when Callicratidas subsequently sells into slavery τὰ ἀνδράποδα τὰ δοῦλα, Xenophon is referring to the slaves who were slave-born—the ἐλευθέρους who were released being the free-born slaves. This interpretation has the advantage of translating consistently the more common meaning of ἀνδράποδον. And the proximity of the directly related verb ἀνδραποδισθῆναι, "to be sold into slavery," seems also to argue for this meaning here.

On the other hand, ἀνδράποδα in Greek occasionally appears to refer to all human beings taken captive when a city is taken by an enemy, this in fact being how free citizens become slaves (ἀνδράποδα) if such is the will of the enemy. F.G. Sturz's interpretation (*Lexicon Xenophonteum* [Leipzig, 1801], s.v. ἀνδράποδον) of τὰ ἀνδράποδα τὰ δοῦλα as referring to *all* those who had previously been slaves in the city is therefore made very plausible by B. Büchsenschütz's citation (ed., *Griechische Geschichte* by Xenophon, 7th ed. [Leipzig, 1908], note on I.vi.14) of Thucydides VIII.28. (There Thucydides speaks of τὰ ἀνδράποδα πάντα καὶ δοῦλα καὶ ἐλεύθερα, τὰ ἀνδράποδα evidently meaning everyone in the city, "*captivi*" according to Bétant's *Lexicon Thucydideum*, the commentators Poppo [who quotes Bloomfield: *Quae rarior vis est huius vocis*] and Bohme ["*die kriegsgefangenen Bewohner* wurden als Sklaven betrachtet..."], E. Kretschmer [*Glotta* 18 (1929), p. 76—who, however, is not precise enough in saying that the word apparently refers also to "*den Freien*"], and the translator Hobbes. Although both Thucydides and Xenophon could have used one of the more usual words for "captives," αἰχμαλῶτοι, as in *Hell.* I.ii.13, or ζωγρηθέντες—both words are later used in II.i.31—the use of the word ἀνδράποδα as a form of prolepsis is more suggestive.) τοὺς ἐλευθέρους would, then, include only the Methymnian citizens, *not* the free-born slaves.

I have followed the latter interpretation, since it seems to fit better the sense of the passage. I would also venture to suggest, although tentatively, that Xenophon perhaps *intended* this confusing ambiguity of the word in order to raise in an oblique, subtle way the question, Who is truly and justly a slave? in the very context where Callicratidas raises the same question in a direct, emphatic way. Xenophon's play on the meaning of ἀνδράποδον might thus call our attention to the fact that Callicratidas soon ("the next day") forgets or ignores his more 'principled' distinction between free Greeks and slavish barbarians and reinforces the actual practice of most Greeks whereby free-born men and women become first captives or prisoners (ἀνδράποδα) of an enemy, are then sold into slavery (ἀνδραποδισθῆναι), thereby becoming permanently slaves (ἀνδράποδα).

divisions among the Hellenes.[17] This will become a much-mouthed theme in a work whose title, after all (whether Xenophon's or not), immediately raises the question of that difference. In the present passage, however, we note that Sparta's allies demand the enslavement of these particular Greeks, the Methymnians. This incident alone, then, seems to show that the freedom of all Greeks is a belief not of all Greeks but only of some Greeks. It will prove to be most characteristic of *Spartan* rhetoric.

It has often been noticed that Callicratidas' consistency immediately breaks down when, after releasing the free-born Methymnians,[18] he sells into slavery not only those who had been slaves before but also the Athenian soldiers who had been garrisoned there (vi.5). Among those who do accept the irony of the passage without trying to emend the text or devise ingenious explanations for it,[19] Büchsenschütz offers the most balanced interpretation:

> . . . evidently by ἀνδραποδισθῆναι the Athenians' frequent, severe practice of selling the population of entire cities into slavery is meant; whereas it was common practice to regard as slaves enemies taken with weapons in hand, a practice from which Callicratidas could have departed only to the detriment of his own country.[20]

One cannot simply and consistently advocate collective Hellenic opposition to non-Hellenes when Hellas is at war with itself.[21]

Having met with success in this first exploit by land, Callicratidas makes a boast that seems similar to the boast of Lysander, which he himself had deflated: "he sent word to Conon that he would put an end to his adulterous affair with the sea" (vi.15).[22] For the sea is thus "claimed by Callicratidas as his . . . bride."[23]

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[17] The primary rift within the Hellenic world is alluded to here by the use of the word ἀττικιζόντων, "atticizing" (I.vi.13).

[18] Or, according to the interpretation of Schneider (see above, n. 16), those who had been slaves in Methymna but were originally free-born.

[19] L.F. Herbst (*Die Schlacht bei den Arginusen* [Hamburg, 1855], p. 20 n. 30), for example, claims that the Athenian garrison must have been composed of Athenian slaves or alien residents (μέτοικοι). See n. 16 above.

[20] Büchsenschütz, *ad loc.*

[21] Yet why sell them into slavery? Earlier, the Athenians had sent Syracusan captives to Athens to be kept in "prison" (I.ii.13), and they appear to have done the same with the Lacedaemonian, Boeotian, and Megarian soldiers taken in Byzantium (I.iii.21-22). But perhaps it is significant that in the first instance the prisoners all escaped shortly thereafter (I.ii.14), and in the second the Boeotian commander escaped even before his imprisonment in Athens.

[22] Higgins translates: ". . . fornicating the sea" and calls this "quite simply the most startling image in the entire corpus of Xenophon . . ." (p. 11). One might therefore say that the remark is un-Xenophontic and thus an indication that Callicratidas was not a man after Xenophon's heart.

[23] J. Irving Manatt, ed., *Hellenica* by Xenophon (Boston, 1897), *ad loc.*, following George Grote, *A History of Greece* (London, 1888), VI, 389.

By virtue of his vastly superior numbers, and perhaps also by virtue of the absence of Alcibiades, Callicratidas is able to make good on this boast momentarily. He chases Conon into the port of Mytilene and there deprives him of thirty ships.[24] When Conon retreats into the city, Callicratidas is able to hold him in siege by land also, with the help of the Methymnians, whom he sends for *en masse* (πανδημεί, vi.18). (This might be Xenophon's way of supplying an ulterior—though not unseemly—motive for his having spared them earlier.) It is at this point that he scores what must have been for him personally a most pleasing victory, although Xenophon's wry, understating style makes it go almost unnoticed: ". . . and money came to him from Cyrus." Whether in the interests of the Persians in general or himself in particular, Cyrus evidently wishes to retain the good will of the Spartans. Now that Callicratidas seems to be demonstrating his ability to wage war without barbarian aid, Cyrus appears willing to settle for gratitude from independent Greeks rather than have none at all.

Either these successes inspire in Callicratidas an imprudent contempt for the enemy, however, or as a commander he is simply not sufficiently diligent and watchful. More canny as a strategist, Conon works upon the human inclination to become incautious through confidence, and seizes upon the moment when Callicratidas and his men have begun to relax and regard the enemy belittlingly (ὀλιγώρως εἶχον) to attempt an escape of two ships to bring word of his plight to Athens, one of which succeeds (vi.19-22). Had this not happened, Callicratidas would soon have destroyed the entire fleet, leaving the Athenians in great despondency and himself free to employ his whole fleet against Athens itself. Instead, the Athenian response is astonishing: within thirty days they prepare and man 110 ships, "putting on board all those of age both slave and free; . . . and many of the Knights also boarded." By the time they reach the Arginusae, they have accumulated a total of more than 150 ships (vi. 24-25).

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[24] Herbst does us the service, in a very long footnote (n. 31, pp. 21-23), of showing how Xenophon's very sketchy account of this battle is nevertheless consistent with the much longer account by Diodorus. But he does so to demonstrate that Xenophon made poor historiographic use of good sources of information. Certainly Herbst intended his very rhetorical conclusion to be very insulting of Xenophon; but, ironically, Herbst's own words (omitting "injudiciously") can be understood quite differently if one keep in mind the simple question: Did Xenophon have any *intention* of writing "history" (as Herbst understands the word)? Perhaps Xenophon narrated only what he considered significant without having any desire to narrate a particular naval battle merely for its own sake or to satisfy the antiquarian curiosity of scholars some twenty-two centuries later.

Callicratidas, leaving 50 ships with Eteonicus to guard against Conon's 28, goes out to meet the Athenians with 120. He loses the element of surprise when a heavy thunderstorm prevents his preparing by night for an attack at dawn. Thus Xenophon describes at some length the ordering of the lines on both sides for a set battle. The Athenians' order takes ingenious advantage of their location, and thereby compensates for the fact that the Spartan ships, though outnumbered, sail better at this time and so could out-maneuver theirs. At this point

> Hermon the Megarian, who was piloting for Callicratidas, said to him that it were well to sail away; for the triremes of the Athenians were more numerous by far. (vi.32)

We have observed the importance of Lysander's choosing not to fight a pitched battle against Alcibiades in the previous chapter, where Xenophon gives precisely *this* as Lysander's reason, "because he was outnumbered by many ships" (I.v.15). Later, advice of a similar tenor will be given by Alcibiades himself to the Athenian generals at Aegospotami (II.i.25)—advice that, had it been taken, would have saved the fleet from that total disaster.

> But Callicratidas said that Sparta would manage none the worse if he were to die, and to flee (φεύγειν), he said, was shameful. (I.vi.32)

"The better part of valor is discretion"; for Callicratidas, however, the matter is decided by the fact that those fine words could be used by a Falstaff.[25]

A long battle ensues, until at last, as one commentator writes, Callicratidas "meets a fate ironically befitting a Spartan—drowning."[26] In fact, the word Xenophon uses is even more striking and more ironic: ". . . falling into the sea he disappeared" (ἠφανίσθη, vi.33). And the consequence of his death heightens still more the tragic irony: ". . . then began a flight (φυγή) of the Peloponnesians" in opposite directions. In all, the Athenians lost twenty-five ships, the "Peloponnesians" more than seventy.[27] (Xenophon adds pointedly but without emphasis that "[only] nine of these were Laconian," the Spartans having contributed but ten ships to the whole fleet.)

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[25] 1 *Henry IV*, V.4.119. Lotze repeatedly calls Callicratidas a "daredevil" and refers to this engagement in particular as *ein Draufgängertum*, yet recognizes that it comes "out of a traditional sense of honor" (*Lysander*, pp. 25-26).

[26] Higgins, p. 12.

[27] Herbst discusses well the strategic circumstances and consequences of this battle (pp. 33-34 and 38-40) and thus shows the imprudence of Callicratidas' decision to fight when and where he did. And earlier Herbst had implicity praised Lysander's decision not to accept Alcibiades' challenge following the battle at Notium (p. 9). Yet he does not see any intention by Xenophon to draw this contrast. So also Lotze, *Lysander*, pp. 17, 22-23, 26.

What is left of the fleet is salvaged only because Eteonicus is more compromising with respect to the noble and the base. He employs a ruse to save face and even offers a false thanksgiving sacrifice to that end, but when Xenophon refers summarily to the removal from Mytilene to Chios, he writes: ". . . they had run away" (vi.38). The sequel to the battle is thus in stark contrast to its beginning. But the fleet has been salvaged.

From the first word to the last, I.vii appears to be a digression from the narrative of the war. Xenophon resumes that narrative in II.i almost exactly where it was left at the end of I.vi, with a description of Eteonicus' plight in Chios. His problem is painfully simple: Callicratidas had sent to Sparta for money but none had come. After the first disaster at Cyzicus the Spartans appeared ready to abandon naval warfare, and so now they are probably all the more so disposed. Some money had come from Cyrus, but we were not told how much, nor was any subsequent support either promised or sent. Callicratidas had also compelled the allies, specifically the Milesians and Chians, to contribute money on the promise that he would repay them when the money should come from Sparta. Now, therefore, when no one will believe that money will be forthcoming from Sparta and Eteonicus is perhaps too ashamed to ask Cyrus for it, he is sorely pressed for sustenance through the winter months. Alcibiades had supported his troops through a winter in Lampsacus by making plundering raids against the King's country (I.ii.15-17), but such raids would be both unjust and impolitic in the extreme for the Spartans. When a large number of his troops conspire secretly to attack the city of Chios, Eteonicus has enough resourcefulness to prevent it.[28] But his only recourse to prevent further rebellion is to appeal to the Chians' fear to make them contribute money once again (II.i.1-5).

We may assume at this stage that the allies are hardly zealous in the Spartan cause, even though Eteonicus' stratagem averted an even worse situation. On the whole, his predicament appears to be directly comparable to the situation of Clearchus in Byzantium in I.iii. Little wonder, then, that the talents of Lysander are once again desired (II.i.6). Lysander was "well regarded among the allies for his former command

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[28] G. Colin (*Xénophon historien d'après le livre II des Helléniques [hiver 406-405 à 401-0]* [Paris, 1933], pp. 9 and 10-11) finds no significance in this episode, the very first he examines in his critical study of Xenophon's historiography. From such a beginning, his conclusions (pp. 105 ff.) are predictable. (Colin even fails to understand that the one slain by Eteonicus was not a soldier but some unlucky passer-by who happened to be using a cane as a mobility device.)

as admiral, when he also won the naval battle at Notium." But the "also" (καί) is telling: the victory was an additional reason, not the primary one. The fact that the allies' request for Lysander follows directly upon their being heavily taxed by Eteonicus indicates that what they do *not* want is another Callicratidas, who taxed them similarly. Their high regard for Lysander is especially for his financial virtue: getting money instead from Cyrus, he had not squeezed it out of the allies.

In view of this, it is somewhat surprising that in the next sentence we find Cyrus himself sending messengers to Sparta "saying the same things" as the ambassadors from the allies (II.i.7). Cyrus appears eager to spend his money. Yet when Lysander subsequently goes to him asking for money,

> Cyrus told him that the money from the King had been spent, and even much more, showing him how much each of the admirals had obtained; all the same he gave it to him. (II.i.11)

We are reminded of the time when Cyrus first came to Sardis: his extravagant, ostentatious promises to Lysander and the Spartan ambassadors were followed first by pleas that he could spend no more than the King's stipulations allowed, and then by a generous compromise (I.v.2-7). We observe now that Cyrus' manner was calculated for something more than to drive a hard bargain. It makes the extra donation appear unambiguously to be from Cyrus' own generosity rather than the King's. So also in the present passage. Moreover, when he is sent for by his father the King, Cyrus sends for Lysander and practically invites him to build a much larger fleet at his expense:

> When Lysander came Cyrus forbade him from fighting the Athenians at sea unless he should have many more ships; for there was much money both of the King's and of his own, so that (he could) on that account fill many ships. And he assigned to him all the tributes from the cities, which belonged to him privately (οἳ αὐτῷ ἴδιοι ἦσαν), and gave him what money he had left over; and reminding him of the friendship he bore both toward the city of the Lacedaemonians and toward Lysander privately, he went inland to his father. (II.i.14)

It is questionable, however, whether Cyrus is unambiguously a friend to "the city of the Lacedaemonians" as a whole. Not only had he been less than receptive to Callicratidas. (We are not told that he put off Lysander in the same way on any of the three visits described by Xenophon.) He also was less than prompt in aiding the Spartans after their defeat at the Arginusae, when Eteonicus was in such dire straits. This latter negligence would not stand out were it not for the example of Pharnabazus after the defeat at Cyzicus (I.i.24-25). The friendship with

Lysander is another matter. Not only are we left to wonder whether Lysander, in returning the "surplus" money to Cyrus after his former command (I.vi.10), had asked for and (in I.vi.6 and II.i.7) received Cyrus' cooperation to get him re-appointed. For Cyrus' partiality to Lysander might be explained simply by supposing that Cyrus saw in him a commander who might succeed where others drained the King's wealth without accomplishing anything. But in II.i.15 Xenophon, seeming merely to repeat what he has just said (quoted above), indicates that the friendship between them is much stronger than that: "Lysander, when Cyrus had given over to him all of his own possessions (πάντα παραδοὺς τὰ αὑτοῦ) . . ."—to a *Greek* rather than one of his own men![29]

In so generously supporting the Spartans with his own money, Cyrus is evidently judicious enough to give it particularly to one he can trust to be grateful. Cyrus will indeed seek a return of these favors—this being in fact the first thing that occurs in Book III (at a time when Lysander must still carry considerable influence in the city).[30] Callicratidas' sort could not be relied upon to be especially grateful for gifts of money, and certainly not from a barbarian, even if the gifts be very large.[31] But we have already seen the extreme ambition that burns in Lysander as well as his appreciation of the advantages that money can bring.

In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon's Socrates relates to Critoboulus an anecdote concerning one of these visits of Lysander to Cyrus at Sardis. According to the story Lysander, who allegedly told the story himself to a fellow Greek, was awed by the pleasure gardens he was shown and admired and praised Cyrus for his personal care of them.[32] Leo Strauss has interpreted the passage (in part) as follows:

> One reason why Lysander was so profoundly impressed by Cyrus' agricultural work was that, in Sparta, Lykurgos had forbidden free men to make money in any manner and in particular by farming. [Footnote: *Resp. Lac.* 7.1-3. Cf. Plato, *Republic* 547c6-d9.] While the authority of original Sparta or of Sparta as a city spoke against money-making in any form, . . . the greatest living Spartan seemed to have shown profound respect for the practice of farming, at least on one outstanding occasion.[33]

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[29] "Such an occurrence is without parallel in the annals of Greco-Persian relations before this time . . ." (Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* [Ithaca, N.Y., 1979], p. 39).

[30] Some doubt has been raised whether II.i.8-9 is by Xenophon or whether it is the interpolation of a later hand. If it be genuine, it provides a more immediate hint of what Cyrus' designs are. See Rahe, pp. 5-7.

[31] Cf. *Lac.* vii.4.

[32] *Oec.* iv.20-25. Note the emphasis there on Lysander's "being in awe" (ἐθαύμαζεν, θαυμάζων, θαυμάζω, θαυμάζεις) and cf. n. 12 above.

[33] *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1970), p. 119.

In light of these observations, Xenophon's mention of the status of Lysander's reappointment becomes more interesting. When the allies and Cyrus sent ambassadors and messengers to Sparta explaining their circumstances and requesting that Lysander be sent out,

> the Lacedaemonians gave them Lysander as vice-admiral, but as admiral, Aracus; for with them it is not lawful for the same man to be admiral twice; nevertheless, they turned the ships over to Lysander. (II.i.7)

With Lysander's increasing power and prestige, Spartan law as a whole may be suffering something much more serious than this *de facto* breach of a particular law.

Taking the money that Cyrus gave him, Lysander gives the troops their pay (i.15). Yet, even though he is not driven by the necessity that compelled Callicratidas to turn to plundering enemy cities, Lysander nevertheless sails immediately against a city allied to the Athenians, storms it, takes it by main force, and sells all the inhabitants into slavery. After proceeding to the Hellespont, he sails against another city allied to Athens, this time with the assistance of a land army from Sparta's Hellespontine allies; together they storm the city, take it by main force, and the soldiers plunder extensively, it being a wealthy and abundantly supplied city (i.18-19). Several reasons could be cited for this vigorous activity. Perhaps Lysander wishes to inspire confidence and zeal in his troops after their recent defeat, as Conon had done after the battle at Notium (I.v.20). And the motives for attacking Kedreia and Lampsacus in particular may be that the former was a port in the Ceramic Gulf of Caria, where Alcibiades had previously obtained a large sum of money (I.iv.8), and the latter was an important Athenian stronghold in the Hellespont, the area of great strategic importance now dominated by the Athenians. (Thus Xenophon states in II.i.17 that "Lysander sailed out from Rhodes along Ionia toward the Hellespont both with a view to [stopping] the sailing out of the cargo boats and against the cities that had revolted from them.") But what is striking is the mere fact of this activity, striking especially by comparison with Lysander's "keeping quiet" (ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν) in I.v.10. The underlying difference between the present passage and the earlier one may be simply the absence here of Alcibiades.

Notable also is Lysander's "policy" regarding the treatment of captives. Although in other respects the circumstances and even the wording of these passages on the capture of Kedreia and Lampsacus are reminiscent of the description of Callicratidas' taking Methymna by storm, Lysander does not say anything respecting the question of enslaving Hellenes, and in fact his actions show some indifference to the moral

stand voiced loudly by Callicratidas. It is Xenophon as narrator who informs us that the Kedreians enslaved by Lysander were part Greek, part barbarian (μιξοβάρβαροι), as if apologizing for Lysander's action. If Lysander had been as conscientiously phil-Hellenic as Callicratidas, however, he would have made some attempt to distinguish and spare the residents who were Hellenes. The apology is dubious. Next, in Lampsacus, "Lysander released all the free bodies (σώματα)." (There appears to be a pun here on his name, which could mean either 'man-releaser' or 'man-breaker.') Here, as above, we might discern strategic motives for the act, perhaps one similar to an ulterior motive we suspected in the case of Callicratidas in Methymna; for Lampsacus, unlike Kedreia, is in the strategically central Hellespont, surrounded by other Greek cities. Or perhaps, wishing to remain in Lampsacus as a well-supplied base (thus II.i.25, the observation of Alcibiades), Lysander does not want to have to guard over slaves who will seize the nearest opportunity to revolt. It may also be that Lysander acts on the same principle as did Callicratidas. But all of this is left merely to our conjecture. What is significant is that Lysander once again says nothing, that he appears not to be a moralizer in such matters.[34] Xenophon adds to this impression by omitting any reference to Hellenes and by instead making a rather unusual use of the word "bodies," which effectively obscures racial or political distinctions.[35]

The contrast between the two Spartan commanders reaches its culmination, however, in the preparation and execution of the battle at Aegospotami. While showing vigor in attacking Kedreia and Lampsacus, Lysander seems at the same time to be avoiding a direct confrontation with the Athenian fleet. In between the accounts of the attacks against Kedreia and Lampsacus, Xenophon shifts his narrative very briefly to report on enemy activity:

> The Athenians, setting out from their base in Samos, were harrying the King's lands, were sailing against Chios and Ephesus, and were preparing for a naval battle. (i.16)

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[34] Higgins (p.11) interprets Callicratidas' declaration, moreover, as boastful moralizing, citing the self-exalting ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος ("at least while *he* was in command") and εἰς τὸ κείνου δυνατόν ("insofar as it was in *his* power") in I.vi.14. For other contrasts between the actions of Lysander and those of Callicratidas, see Rahe, pp. 79-80.

[35] Sturz (s.v. σῶμα, par. 3) lists this among several other Xenophontic usages of the word with apparently equivalent meanings. But this is the only example which completely lacks an accompanying possessive genitive. The odd sound of this example is evident if one simply translate all of Sturz's examples literally into English. One might argue that there is an abbreviation of expression in this passage, comparing the sentence as a whole with *Cyr.* VII.v.73. But, in abbreviating, would a student of Socrates make such a blunder as to imply, unless in jest or attributing the unreflective view to another (or some of both), that *freedom* is inherent somehow in the body rather than in the soul?

To get from Kedreia and Rhodes to the Hellespont, especially by sailing "along Ionia," Lysander must nearly have passed before their very eyes. The Athenians set sail northward, apparently in pursuit. The next we hear of them, after Lysander's capture of Lampsacus, the Athenians are sailing "at his heels" (i.20). Since the Athenians had been "preparing for a naval battle," Lysander almost seems to be fleeing from them,[36]—yet since his "flight" was into the *Hellespont*, their aggressive pursuit must have become driven instead by high anxiety.[37] Xenophon's matter-of-fact, undramatic narrative here conceals a drama of epic proportions, thus reflecting faithfully the strategic style of Lysander as opposed to that of Callicratidas. The latter, though wholly inexperienced as an admiral, announced bombastically that he would teach the Athenian Conon a good naval lesson, gave hot chase, and appeared to succeed. But this initial success was gained primarily by virtue of his *immense* numerical superiority (170 to 70) of ships. When with similar boldness he set out without hesitation against superior Athenian numbers and then, having lost the advantage of surprise, met them with proud courage in a pitched battle, he thereby brought on a grave defeat for the Spartan confederacy. Lysander's first move, once the Athenians have arrived at the coast of the Hellespont opposite him, is to make all preparations "as if for battle" and draw his ships up in strict order (τάξεως). The Athenians order their ships (παρετάξαντο) in line facing his (II.i.21-23). Everyone therefore expects a pitched battle immediately. But Lysander is more circumspect, more cunning, and less pretentiously bold than Callicratidas. His masterful execution of strategy in what follows argues all the more strongly that it was his *intent* to have the Athenians "chase" him into the Hellespont, into just some situation as this. Each day, for five days, he refuses to do battle, even though each day the formations are drawn up on each side, as at the Arginusae. The Athenians therefore become both more desperate and more contemptuous of him. Even Alcibiades' eminently prudent advice does not suffice to make them more careful. Perhaps partly from seeing Lysander's apparent fear, the generals now consider themselves to be Alcibiades' equals (i.25-26). With patient

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[36] Every other use (five) of this phrase (κατὰ πόδας) in Xenophon's writings, according to the list in Sturz's lexicon (s.v. πούς), refers explicitly to hunting-dogs chasing rabbits.

[37] W.P. Henry observes that the storming of Lampsacus "compelled the Athenians to defend their interests in that region . . ." (*Greek Historical Writing* [Chicago, 1967], pp. 10-11). This is also by far the most sound and useful point of C. Ehrhardt's "Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami," *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 225-228. Ehrhardt notices that Xenophon's account gives greater attention to Lysander's actions and intentions than to the Athenians'. But he fails to consider any possible *purpose* behind either Xenophon's or Diodorus' writing and is too hasty in understanding all the differences between the two accounts as being contradictions.

waiting on Lysander's part and strict control of his ships,[38] their contemptuous relaxing of caution soon provides the opportunity for him once again to fight a battle where there is all order on his side, all disorder among the Athenians (as in I.v.12-14). One can scarcely speak of it as a battle at all. Lysander makes what would have been a naval battle into a land battle—"Thorax with the infantry went along"—and even on the land the ships are simply "taken" and the men for the most part "herded together" (συνέλεξεν, II.i.27-28). At the Arginusae the fight had lasted "a long time" (I.vi.33).

Xenophon sharpens still more the irony of this whole passage by including several striking though minor details: 1) Lysander has the protective screens drawn shut on the sides of his ships; 2) he selects "the swiftest" of his ships for a special mission; 3) his men sit in the ships all day long, without stirring, for four days; 4) it is on "the fifth day," when the enemy has become increasingly contemptuous and disordered, that he makes his move; and 5) he attacks when the enemy soldiers are preoccupied with their stomachs. These were the very measures taken earlier by Conon (the 'adulterer') to outwit Callicratidas (I.vi.19-21)![39]

Finally, we observe that there is one detail *missing*. In the narratives of the naval battles at Cyzicus, Mytilene, and the Arginusae, either we are directly told or we do not have far to look to find the exact number of ships on each side.[40] And in II.i.14 Cyrus specifically forbade Lysander to encounter the Athenians in battle "unless he should have more ships by far." Yet in this all-decisive battle we are not told and cannot reckon whether Lysander has this advantage.[41] We *are* told that the *Athenians* have the very large number of 180 (II.i.20).

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[38] His command "that no one move from his ordered position (τάξεως) nor put out" (II.i.22) reminds of Alcibiades' strict warning in I.i.15.

[39] No one has been able to conceive how the παραβλήματα ("protective screens") mentioned here (II.i.22) could have differed in function from the παραρύματα on Conon's ships (I.vi.19). Neither word occurs anywhere else in Xenophon's writings. A conjecture: this is a classic instance of what Higgins describes as Xenophon's desire "always and everywhere to call a thing by its exact name" (p. 4), and that on Athenian ships they were called παραρύματα, on Lacedaemonian ships παραβλήματα. Sturz's conjecture about Conon's purpose in drawing them shut—". . . so as to convince the enemy that he was going to fight" (s.v. παραρρύματα)—comes near the mark in Lysander's case. Conon more probably did this with his two ships to conceal the cause of their resting low in the water (this needing to be maintained each day during daylight hours so as to prevent a tell-tale change on the fifth day).

[40] Xenophon's painstaking precision in regard to numbers in I-II.iii.10 has attracted the attention of many scholars. Henry appears to be the only one to have noticed "a suspicious character" to this precision (pp. 24-25).

[41] In I.vi.16 and 26 Callicratidas has a total of 170 ships; more than 69 of these are lost at the Arginusae (I.vi.34), leaving about 100 under Eteonicus. In II.i.10 no numbers at all are given: ". . . Lysander, coming to Ephesus, summoned Eteonicus from Chios with the ships, and gathered together all the others, if there were any anywhere . . . and

We recall that Lysander had earlier, following the battle at Notium, refused to accept Alcibiades' challenge "because he was outnumbered by many ships" (I.v.15). But we now observe in retrospect not only that exact figures for the number of Athenian ships there are hard to come by, but that indeed Lysander was probably *not* "outnumbered by many ships."[42] Moreover, we cannot determine it precisely, but Xenophon's account of the preceding battle even insinuates—or rather neglects to preclude, by means of a simple insertion, our inferring—that the numbers on both sides in that battle against Antiochus must have been even *less* in Lysander's favor.[43] One cannot draw certain conclusions from what can at best be called innuendo. But it remains true that, while Xenophon has otherwise been generous with precise numbers, in both cases where numbers have been asserted to be of decisive importance he has conspicuously failed to provide them. Numbers are not decisive.

Let us now review the course of Lysander's reactions to Antiochus' and Alcibiades' challenges. At I.v.13 Lysander may or may not know whether Alcibiades is present or near by,[44] but he does see that Antiochus' first reinforcements are coming up helter-skelter; "then, accordingly, having put in order (συντάξας) now all of his ships, he sailed against them." After the remaining Athenian ships come out from Notium in similar disarray, "they fought—on the one side in order (ἐν τάξει), but the Athenians with their ships scattered, until they fled, having lost fifteen ships." But when Alcibiades returns, sets out with all the (remaining) ships for the harbor of Ephesus, "and put them in order (παρέταξεν) before the mouth of the harbor, should someone wish to fight," Lysander does not accept the challenge "because he was outnumbered by many ships." This last addition now appears to have been

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began having others built in Antandrus." But this is the last we hear in this regard until some time *after* the battle at Aegospotami: in II.ii.5 Lysander leaves the Hellespont with 200 ships. It is quite possible, perhaps likely, that he had that many at the time of the battle. (It is also possible that he later took over and manned some of those taken from the Athenians, but he would not have needed them at this point; besides, cf. II.iii.8.) The point here is that Xenophon forbore noting the fact in that passage.

[42] Alcibiades started out from Athens with 100 ships (I.iv.21) and seems to have left 20 at Andros (v.18). In the battle itself the Athenians lose 15 ships (v.14). It may be that Alcibiades brought some or all of Thrasybulus' 30 ships (iv.9) with him on returning to Samos, although Xenophon does not indicate this (Busolt's inference [quoted by Lotze, p. 22 n. 1] from Lysander's excuse begs the question, as Lotze perceives.) Therefore Alcibiades probably had between 65 and 95 ships to Lysander's 90—i.e. it is unlikely that Lysander was even outnumbered, much less "by many ships." Cf. Herbst, pp. 6-9.

[43] Xenophon's saying that he left Antiochus in charge of "*the* ships" (I.v.11) suggests—although it *only* suggests—that he left him with all or most of them. (Cf. n. 42 above.)

[44] Diodorus relates that he does (XIII.71.3). Xenophon is silent.

a face-saving and rather implausible excuse for a decision based instead on his appreciation of the power of order and on his reluctance to fight wherever he should not have the full advantage of order against the enemies' disorder.[45] That decision was most prudent, as we have observed, but could not appear honorable among Spartans.[46]

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[45] Cf. *Cyr.* I.vi.35-37; Lotze, p. 17.

[46] It should be observed that, in attempting at first to catch the Athenians unawares at the Arginusae, Callicratidas does show an inclination to use certain forms of deception in war. The Spartans were, after all, taught to steal (*Lac.* ii.6-9). But once confronted squarely by the enemy, to appear the coward and to win a battle or avoid a loss by *shunning* an "honest" fight is quite another matter. Cf. Cicero's *Offices* I.30.

The difference between them is still more visible if we compare Lysander's general strategy with the actions of Alcibiades. For the latter surprised his enemies by appearing suddenly as if out of nowhere (and even strange, fortuitous changes in the weather assist him in this on occasion: I.i.16). Cf. Thucydides III.30. Lysander's is a more calculated, organized, patiently awaited, and safe form of surprise: he takes the time to *prepare* the enemy to be surprised.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR (*HELLENICA* II.i.29-iii.9)

We note again Underhill's observation that "Xenophon never has a word of praise for Lysander, although he was the victor at Aegospotami and the main cause of the downfall of Athens . . ." This silence is justified, according to Underhill, by "Lysander's meanness and ambition" as contrasted tacitly with Callicratidas' "unselfish and patriotic behaviour."[1] This interpretation is open to several difficulties, notably that ambition is not necessarily worthy of blame and that Callicratidas himself confessed publicly to being ambitious (*Hell.* I.vi.5). Still, there is something to Underhill's interpretation (especially in light of I.vi.10), and it will be useful to examine Lysander's behavior following the great victory with this in mind.

Indeed, Lysander's victory at Aegospotami made him with one stroke the leading figure in all of Greece. Lysander himself was not indifferent to this success. Whereas earlier Callicratidas had dispatched "triremes" on a mission to Sparta (I.vi.8), and while Conon now has sent the Paralus (the sacred ship of state) "to Athens to report what had occurred," Lysander,

> on the [very] day that he accomplished these things, sent Theopompus, the Milesian pirate, to Lacedaemon to report what had occurred, who arrived there on the third day and reported it. (II.i.29-30)

Hatzfeld observes that this speed for crossing the Aegean Sea is "abnormal." And before him Sturz explained "pirate" in this context as "one who has a ship that is for pirating and therefore swift."[2]

After sending off Theopompus,

> Lysander gathered together the allies and bade them deliberate concerning the prisoners. Thereupon many charges were made against the Athenians, both for the unlawful acts they had already committed and for what they had voted to do if they prevailed in the battle: to cut off the right hand of

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[1] See above, Chapter 2 n. 4.

[2] F.G. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonteum* (Leipzig, 1801), s.v. Jean Hatzfeld's note (*Helléniques* by Xenophon [Paris, 1936], I, p. 162) corrects Gustave Glotz, *Le Travail dans la Grece ancienne* (Paris, 1920), pp. 350-351, who refers to this as a commercial vessel. Glotz also errs in reading "three days and three nights" for what could at most have been two and one-half days and two nights. Since in addition he takes this voyage as his standard, his conjectural list of times for other Grecian voyages is groundless, and we must look elsewhere for comparison.

> all those taken alive; also that, having captured two triremes, a Corinthian and an Andrian, they had all the men from them thrown overboard. Philocles was the Athenian general who had made these men perish. Many other things, also, were said, and it was resolved to kill as many of the prisoners as were Athenians . . . And Lysander, asking first of Philocles, who had thrown overboard the Andrians and Corinthians, what he deserved to suffer for having begun to act unlawfully against Hellenes, cut his throat. (II.i.31-32)

One is tempted to understand ἀπέσφαξεν, with Brownson, as "had his throat cut." But I think (with Hatzfeld, apparently, who has "l'égorgea de sa main")[3] that Xenophon intended to shock the reader with the brutal force of the word. It stands abrupt and alone at the end of the sentence, its abruptness made all the more forceful as we expected Lysander at least to wait for some sort of reply from Philocles, perhaps even some sort of 'apology.'

If this act, which is the last act of the final, decisive battle of the Peloponnesian War, is brutal, it is at the same time a dramatic act of retributive justice. Lysander therefore appears to the assembled allies as an agent of justice, punishing with a vengeance the acts planned as well as those previously committed by the Athenians contrary to the unwritten laws governing all Hellenes.

In view of this, our earlier impression that Lysander was not an outspoken Hellenist (from his actions and his silences earlier in this chapter, II.i.15 and 19) appears to have been incorrect.[4] We note here that whereas the allies charge the Athenians with "having acted unlawfully" simply, it is Lysander who adds "against Hellenes." He thus appears to be like Callicratidas in upholding the distinction between Greeks and barbarians as a most—or perhaps *the* most—important political distinction. We observe also, however, a difference. When Callicratidas captured Methymna, not only did he not gather together the allies and bid them deliberate concerning the prisoners, but on the contrary, when *they* bade *him* to sell the Methymnians into slavery, he opposed them and simply overruled their demand (I.vi.14-15). Lysander, in his only "public" appearance recorded by Xenophon thus far, speaks and acts very much in accord with the vengeful desires of the allies and does so only after soliciting to know those desires. This interpretation will be reinforced when we find that this passage compares still more directly with one that follows, when "the Lacedaemonians" give their judgment in similar circumstances. For the present, Lysander

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[3] C.L. Brownson, ed. and trans., *Hellenica*, Books I-V by Xenophon (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), *ad loc.*; Hatzfeld, *ad loc.*

[4] See above, Chapter 2, pp. 24-25.

appears at least to be amply rewarding the allies' choice of himself as their commander (II.i.6-7) even beyond the destruction of the entire Athenian fleet.

After this scene and after "settling things" in Lampsacus, Lysander proceeds to take Byzantium and Chalcedon once again into the Spartan fold, those cities receiving him peacefully and surrendering under truce the Athenian garrisons. Those Byzantines who had betrayed the city into the hands of Alcibiades are forced to flee, and a new Laconian harmost is established over both cities (II.ii.1-2). By briefly observing these events in particular, Xenophon calls to our attention the fact that Lysander has, in very short order, reversed all the Athenian gains reported in the first three chapters of the *Hellenica.* So certain is the final defeat of Athens once her fleet is lost and her grain shipments from the Black Sea are cut off, that Lysander sends all Athenians he comes upon, even soldiers, to Athens, in order to hasten the depletion of the food supplies there (II.ii.2). Lysander assumes, in other words, that the Athenians will be forced to surrender without a fight.

In ii.3 we learn of the Athenian reaction to the news of the defeat at Aegospotami. Lysander's doings after that battle are probably not reported at that time, since the Paralus departed for Athens almost while the battle was still taking place (II.i.29). But while the fate of the prisoners might not have been clearly predictable, the Athenians must have known that such a defeat would mean the loss of the Hellespont and of Byzantium and Chalcedon, and likewise could only draw the same conclusion as did Lysander.

> In Athens, the Paralus arriving in the night, the misfortune was told, and a wailing spread from the Peiraeus, through the long walls, into the city, one man passing on the news to another; so that that night no one slept, not only were they mourning for those lost, but much more for their own selves, believing they were to suffer the kind of things they had done to the Melians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, having subdued them by siege, as well as to the Histiaeans, Scionaeans, Toronaeans, Aeginetans, and many others of the Hellenes. (II.ii.3)

The Athenians do not yet despair, however. The next day they resolve to make preparations for the siege they know will be set up against them (ii.4). But as they are now bereft both of all supplies of food and of a fleet with which to secure a new supply, we might expect that their surrender will not be long in coming. The narrative that follows also leads us to expect this. The order of events seems simple. The final revolt of all her allies in ii.5-6, Pausanias' encampment not far from the walls of Athens with a large land army (πανδημεί) in ii.7-8, and Lysander's final

approach and blockade of the Peiraeus with the fleet in ii.9 seem to add up to a predictable narrative conclusion in ii.10:

> The Athenians, besieged by land and by sea, were at a loss to know what they should do, having neither ships nor allies nor food.

But the story of the Athenian surrender is not short. They continue to persevere (ἐκαρτέρουν, ii.11) not just for days, nor weeks, but for months.

We see at *this* point, however, that the Athenians *are* despairing, that their perseverance comes not from courage but from despair. "Many in the city were dying from hunger . . ." (ii.11). With two armies and a fleet of ships surrounding them, they could only continue to starve to death. (Xenophon does not mention any attacks by the enemy against their walls, and we assume that, against such massive forces, an Athenian offensive strike is now out of the question.) Nevertheless, ". . . they did not discuss reconciliation." The reason for this is explicit (διὰ ταῦτα, ii.11):

> . . . they believed that there was to be no salvation whatever from suffering what they had done, not by way of punishing, but rather out of hubris acting unjustly against the people of small cities, not on a single other account than that they were allied with (the Lacedaemonians). (ii.10)

This seems to repeat what Xenophon had just said in ii.3 (quoted earlier) in giving the Athenians' premonition of their fate. But two differences are striking: they now believe that fate to be all but inevitable (οὐδεμίαν εἶναι σωτηρίαν; and they now begin to consider the gross injustice of what they had formerly done to those peoples. It is clearly the fear arising from these thoughts that causes them to endure ever greater degrees of hunger as they allow the siege to continue and refuse even to discuss tearing down any part of the long walls: they expect one and all to be sold into slavery (ii.14 and 16).

The source or cause of this belief, however, is not explicit. We are induced to wonder at their dread-inspired intransigence, to ask why the Athenians see no hope at all of being treated with lenience if they surrender. In ii.3, while naming five peoples who had been dealt serious harm by them, Xenophon particularly singles out, as if foremost in their minds, the Melians. But hadn't the Athenian ambassadors in Melos, in the debate preceding that act (Thucydides V.84-114), argued that the Athenians would have just such a hope if it should ever come to this? Those unnamed ambassadors, representing the height of Athenian hubris, had just refused to entertain any arguments of justice from the Melians, whose own salvation was then in question. Asserting that justice holds only among those with equal power to compel and that otherwise the stronger prevail, they insisted that the Melians consider only the

capabilities of both sides (V.89). The Melians attempted nevertheless to reintroduce considerations of the just and the reasonable on the ground of expediency, that it is in everyone's interest to listen to such claims from those whose lives are at stake:

> "And this applies no less to you, inasmuch as you would provide the example to others for the greatest punishment if you should fall."
> Athenians: "As for us, even if our empire should cease, we are not disheartened in regard to the end of it. For those who rule others, as the Lacedaemonians do—it is not those who are terrible to the vanquished . . . but rather the subject peoples, if ever they should themselves attack their rulers and prevail over them . . . ." (V..90-91)

The change in the Athenian outlook between Thucydides V.91 and *Hellenica* II.ii.3, from hubris to sober fear, is easy to understand. The presence of serious danger usually cools such sanguine expectations. But the intensification of that fear to the extremes displayed in ii.10 ff. is more difficult to explain on that ground alone. Xenophon's narrative between ii.3-4 and ii.10, read again with this in mind, makes evident the reason for it: Lysander has become the most prominent of the commanders of Athens' enemies, and he is very conspicuously championing the cause of her former subjects. Upon leaving the Hellespont, Lysander becomes directly or indirectly the leader of the nearly complete overthrow of the Athenian empire (ii.5-6). (Eteonicus' mission to Thrace at this time, which shortly precedes Lysander's announcement that he is sailing back to mainland Greece, answers to Thrasybulus' mission there in I.iv.9 and thus to the final gains made by the Athenians just prior to Alcibiades' return to Athens.) What is more, Lysander restores to their cities all those "who had been deprived of their own city" by the Athenians (ii.9). Xenophon names two cities here in particular, though he says that other cities were also restored to their citizens. These two are notable, among other reasons, for being the last and the first of the five examples whose memory disturbed the Athenians in ii.3. The latter-named of these two peoples are the Melians.

By ii.10 the Athenians must have heard many reports of what had occurred in Lampsacus after the battle. Lysander's liberation and restoration of their former subjects must appear to them to be of a piece with his part in that "trial." Little wonder, then, that the Athenians are so much in terror for their lives.

But the Athenians have good reason for *utter* despair only if it appears in addition that Lysander and the allies will have the preponderant say in determining that fate. Although Lysander's pre-eminence in these passages, owing to the extent and significance of his successes, suggests to us (and to the Athenians) that this might be the case, doubts are raised

in the midst of those successes by a reminder that there are higher authorities in Sparta, in particular that there are two kings whose authority over the mainland war is higher than Lysander's:

> Lysander thereupon sent word to Agis in Decelea and to Lacedaemon that he was sailing thither with two hundred ships. The Lacedaemonians went out *en masse* as did also the other Peloponnesians except the Argives, the other king of the Lacedaemonians, Pausanias, issuing the call. When all had been gathered together, he took them to Athens and encamped them in the gymnastic grounds called the Academy. (ii.7-8)

We are thus given to wonder what will happen when the three highest military commanders converge on the seaport city.

Pausanias—whom we would perhaps expect to assume the decisive control, since he has encamped just outside Athens with a very large army and because he is a king (though the younger of the two)—is conspicuous only in not being referred to at all in what follows. He merely disappears silently from the scene. Diodorus wrote that, the siege lasting a long time, the Lacedaemonians gave it up and returned home; Schneider properly takes this to refer only to Pausanias, not to Agis in Decelea.[5] We may infer as much by comparing Xenophon's silence concerning Pausanias with the notice made of Agis' later dispersal of his land army from Decelea following the surrender of the Athenians (II.iii.3). Xenophon spares Pausanias' dignity, but it is implied that once again the Spartans have misjudged the usefulness of sending land forces against Athens.

It is to Agis that the Athenians first turn with a proposal of terms for peace. Perhaps this resort is grounded not only in some general expectation that Agis, whose kingship is inherited and permanent, will be more immune than Lysander to the demands of the allies, but also, in particular, in the memory of his having once made peace with the Argives without consulting even the Spartan officials who were there with him at the time (Thucydides V.59-60). For that act, however, Agis had been rebuked by the Spartans at home, his power somewhat curtailed, and he had shown himself chastened by the affair (Thuc. V.63, 65.1-3). So also now: "He bade them go to Lacedaemon, for (, he said,) he was not in authority" (II.ii.12).

With one insignificant exception Agis, like Pausanias, is not even referred to in the remainder of this chapter. Notice is taken of him only later, as we have observed, when he departs with the land army. The

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[5] Diodorus Siculus XIII.107; J.G. Schneider, ed., *Opera Quae Extant* by Xenophon (Oxford, 1810), I, note on *Hell.* II.ii.8.

absence or inconspicuousness of both kings is especially noticeable in the final, climactic scene:

> And thereupon Lysander sailed into the Peiraeus, the exiles returned, and they tore down the walls to the accompaniment of flute-girls . . . (ii.23)

Several commentators and translators (implicitly) have noticed that Xenophon failed to provide a subject for the verb "they-tore-down" (unless, improbably, he means only "the exiles" here as well), and most of them supply "the Peloponnesians." Perhaps the ambiguity which even then remains was intended: Are the Peloponnesians under Agis to be understood as included?

All of these observations make it easier to understand why the Athenians offered such patently absurd peace terms to Agis and, on his disclaiming authority in the matter, to the ephors (ii.11-13), and why they remained so intransigent.

> No one wished to give counsel (συμβουλεύειν) about the tearing down of the walls; for when Archestratus said in the Council (τῇ βουλῇ) that it was best to make peace with the Lacedaemonians on the terms which they were requiring, he was put into prison—they were requiring them to pull down ten stades' length of the Long Walls on each end—and there was a vote that it not be permitted to give counsel about this. (ii.15)

Xenophon takes pains to indicate the extraordinary force of this almost reckless intransigence. A striking feature of this entire passage is the frequency of references to their dire lack of food.[6] After saying in ii.10 (as quoted above) that the Athenians were without food and in ii.11 that, "though many in the city were dying from hunger, they did not discuss reconciliation," Xenophon says that the mission to Agis was sent "after the food had *entirely* (παντελῶς) given out." When the missions to Agis and to Sparta failed, the Athenians were all "disheartened" by the belief not only that they would be sold into slavery, but also that "while they were sending more ambassadors many would die from hunger" (ii.14). Nevertheless, it is immediately after this that the prohibitive decree was passed.

The Spartans are said to demand only that part of the Long Walls be torn down. But it is clear that Sparta's allies, who comprise a large part of the besieging forces, wish to see Athens destroyed root and branch[7]

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[6] This is observed in Saul Levin's attempt at an unpretentious reading of this passage: "Xenophon on the Surrender of Athens," *Journal of General Education* 5 (1951), pp. 274 ff. Cf. the notes of G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900) and J. Irving Manatt, ed., *Hellenica* by Xenophon (Boston, 1897) on II.ii.16, διὰ τὸ ἐπιλελοιπέναι τὸν σῖτον.

[7] In addition to II.i.31-32 and the Athenian ambassadors' observation in Thucydides V.91, see *Hell.* I.vi.14, where the allies demanded the enslavement of the Methymnians, who were merely *allied* to the Athenians.

(this will soon become still clearer) and that Lysander appears to be championing this passion for justice. And no indication has been given that this drive for vengeance will be overruled by those officially in authority at Sparta, that the Athenians' safety will be guaranteed once the walls are broken. The Athenians seem to have good reason to fear as they do.

> This being the state of things, Theramenes said in the Assembly that if they wished to send him to Lysander, he would return knowing whether the Lacedaemonians were insistent about the walls because they wished to enslave the city entirely or whether it was for the sake of assurance. (ii.16)

This impresses us as being logically the next step to be taken. But we are next shocked by what seems to be treachery on Theramenes' part. Instead of fulfilling the mission he promised,

> he tarried with Lysander for three months and more, awaiting the time when the Athenians would be ready, because their food had given out, to agree to whatever they might be told. (ii.16)

Schneider comments: "This seems to reveal to us that the character of Theramenes is as Lysias paints it frequently in his orations."[8]

But Theramenes' action is justified by the fact that the Athenians' intransigence was most likely to bring on exactly what they feared, since famine would eventually compel them (unless they should simply starve to death one and all) to surrender unconditionally to those besieging forces. To obtain any assurances at all for their safety, their only hope lay in negotiating for a contractual peace with the ephors in Sparta according to the ephors' demands.

One scholar, Saul Levin, has observed the "dramatic contrast which Xenophon implies between Archestratus and Theramenes, who have the same aim but use different means with unequal success. . . ."[9] Another has remarked in particular on Theramenes' prudence in making his initial proposal to the Athenians:

> It was an astute move. Theramenes observed the letter of the decree [ii.15, quoted above]; he made his offer in the Assembly, not in the Council; he proposed to approach, not the Ephors, but Lysander; he evaded the intention of the prohibition through the loophole presented in the controversy about the duplicity of the Spartans. . . .[10]

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[8] Schneider, note on II.ii.16. See especially Lysias XII.62-78, XIII.5-17.

[9] Levin, p. 278.

[10] J.A.R. Munro, "Theramenes against Lysander," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1938), p. 20. Munro evidently takes the συμβουλεύειν ("to make a proposal") in II.ii.15 to apply only to the Council (βουλή). Xenophon can be his only source for this interpretation, since the other ancient sources cited by Munro do not include these details. Yet Munro does not attribute to Xenophon the intention of eliciting this observation. Munro's is an

But this leads us to note, with Levin, that while the plan was contrived by Theramenes, "it goes without saying that Lysander had to fall in with it."[11] When Theramenes returns to Athens and tells the Assembly "that Lysander detained him during that time, then bade him go to Lacedaemon" (ii.17), it cannot be completely false, since it was in Lysander's power to send him back immediately. For Agis earlier, in answer to the Athenian ambassadors, "bade them go to Lacedaemon" (ii.12), and subsequently, when they were in Sellasia, the ephors "bade them go away from there" (ii.13).

It may be that Lysander would like to have the Athenians surrender directly to himself. But he could perhaps have effected precisely that by detaining Theramenes still longer (cf. II.iii.41). Thus it might rather be that Lysander does not wish to see Athens destroyed by the vengeful allies yet does not wish to lose favor with the latter by denying them this revenge; he might therefore *prefer* that the ephors be responsible for this decision. For this reason he might prefer that the siege continue until the Athenians be ready to accept terms. This delay would also—as apparently it does—remove Pausanias from the scene.[12]

But the more certain and more significant point of this passage is that Lysander *could* not simply act as he did following the battle at Aegospotami, as he did subsequently in "settling things" at Lampsacus and in Byzantium and Chalcedon (ii.1 and 2), and as he will do later at Samos. He does not have the authority either to accept the Athenians' unconditional surrender (since Agis and perhaps Pausanias are present) or to dictate even the military terms of a conditional surrender.[13] In fact, when Lysander, according to Theramenes, "bade him go to Lacedaemon, for (, Lysander said,) he was not in authority over what he was asked by him, but rather the ephors were" (ii.17), this was a rather pretentious act of humility. For he thus imitated even the very words of Agis' earlier denial of *his* authority. Now, while there had been throughout Sparta's history under the laws of Lycurgus a tension between the kings and the ephors, requiring constant, mutual reaffirma-

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intelligent attempt to reconstruct, from the accounts of Lysias, Aristotle, and other ancient sources as well as from the *Hellenica*, what must have been the intentions of Theramenes in this action. But much that is sound in that reconstruction could be based solely on Xenophon's narrative. While calling that narrative "straightforward" (p. 21 n. 1) as compared with Lysias' tendentious accounts, Munro uses it only as a chronicle to be supplemented by information from the other sources.

[11] Levin, p. 278. This corrects a significant error in Munro's account.

[12] Cf. Detlef Lotze, *Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964), p. 40.

[13] Munro seems to attribute such an authority to him: pp. 19, 20, 21, 22. This is criticized by Lotze, p. 44 notes 1 and 2, although Lotze does not mention the kings' superior authority.

tion of the deference due by law to each,[14] there should never have been any question about the limits to the authority of any other official—and certainly not in a case where the elder king himself had denied having authority. Lysander even outdoes Agis in this by sending Aristoteles and others to report directly to the ephors "that he had answered to Theramenes that they were in authority over peace and war" (ii.18). We note in addition that both Theramenes' quotation of Lysander's words[15] and the message sent through Aristoteles add a subtle qualification beyond the simpler statement of Agis that "he was not in authority." We have already seen glimmerings of Lysander's ambition following his premature boast to Callicratidas (in I.vi.2), especially in his unscrupulous schemes to get himself re-appointed as admiral in spite of the law forbidding it. But we must remember that, although he was in fact put in charge of the ships, because of the law he is now not even the admiral, officially, but merely "vice-admiral" under the official admiral, Aracus.

We may doubt, on the other hand, whether his words here are merely grandiose pretension. For while there should be no question as to his lack of official authority here, there may well be some doubts arising from his actual power. The empty boast he made to Callicratidas is no longer an empty boast. Nor is he just "master of the sea and victor of a naval battle": He is the liberator of Greece, hero of the allies and terror of the Athenians. What is more, he is sitting outside the Peiraeus at the head of a massive, well-disciplined fleet whose sailors are being well paid not by the Spartans but by Cyrus through the sole agency of Lysander himself, who now has complete control of those funds (II.i.14).[16]

The Athenians at last agree to send Theramenes and nine others as plenipotentiary ambassadors to Sparta. Upon hearing that they are not restricted as to the terms for peace, the ephors admit them into Sparta and convoke an assembly of the allies. In this assembly

> the Corinthians and Thebans especially, and many others of the allies also, spoke in opposition, (urging them) not to make a treaty with the Athenians, but to destroy (the city). But the Lacedaemonians said they would not enslave an Hellenic city that had performed a great good when the greatest dangers had arisen for Hellas . . . (II.ii.19-20)

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[14] *Lac.* xv.7.

[15] That it is a quotation: see B. Büchsenschütz, ed., *Griechische Geschichte* by Xenophon, 7th ed. (Leipzig, 1908), note on ii.17; so also Manatt.

[16] There are implicit suggestions by Munro that he recognizes the distinction between Lysander's actual power and his official authority (e.g. pp. 21, 23); it is his failure to address the problem more clearly that causes no little confusion. Perhaps he considered the problem to be only peripheral to the questions he addressed in that study.

Against strong opposition from the allies, then, the Spartans offer the Athenians what under the circumstances are lenient terms for peace, terms which in effect render the city subject to the will of the Spartans in foreign affairs and return the radical oligarchic faction to domestic politics, but which spare the Athenians from mass slaughter, outrage, enslavement, and even from plunder.

Theramenes and the other ambassadors return to Athens to report these terms.

> As they entered, a large crowd surrounded them, fearing lest they came without having accomplished anything; for there was no admitting of delay any longer, because of the number of those dying from hunger. (ii.21)

Nevertheless, when Theramenes presented to the Athenians the Spartan terms and urged "that is was necessary to obey the Lacedaemonians and tear down the walls," Xenophon mentions almost in passing that "some spoke against him" even at this time. This, then, is the final justification of what might earlier have seemed to be an unconscionably long procrastination of the negotiations by Theramenes. His timing could hardly have been better: ". . . but many more approving, it was resolved to accept the peace" (ii.22).

> And thereupon Lysander sailed into the Peiraeus, the exiles returned, and they tore down the walls to the accompaniment of flute-girls, with much enthusiasm, believing that day to be for Hellas the beginning of freedom. (ii.23)

This sentence marks the end of the Peloponnesian War according to the definition of Thucydides, who stated that his writing would cover events "up to the time when the Lacedaemonians and the allies put an end to the Athenians' empire and took the Long Walls and Peiraeus" (V.26.1). Moreover, Xenophon indicates that this is also the opinion of the victorious Greeks. For the last words of the sentence quoted (ii.23) are reminiscent of the words used by the Spartan emissary Melesippus, whom the Athenians had refused to admit into the city on the advice of Pericles, thereby precipitating the entry into Attica of the first invading forces of the Peloponnesians under Archidamus, at the very beginning of the war: "This day will be for the Hellenes the beginning of great evils" (Thuc. II.12). A few chapters earlier, when telling of the various preparations and anxieties preceding the outbreak of the war, Thucydides had observed that "the good will of mankind made for the Lacedaemonians by far, especially as they proclaimed that they were freeing Hellas" (II.8). Even apart from considerations of the character of the Spartan regime, there is justification for the Greeks' hopes both at the beginning and at the close of the war in the memory that it was

the Spartans who had formerly deposed most of the tyrants in Greece (Thuc. I.18).

Xenophon makes no comment on these opinions. He simply continues matter-of-factly with a narration of events that speak loudly enough for themselves.

(What Xenophon actually wrote here has been brought into question by many scholars, who believe that several of the ensuing passages are interpolations by later hands. But no one doubts the authenticity of those passages concerning the doings of Lysander, and it will be enough for the present purposes to examine only those passages, which we may call a 'direct' sequel to the narrative on the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, as opposed to the events occurring in other parts of Greece and relating less directly to that war.)

It was not required in the terms of the treaty that the Athenians change their regime, although some change might be likely, owing to the return of the oligarchic exiles. Xenophon at first says merely: "The demos resolved to choose thirty men to draw up in writing the ancestral laws, according to which they would run the city" (II.iii.2). But immediately after giving the names of the Thirty, he writes: "This having been done, Lysander sailed off . . ."[17]

Agis also is mentioned here: ". . . and Agis, leading off the land army from Decelea, dispersed them severally to their respective cities" (iii.3). We were never told of his having entered Athens at any time, and we cannot assume that he had any part in the appointment of the Thirty. More immediately, Xenophon's purpose is to contrast his disbanding of the army with the preceding words: ". . . Lysander sailed off to Samos . . ." This is confirmed when, *after* Lysander has settled things in Samos, "he sent off the navy of the allies to their respective cities" (iii.7). (We note also that, since before this Xenophon noted the ending of one year and the beginning of a new year—II.ii.24 and iii.1—the term of Lysander's command as vice-admiral should have expired already: cf. I.vi.1 and II.i.10.)[18]

The events at Samos are told briefly:

> The Samians were being besieged on all sides by Lysander; when at first they were not willing to come to an agreement and Lysander was just about to attack, they agreed that (every one) of the freemen should depart, each

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[17] This is as much as Xenophon thinks necessary to say to make the point. Characteristically, the commentators comment upon his simplifying here events whose details were in fact somewhat more complicated: thus Underhill (*ad loc.*), Hatzfeld (p. 162), and Lotze ("Xenophon leaves us once again in the lurch," p. 41). But here, at least, no one accuses him of serious misrepresentation.

[18] Lotze troubles over this (p. 42).

> having one cloak, but that they should give over all else; and thus they went out. Lysander gave the city and all that was in it over to the ancient citizens and established ten rulers to keep watch over it . . . (iii.6-7)

This action could be justified on the grounds that a democratic Samos which had not renounced its alliance with Athens (cf. II.ii.6) might serve as a base for an Athenian revival, and that such an island power must be dealt with before the Spartan fleet should be disbanded. But that does not make Lysander's authority any the less dubious, especially in regard to his imposition of the decarchy. Xenophon does not mention here Lysander's establishment of decarchies over many other of Athens' former subjects (cf. III.iv.2, 7; v.13), but the case of Samos perhaps serves as a preliminary indication that what is about to occur in Athens is not altogether singular.

Finally, after dismissing the ships of the allies, Lysander

> sailed off to Lacedaemon with the Laconian ships, bringing with him the prows of the ships captured in battle, the triremes from Peiraeus except twelve, crowns that he received from the cities as private gifts, four hundred seventy talents of silver that remained of the tribute monies that Cyrus had assigned to him for the war, and anything else he had acquired in the war. All these things he gave over to the Lacedaemonians as the summer was ending . . . (II.iii.8-9)

What is most striking—nay, shocking here is the bringing of this immense treasure of silver into the city whose laws forbade as illiberal the getting and even the possessing of gold and silver by its citizens.[19] And about this silver in particular, its source and its amount, one should notice three particularly disturbing odors. For it is barbarian silver acquired by flattery of the barbarians (cf. I.vi.6-7 with *Oec.* iv.20-25). Moreover, it is a surplus of money that was given by Cyrus "for the war" and therefore money that should appear to be dishonestly kept by Lysander for the Spartans after the war is over.—Had not Lysander previously returned similar money to Cyrus "on the ground that it was surplus," i.e. because he was honest (I.vi.10)?[20] But what is perhaps most ominous is the exact quantity of this originally tribute money as recorded by Xenophon, a number not attested by any other ancient source[21] and suspiciously close to (with an increment that is not without humor) and therefore reminiscent of the four hundred *sixty* talents

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[19] *Lac.* vii; cf. Plutarch, *Lysander* 17.

[20] Cf. Lotze, p. 24. See, however, III.i.1.

[21] See the conjecture to which Bishop Connop Thirlwall was driven: *A History of Greece* (London, n.d.), IV, 177 n.1.

exacted from the "allies" as the first "tribute" that was the foundation of the Athenian empire at the end of the Persian War (Thucydides I.96).

This triumphal return of Lysander to Sparta far surpasses in splendor the return of Alcibiades to Athens in I.iv. But here we are not told how Lysander was received by the Spartans.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS

> Reflecting one time that Sparta, being one of the least populous cities, showed itself to be the most powerful and renowned in Hellas, I wondered in what way soever this came about; but when I took to mind the practices of the Spartans, I no longer wondered.

Thus Xenophon introduces his writing on the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*.[1] Some great military event or series of events, it seems, drew his attention to Sparta. Sparta's most famous victory and therefore the event most likely to have drawn his attention in this way—and he happened to be a young man just at that time—was her victory over the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War.[2] In any case, it was the surprising power and renown of this small city that made Xenophon interested in the practices of the Spartans.

Xenophon's brief introduction continues as follows:

> Lycurgus, though, the one who set down for them the laws, the which obeying they were happy, this one I both wonder at and deem to be very wise in the extreme(s). For he, not imitating the other cities but on the contrary understanding the opposite of most of them, rendered his fatherland outstanding in happiness. (*Lac.* i.2)

Several questions arise: What exactly is the relation between the laws of Lycurgus and "the practices of the Spartans"?[3] Is the twice-mentioned happiness identifiable with the great power and renown of the city or do the words signify something different? Was the happiness of "the

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[1] (Compare the beginning of the *Cyropaedia*.) This work is usually translated *Constitution* (or *Republic*) *of the Lacedaemonians*. K.M.T. Chrimes (Atkinson) has argued that the work was not written by Xenophon: *The Respublica Lacedaemoniorum Ascribed to Xenophon* (Manchester, 1948), pp. 22-30. But her arguments carry to the most absurd lengths the common failure by scholars to consider the literary character and the philosophic purposes of the writing.

[2] Leo Strauss, "The Spirit of Sparta or the Taste of Xenophon," *Social Research* 6 (1939), p. 522 n. 1. At the outset we note that much of the obscurity both of particular passages and of the treatise in general has already been illumined in this early essay by Strauss. Remarkable also in other respects, the essay is brilliant and yet lucid as an interpretive study (and, like Xenophon's own writing, deserves much more attention than it has received). As it is not a thoroughgoing commentary, many questions still emerge from passages unexplained or incompletely explained by Strauss. We shall try to proceed here without restating his findings while nevertheless assuming experience of them. Here and there we shall depart from them.

[3] See Strauss, *ibidem*.

fatherland'' the same as the happiness attributed to ''the Spartans''? Why does Xenophon use the past tense, ''they were happy,'' implying that they might no longer be so?[4] Did their happiness precede, coincide with, or follow the city's great power and renown? Since there, too, he used the past tense (''showed itself'' or ''came to light''), is Sparta still the most powerful and renowned city in Hellas at the time of Xenophon's writing?

A simple overview of the treatise that follows this introduction may be useful. Xenophon begins with certain maternal and marital practices designed to produce large, strong offspring (Chapter i). Their education, beginning as everywhere from a young age but continuing into manhood, produces modest and obedient yet bold and resourceful citizens who vie for honors through virtue and engage in the noble, quasi-military practice of hunting well into their mature years (ii-iv). The institutions pertaining to the Spartans of all ages alike make citizens who are: moderate in their eating and drinking habits, proper in their public demeanor (and they are usually in the public eye), and robust from regular gymnastic exercise (v); generous in sharing publicly their goods, so that being privately rich or poor is of little difference to them (vi); indeed, contemptuous of money altogether, and therefore attentive only ''to such works as provide freedom to cities'' (vii); zealously obedient to the laws and to the ruling authorities, who are endowed with ample power to enforce those laws (viii); willing to die nobly in battle rather than suffer dishonor (ix); and, with promises of honorable reward before them, constantly practicing publicly all the gentlemanly and politically beneficial virtues (x). Their military arrangements provide for efficient, disciplined address of every possible circumstance on the march (xi) and for security in encamping (xii); and their kings, as both generals and high priests, supply the leadership for military expeditions (xiii). In Chapter xiv Xenophon's drift suddenly changes: As if having finished describing all the laws of Lycurgus and thus accomplished his original design, he discloses that these laws are no longer obeyed, that the citizens have become corrupt and that therefore the Hellenes no longer seek Lacedaemonian leadership against the unjust but on the contrary are rallying one another to prevent imperial rule by the Lacedaemonians themselves! But the concluding Chapter xv introduces other provisions of Lycurgus which describe in a more political light than before the one institution that has *not* changed, the kingship.

That these rough impressions of the work as a whole were intended by

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[4] François Ollier asserts that this is what is called in English the ''inceptive'' use of the aorist tense: *La République des Lacédémoniens* (Lyon, 1934), p. XIV n. 1.

Xenophon is given credence by the fact that, though with some variation in particulars, these impressions have by and large prevailed among the scholars in modern times who have published examinations of the writing.[5]

We observe that the last two chapters depart from the initial and single purpose of explaining the practices that caused Sparta's great power and renown to discuss the current decline of that polity as well as the enduring status of the kingship. Still, it is not necessary to see either of these chapters as wholly disjointed from the rest of the work, as many scholars have done.[6] For Chapter xiv seems to explain why Xenophon used the past tenses "showed" and "were happy" in the introduction. In granting this continuity we would be left wondering only why the polity has declined and why the kingship has survived as it were on the ruins of that polity.

Almost everything in this writing on a "polity" relates directly or indirectly to war. Xenophon's own summary seems to indicate this: At the beginning of Chapter xi he writes that what has preceded—which we can easily take to mean all of Chapters i-x—has pertained both to peace and to war while what follows, in Chapters xi-xiii, pertains exclusively to war. We would expect the chapters devoted solely to military practices to be of no little weight for explaining the great power and fame of Sparta.[7] But Xenophon stated in the introduction that it was "the practices of the Spartans" (τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν) that settled his amazement, and we must take this to refer especially to what is discussed in the first ten chapters, i.e. the more political chapters.[8] For the military arrangements described in Chapters xi-xiii apply to the Lacedaemonians in general, the free natives of the land called Lacedaemon; after Chapter x there is no mention at all of the city of Sparta proper or of the Spartan citizens. Moreover, Chapter x ends "in such a way that that passage appears to be the end of the whole account of Spartan legislation."[9] Do Chapters xi-xiii, too, somehow depart from the purpose of the treatise as we understood it in the beginning?

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[5] E.g. Ollier, *La République*, pp. xi-xiii and *Le Mirage Spartiate* I (Paris, 1933), pp. 378-384; H.R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon von Athen* (Stuttgart, 1966; offprint from Pauly's *Realencyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Band IX A2), col. 1748-53.

[6] See the simple and sensible argument of Arnoldo Momigliano, "Per l'unità logica della *Lakedaemonion Politeia* di Senofonte," included in *Terzo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico* I (Rome, 1966), 341-345.

[7] Thus Ollier, *La République*, p. XII.

[8] Cf. the argument of E.C. Marchant, ed. and trans., *Scripta Minora* by Xenophon (London, 1925), p. xxi.

[9] Strauss, p. 525; so also Ollier, *Le Mirage* I, p. 383.

We note that while the opening sentence refers to the surprising power and renown of Sparta and the practices of the *Spartans*, the title of the work as a whole is *Polity of the Lacedaemonians.*[10] Could Xenophon thereby mean that the practices of the Spartans provided for by the laws of Lycurgus were the heart of the polity of the Lacedaemonians as a whole? and that what impressed him was not just the victory of the Lacedaemonians with the Peloponnesians over the Athenian empire, but more particularly the power and renown of the small number of Spartan citizens who controlled the Lacedaemonians and, through them, the other Peloponnesians?

These inferences are questionable, as they assume that Xenophon is precise and even emphatic in applying distinctly these commonly confused names. Following his lead, we should "begin at the beginning" (i.3) in order to understand better the significance Xenophon sees in the political and military institutions that he describes.

The remainder of Chapter i is clearly "about the making of children" (i.3 and 10). In keeping with his introductory remarks, he contrasts the understanding of Lycurgus with the practices of the other Greeks. Lycurgus' goal is clearly the begetting of large and strong offspring: Regarding the very measured dietary practices and the sedentary occupation of the young women elsewhere who are to bear children (at least of those young women held to be nobly educated) Xenophon asks, "How should one expect that women thus nurtured would engender something grand?" (i.3) And he gives the belief behind Lycurgus' opposite arrangement for exercises and athletic contests: that "from both being strong the offspring, too, become stouter" (i.4). We learn as if in passing that the other Greeks' practice of having the nobly bred women engage in weaving appears to be economic in purpose, whereas Lycurgus deemed that "the free women" could be spared from that work to devote themselves chiefly to procreation.

Xenophon turns next to another aspect of procreation, the mating of men and women. In attaching shame, and therefore greater longing, to the sexual act, Lycurgus' purpose remains the production of "stouter" offspring (i.5); and the same appears to be true of his ordering that marriages be made when both parents are in their bodily prime, Lycurgus "believing this, too, conducive to good generation" (i.6). But after Xenophon mentions other, extramarital practices made lawful by

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[10] Consistent with my procedure throughout, I begin with and give all possible credence to the text as it has come down to us in the manuscripts. On the authorship of the title in particular, see Ollier, *La République*, p. VIII n. 6.

Lycurgus apparently to facilitate the mating of admirable men and women in their prime (i.7-8), the drift seems to change: Lycurgus "*conceded* many such (practices)." Xenophon proceeds to explain:

> For the women wish to control two households and the men wish to acquire for their children brothers who share in the clan and in the power but do not make claims on the wealth. (i.9)

These latter practices, then, appear to be not so much institutions designed to affect the size and strength of Spartan offspring as concessions by the law-giver to oligarchs who wish to keep their fortunes from being divided into small portions while increasing the numbers of their clan. But what exactly is meant by "the clan" (τοῦ γένους)? And "the power"?

While the Lycurgean procreative practices seemed at first to help explain the power and renown of Sparta simply by showing that these practices produced big, strong children and therefore better soldiers, by the end of the chapter the bearing seems to have become more political. But what are we to make of the chapter's conclusion?

> About the making of children, then, if by thus understanding the opposite of the others he produced for Sparta men outstanding in size and strength, let him who wishes investigate. (i.10)

Taken most simply, Xenophon seems to mean that he is uninterested in the question he raises, and leaves it for one "who wishes" to investigate the matter. This seems implausible, however, since the question bears directly on the intentions of Lycurgus as presented almost throughout the chapter. The conclusion may thus appear instead, as it has to most commentators, to be a form of rhetorical question.[11] Yet it smacks of irony. Does Xenophon doubt whether mating with that end in view actually achieves the desired result?—or perhaps whether these practices were actually followed in just the way ordered by Lycurgus? This conclusion of the first chapter is directly reminiscent of the conclusion of the introduction. If we read it either as an ironic rhetorical question or as indicating Xenophon's indifference to this question, we must wonder whether or in what sense these practices contributed to the outstanding "happiness" of the fatherland (as "rendered" by Lycurgus) or to the power and renown of Sparta.

Xenophon reinforces the impression of his indifference to the first chapter's concluding question in the opening sentence of Chapter ii: "*I,*

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[11] For example, J.M. Moore, *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (Berkeley, 1975), p. 98 and Ollier, *Le Mirage* I, pp. 378-79 and 400 n. 3; most of the others do so implicitly.

however, now that I have explained about birth, wish to make clear the education of each of the two'' (ii.1). Chapter ii is also composed by means of a contrast not simply with ''the other Hellenes'' but with those among the others who hold that they educate their children nobly—in this case ''most nobly'' (cf. i.3). But whereas in the first chapter the corresponding girls to whom Lycurgus' arrangements pertained were referred to as ''the free'' (i.4), here Xenophon does not specify which children are given the Lycurgean education.

The elementary moral education in Sparta is eminently public, not private. The one appointed to have mastery over the boys (''who is, then, called 'boyherd' [or, with a pun, 'law of the boys': παιδονόμος]'')[12] is one of ''those indeed from among whom the greatest ruling offices are appointed'' (ii.2). His primary function is to make sure that the boys do not ''take it easy.'' And punishment is made fearsome by the addition of whip-bearers, ''so as to make much shame, much obedience be present there'' (ii.2).

Xenophon then completes in an orderly fashion a contrast between Lycurgus' arrangements and the other Greeks' practices pertaining to the boys' footwear, clothing, and eating as presented in the beginning of the chapter. Lycurgus' purpose was to make the boys more agile, hardy, continent, healthy and tall (ii.3-5). But then what at first seems to emerge as part of the practices relating to eating—the boys were educated in stealing to seek relief from hunger by their own devices—turns out to have another, emphatically different end: ''to make the boys more resourceful . . . and more warlike'' (ii.6-7). Evidently anticipating some disbelief on the part of the reader, Xenophon raises and answers a hypothetical doubt about Lycurgus' belief in the goodness of stealing as a practice (ii.8). The passage concludes:

> And while setting it down as noble to snatch the most cheeses from (the altar of) Orthia, he ordered others to whip these boys, wishing to make it evident in this, too, that one can, by suffering pain for a little time, rejoice for a long time with esteem. And it is made evident in this that indeed wherever there is need of swiftness the sluggard is least benefited and gets the most troubles. (ii.9)

Stealing compels the boys to practice avoidance of the public eye. Perhaps this is why Xenophon next mentions the precautions taken to reinforce the sense of shame or respect usually inspired by the

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[12] With the word ''then'' (δή) Xenophon draws attention to his opinion of the appropriateness of the name παιδονόμος, but it is ambiguous whether he implies reference to the verb ''to master'' (κρατεῖν) or to the word for ''governing offices'' (ἀρχαί).—Cf. *Mem.* I.ii.40-46?

"boyherd" and his whip-bearers. In his absence some ruler (ἄρχων) is always to be over the boys.

> And by doing this he made the boys to be even more filled with a sense of shame; for neither boys nor men have a sense of shame before anything as they do before rulers. (ii.10; cf. *Cyr.* I.i.2)

This authority is given to whoever of the citizens might be at hand or, whenever no man is at hand, to "the sharpest of the males" (ii.10-11). ("The sharpest" translates an unusual word, τὸν τορώτατον; given what has preceded this discussion, one might discern in it a pun translatable only as "the one with the most cheese [τυρός].")

Xenophon next adds a discussion "about erotic love of boys" (ii.12-14). Lycurgus sought to transform men's lust for boys into a greater solicitude for the boys' moral growth. But Xenophon seems to doubt the effectiveness of this attempt either in principle or in fact. For while Lycurgus "praised and believed this the noblest education," Xenophon gives as his own reason for including this passage merely that "this, too, has something to do with education."

Chapter ii then closes with the following words:

> The education, then, has been told, both the Laconic and that of the other Hellenes; from which of them men are produced who are more obedient, have more a sense of shame, and are more continent in what is needed, let him who wishes investigate these things, too. (ii.14)

Is this a rhetorical question? If so, there seems to be less cause for irony here, and so we might more easily understand it to be sincere. Or is Xenophon quite simply expressing his indifference to *these* questions, too? Without attempting yet to resolve this ambiguity we should nevertheless keep in mind the original questions about whether or how these practices contributed to the power and renown of Sparta or the happiness of the Spartans.

In Chapter iii there is no longer a contrast to be drawn with the other cities except in the fact itself that the others have nothing corresponding to Lycurgus' continuing attention to the adolescents; instead, "they leave them autonomous" (iii.1). But cognizant of the great pride that grows by nature in adolescents, their insolence and strong desires for pleasures, Lycurgus sought to repress these passions with unceasing labors (iii.2).

> And enjoining also that if someone should escape this he would no longer meet with any of the noble things, Lycurgus made not only public officials but also those anxious for each of them to take care lest by flinching they become altogether disesteemed in the city. (iii.3)

"Escape"? The adolescents' evident aversion to this training makes us wonder again how it makes them happy. What noble things and what esteem are they possessed of or promised?

The goal of these constant labors and lack of leisure is not to make the adolescents able to endure long labors but to repress the strong private and, as we would call them, 'individualistic' passions (cf. ii.2). Moreover, not content to repress this form of natural growth in their souls, Lycurgus wished "to implant (or 'ennature,' ἐμφυσιῶσαι) strongly" a sense of shame or reverence, and so ordered the adolescents to conduct themselves modestly (iii.4). The remainder of the chapter documents the results of this order (iii.5).

The importance of the next chapter is marked at the outset:

> About the young men in their prime, however, he took by far the most serious concern, thinking that these, if they became such as they ought, would weigh the most heavily to the good for the city. (iv.1)

But the only institution that Xenophon describes relating to this crucial age group is the "strife over virtue" established by Lycurgus. Its purpose is to make these men reach the greatest degree of manliness or courage (iv.2). As with the previous training, however, when obedience and shame were instilled not by any desire in the boys to become obedient and respectful but through fear of punishment (especially whipping) and through constant labors and modest carriage, and when resourcefulness was induced not by the desire to become resourceful but through hunger, so also here: while virtue is the end for the city (for the sake of the citizens' happiness?) the goal for the individual young men is not virtue but victory. As Xenophon's comparison indicates, the same passion, love of victory,[13] can be channeled in other ways: choral and gymnastic competitions.

At first blush the love of victory is quite at odds with the reverent obedience and sense of shame, the fear and the modesty that the previous training sought to cultivate; indeed it might seem quite congruous with the very pride that Lycurgus sought carefully to repress. But we note this difference: While natural pride and its kindred insolence spurn any authority outside of the individual himself, love of victory usually means love of honor (iv.3) and therefore—like obedience and sense of shame—depends on some external authority. Perhaps the more political love of honor was in fact meant to be rendered more intense by that very repression of natural pride and insolence. We note that to be honored by selec-

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[13] φιλονικία, the reading of inferior manuscripts, is accepted by most modern editors. The better MSS have φιλονεικία, "love of contention." Cf. *Ages.* ii.8, but also *Cyr.* II.i.22 (the reading of the MSS). Cf. the same alternative readings in Plato's *Republic*, 548c6.

tion among the three hundred here proves to be an example of "meeting with the noble things."

By setting the disesteemed "at war with those dismissing them and with those chosen instead of them" Lycurgus induced them all to "guard against one another, if they should be remiss ('take it easy') contrary to the things believed noble" (iv.4). The constant supervision provided earlier by the constant presence of some ruling authority is replaced by the young men's becoming watchful of one another:

> And this indeed becomes the most god-beloved and most citizen-like strife, in which the things the good man ought to do are pointed out and separately on each side they practice so that they will ever be the best (or strongest), but if there be any need, they will together defend the city with all their strength. (iv.5)

We begin to see how the laws of Lycurgus may have been a cause of the great power of Sparta. The strife over virtue, however, leads also to anger, even violent anger, among them: ". . . for they even fist-fight because of the strife wherever they come together" (iv.6). The ostensible benefit of this practice is that "it is necessary for them also to take care for their good condition." But lest this strife destroy the power of the city from within, any passer-by is authorized to separate the combatants. The end in view is disciplined obedience not merely to the rulers but to the laws. We note that both here and in the establishment of the strife in the first place the enforcing authority rests ultimately in the ephors (iv.3, 6).

Turning to the activity recommended for "those who have finished the age of youthful prime"—i.e. those who have now learned to strive even violently for honor and to give strict obedience to those in authority—Xenophon notes that it is *these* "from among whom now the greatest ruling offices, too, are appointed" (iv.7). It is the ruling class whose long training has been under examination from the beginning. While it may still be unclear what the criteria are for eligibility to this education in the first place, the character of this polity has become evident—at least if we assume that Xenophon accepts Socrates' definition of various regimes: "And wherever the ruling offices are appointed from among those completing the lawful (requirements—or regimen?), this polity he believed to be aristocracy . . ." (*Memorabilia* IV.vi.12).

Xenophon did not indicate at the beginning of Chapter iv any opposite practices among the other Greeks. And as in Chapter iii, he has not mentioned any conclusive contrast that might be drawn between the results of the "strife over virtue" in this city and the moral or physical condition of young men in other cities. The last part of Chapter iv, however, does show Lycurgus' opposition to the other Greeks' treatment of "those who

have finished the age of youthful prime." By law Lycurgus made hunting the noblest activity "unless some public (business) should prevent." The purpose is clear: so that even beyond their youthful prime the citizens would have a good training for military rigors. Hunting thus replaces to some extent the practice set down as noble among the boys: stealing. (Cf. *Cyr.* I.vi.27-41.)

Chapter v clearly begins a new section of the treatise:

> What practices Lycurgus set down by law for each age, then, has nearly been told; but what sort of lifestyle he prepared for all I shall now attempt to explain. Lycurgus, then, finding the Spartans . . . (v.1-2)

In the first of the three chapters on the practices set down by law for each age in succession, Xenophon referred to Lacedaemon and called the education "Laconic" (ii.13 and 14). No polity at all is named in reference to the adolescents and young men in Chapters iii and iv. But Chapters v-x, the discussion about "all" of them together—meaning not all the local inhabitants and not even all of those who entered the "education" but only those who actually remained in the ruling class, who were entering each stage of discipline in succession and continued in good standing—contain ten references to Sparta and the Spartans and only one to Lacedaemon.[14]

As with the education of the boys, Lycurgus' first concern for the Spartans in general was to prevent their living in ease. And as in Chapter iv his means to this end was to make the citizens watch each other rather than constantly have ruling authorities over them: He introduced public messes, "supposing that thus they would least transgress their orders" (v.2).

Also similar to the education of the boys is Lycurgus' regulating the amount of food at these meals (σῖτόν γε ἔταξεν, v.3; cf. ii.5). But here there is a difference: The Spartans are not to go away from the meals hungry. Whereas for the boys the deficiency was to be filled by stealing, at the common mess "much that is beyond the reckoned is also added from what was taken in hunting; and the rich sometimes contribute also wheat-bread instead . . ." (v.3).[15]

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[14] Does Xenophon thus imply that all Lacedaemonians were eligible to receive this training and that those who completed it, the ruling class, were called Spartans?—Yet the reference in v.2 indicates that the name "Spartans" antedates the laws of Lycurgus. Was it perhaps by a reform of Lycurgus that Lacedaemonians became eligible to become "Spartans" (if they had the wherewithal)? Or was the education "Laconic" in name only? Or both?

[15] "Wheat-bread" (ἄρτον) is an emendation most modern editors accept in place of the MSS' reading, "without work" (ἀργόν). If ἀντιπαραβάλλουσιν might with the latter mean "they contribute in behalf of (in place of the contribution of) one who is idle," the

Xenophon next mentions Lycurgus' effort to prevent excessive drinking and concludes by asking: "Now, their having mess together in this manner, how would one either by gourmandise or drunkenness ruin either himself or his household?" (v.4) But as though the question were premature, Xenophon proceeds to discuss other aspects of the common mess that maintain decorum there among the citizens (v.5-7). Finally, declaring that Lycurgus observed the good effects on the body when food is worked off and took to mind the example of those who by their own judgment enjoy laboring, Xenophon mentions his order that in the gymnasia the citizens be watched and commanded to exercise (v.8). Xenophon's conclusion about the success of this practice (v.9), unlike his conclusion about the Spartans' practices with a view to good bodily condition in Chapter i as well as the conclusion earlier in this chapter, is emphatic and unambiguous.[16]

In Chapter v as in most of the treatise thus far, there is nothing subtle either about Lycurgus' purposes or about his methods. We might summarize Chapters ii-v by saying that he sought to make the Spartan citizens both morally and physically fit for public service by putting them constantly under the watchful public eye. Chapter vi, on their common sharing of what usually are private goods, seems not only to show still more of Lycurgus' goal of inculcating a public spirit but also to indicate what the citizens stand to gain after being deprived of the private satisfactions both of self-indulgence and of self-governance. For the chapter begins by speaking of both the ruling and the enjoyment of one another's goods (vi.1). And the conclusion is particularly revealing:

> Wherefore sharing thus with one another even those having little partake of all that is in the country, whenever they should need something. (vi.5)

Here at last we find some private compensation beyond eligibility for high office, a motive for the Spartans to endure their laborious training and many deprivations—or at least a motive for the poor among them.

But we notice a difference between the beginning and the end of this chapter. Whereas in the beginning the opposite practice "among the other cities" is said to be that "they rule each his own children, servants, and wealth" (vi.1), Xenophon writes of shared "*ruling*" in Sparta only in the case of children (vi.1-2). As he proceeds to discuss the sharing of servants and then of various forms of wealth, the words "use" and

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reading might be comparable to *Cyr.* I.ii.15. (Thus perhaps the meaning of Fr. Portus, whose "explanation is sufficiently obscure" to F.G. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonteum* [Leipzig, 1801], s.v. ἀντιπαραβάλλειν.)

[16] His use of a form of the word σφάλλειν ("to trip up") this fourth time in the chapter is, in this light, quite wry. See Strauss, pp. 514-15.

''need'' are stressed by frequent repetition (vi.3-5), and the stipulation, ''whenever they should need something,'' is added almost as a tag at the end of the chapter's conclusion. ''Community'' (vi.3) actually means limited borrowing at the owner's convenience. Moreover, the beginning of the chapter led us to expect that ''wealth'' in general was to be shared in Sparta; but while several specific examples are given—hunting dogs, horses, provisions for extended hunting—no mention is made at all of money. The word χρήματα seems to have more its literal sense of ''usables''—and only certain ones at that—than its more general and common sense of ''wealth.''

Chapter vii now seems to follow even more logically and rhetorically after Chapter vi than it did in our initial overview of the treatise. For it explains why, under the laws of Lycurgus, the limitation of their sharing of goods to certain usables is no real denial to the poor Spartans, as they have no use for either money or the so-called 'finer' things for which money is usually sought. Lycurgus forbade ''the free'' in Sparta to have anything to do with the pursuits of wealth common to all in the other cities; ''but such things as provide freedom for cities—these he ordered them to believe their only functions'' (vii.1-2). Xenophon presents here a very orderly argument of three reasons to answer the rhetorical question, Why should the Spartans have a serious concern for wealth anyway? The equality ordered by Lycurgus to govern both their contribution of supplies and their living should preclude their longing for wealth for the sake of pleasure; personal adornment is by good bodily condition rather than by opulence of clothing; and esteem is to be won more by benefiting others through bodily labor than by spending wealth (vii.3-4). We observe in the presentation of these considerations a progression from the desire of private pleasure to vanity (concern for one's appearance to others) to the desire for esteem from generosity. The last argument is unusual, for it is difficult to understand why the generous use of wealth should be any less ''a function of the soul'' than is the generous use of one's bodily labor or why it should win less gratitude and esteem.

We note in all of this that the word χρήματα does indeed carry the more general and common meaning of ''wealth.'' For not only are the Spartans supposed to spurn ''riches'' (πλοῦτος, vii.3 and 4), but—what seems to be the same thing—they are supposed not to ''acquire usables'' nor ''long for usables'' nor ''gather usables'' (vii, *passim*). But perhaps we are quibbling over words and should distinguish between Spartan wealth and common wealth. Xenophon mentioned in Chapter vi only certain forms of wealth. Hunting dogs, for example (vi.3), are used for the noble exercise of hunting (iv.7).

The next and last part of Chapter vii explains that Lycurgus also prevented the unjust acquisition of wealth by establishing an extraordinarily bulky and therefore detectable currency and by punishing anyone found to possess gold or silver (vii.5-6). Xenophon closes with a second rhetorical question, similar to the one raised earlier in the chapter: "Why, then, would one take serious concern there for the acquiring of wealth, where the acquisition provides more pains than the use (provides) joys?" Here too, however, there is something odd in Xenophon's argument. Why should it be necessary to prevent the acquiring of wealth by unjust means if *all* wealth, even wealth acquired "legitimately," is proscribed in Sparta?[17] We must therefore consider more closely what "joys" are possible with the use of money even in Sparta. For the fact is, after all, that there are rich men in Sparta (v.3) and that Spartan men are concerned about the inheritance of their wealth (i.9). Chapter vi indicated that some possess, besides hunting dogs, servants and horses permanently at their disposal, and the uses of these certainly extend to far more than hunting. And Chapter v mentioned the greater abundance of food owned by "the rich"—even though this should be, according to vii.3-4, a source neither of pleasure nor of esteem to them. Finally, we begin to wonder whether there is some connection implicit in the first chapter between "wealth" and "power" (i.9).

These reflections tempt us to discern in the closing question of Chapter vii a reminder of Xenophon's earlier discussion of a practice set down as noble for Spartan boys, a practice involving brief pains but lasting joy with esteem.

As if anticipating just such a suspicion, Xenophon strongly affirms—nay, almost protests—in the very next sentence: "But indeed, that in Sparta especially they obey the ruling authorities and the laws, we all know" (viii.1; cf. vii.1, κατέστησεν . . . νόμιμα, and vii.5, νόμισμα . . . κατεστήσατο). Chapter viii explains in three parts how the strict obedience whipped into the Spartans as boys and young men is both prompted and enforced for all. There may be an indication of a more general reason for its inclusion in the treatise, however, in Xenophon's referring to this obedience as "*this* good condition" (viii.1). The demonstrative indicates a distinction from as well as a comparison to the "good condition" mentioned just a few sentences earlier, "good condition *of body*" (vii.3). "Good condition" was earlier mentioned without specification, in iv.6, when it seemed to refer to the body; but we notice now that there, too, the practice in question included exercise in obedience as well as in bodily

[17] See the inference to which Ollier was driven by this observation: *La République*, p. 43.

fitness. One commentator has remarked, "*this* good condition" must now mean "good condition of the *soul*."[18] Xenophon is silent.

"The strongest in the city" set an example of obsequious obedience (viii.1-2). These "strongest" correspond to "the more powerful . . . in the other cities." (Cf. vii.1?) The latter consider such obedience to be inconsistent with their free condition. Xenophon does not say that in Sparta "the strongest" consider it to be consistent with freedom but rather implies that they are not concerned about the appearance of freedom in this sense. This must qualify our understanding of the Spartan citizens as "the free" and indicate some difference between the freedom of individual citizens and the freedom of the city as a whole (in the preceding chapter, vii.2), which would probably not admit of even the appearance of obeisance to any other city or empire.[19]

Xenophon introduces the example of obedience set by the strongest not to show how the citizens at large are made obedient but rather to confirm a certain conjecture: that before attempting to establish obedience in Sparta Lycurgus must have made these strongest men to be of like mind (viii.1). This is what especially impresses Xenophon. Evidently the strongest were made to see that it was in their interest to have the citizens give strict obedience to these ruling authorities and these laws, laws establishing a class of men robust, warlike, enured to hardships, of simple needs, anxious to obtain honor through virtue and yet, above all, obedient.

The citizens' obedience was not made to depend solely on the good example of those strong enough to disobey with impunity if they wished. The second part of the chapter tells of the extraordinary, even tyrannic power invested in the ephorate. This is evidently the greatest ruling office of all in the city, and so the very center of the polity. In a treatise that began with birth, we find here also the first shadow of death; for the ephors have sovereign authority to put even ruling officials on trial for their lives (literally: to put them into a contest about the soul, viii.4).

But it is difficult to discern which is more central here, the ephorate or those who created it or assisted in its creation. As in the first part, Xenophon's attention is focused not just on the institution effecting obedience but first on "the strongest in the city":

> And it is likely that these same ones helped to establish also the power of the ephorate, since they judged obedience to be a very great good in a city,

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[18] Fr. Portus, according to Sturz, s.v. εὐεξία, par. 2.

[19] Cf. the contrast in Chapter iii between the Lycurgean training of adolescents at Sparta and the practice elsewhere, where "none rules them any longer, but they leave them autonomous."

> in an army, and in a household; for the greater the power that the ruling authority has, they supposed, so much the more would it overwhelm the citizens so that they heed. (viii.3)

While disclosing that "there are also many other noble contrivances by Lycurgus with a view to the citizens' being willing to obey the laws," Xenophon writes in the third and last part of this chapter only of one: Lycurgus obtained divine approval of his laws (viii.5). More precisely, he obtained from Apollo an oracular decree that it would be altogether better "for Sparta" if Sparta were to obey the laws that Lycurgus himself set down, and this decree was sought especially to impress "the mass"—meaning, we presume, the mass of "the citizens," i.e. those who constitute the polity called "Sparta." Xenophon considers this to be "among the noblest" of such contrivances but does not explain why. Perhaps it is that the citizens thus become more "willing" to obey the laws, a word not used in the earlier parts of the chapter.

Xenophon mentions once again "the strongest" as having some part in this contrivance, too. Here we quote from Strauss:

> Whereas he makes it perfectly clear that these men accompanied Lycurgus when he went to Delphi to ask the god for confirmation of the laws 'which he himself had given,' he says merely that they 'helped in establishing the power of the office of the ephors.' It is perhaps not out of place to question the identity of the man or men with whom the most powerful Spartiates collaborated in establishing the power of the ephors. Did they collaborate simply with each other?[20]

One further remark about this chapter is in order here. "We all know," Xenophon wrote in introducing the subject, that "in Sparta" (or perhaps "especially in Sparta"?[21]) there is obedience "both to the ruling authorities and to the laws." Of the three parts that we have discerned in the chapter, the first and second treat primarily of obedience to the authorities while the third has to do primarily with obedience to the laws. Does this mean that it is left to the god to secure obedience to the laws? We are almost induced by Xenophon's emphatic manner in the second part to ask: Of what is the god "sovereign" (viii.4, twice of the ephors)? Of what is he "capable"? Can he "punish right on the spot"? What "power" does he have? (Cf. ii.10.) But there is no need to make such comparisons. For the function of this divine approval is, after all, to make the citizens *willing* rather than merely coerced into obeying the laws. Besides, the ephors themselves enforce the laws. *They* see to it that the other ruling officials rule according to the law (viii.4). Since for the

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[20] Strauss, p. 527.
[21] Cf. Thucydides I.95.

citizens and lesser officials, however, obedience to the laws means obedience to their superiors' decisions about the laws, we must conclude that obedience to the ruling officials and especially to the ephors is likely to be much readier in Sparta than obedience to the laws themselves.

We have discerned a progression of thought in Chapters v-viii. We may also understand these chapters as part of the larger order of Chapters i-x. For while Chapters i-iv followed the Spartans from birth into full maturity, Chapters v-viii have discussed the laws and practices bearing on them "all" (v.1); and in x.1-3 will come a brief discussion of an institution pertaining to those "at the end of life" (x.1). Perhaps it is not inappropriate, however, that a chapter having to do with death itself comes before the disussion of old age in Sparta. Chapter ix treats of the preference for noble death in war to shameful flight. Needless to say, such a death would prevent the advance to old age. At the same time Xenophon stresses that, "to speak truly, being preserved for a longer time follows upon virtue more than upon baseness" (ix.2).

Xenophon continues with a brief but impressive list of the advantages of courage over cowardice:

> for it is easier, more pleasant, more expeditious, and stronger. And it's clear that acclaim, too, most follows virtue; for all wish to ally themselves somehow with the good. (ix.2)

Nevertheless, there is evidently still not enough advantage in it to make the citizens practice this virtue of their own accord. After all, it is death that is being braved, and indeed not *all* will be "preserved for a longer time"; for it is only "fewer" of the courageous who die (ix.1). This explains Xenophon's introductory remark that Lycurgus deserves admiration for having effected in the city this preferability of noble death to shameful life. As in the discussions of virtue in Chapter iv and obedience in Chapter viii, Xenophon frankly discusses a contrivance by which the citizens do what is good for the city as a whole for private reasons. ". . . He, then, clearly prepared happiness for the good, for the base, unhappiness" (ix.3).

The remainder of this chapter elaborates the severe dishonor attendant on cowardice. As in Chapter iv, anxiety about honors supplies the motive for virtue. We observe in Xenophon's elaboration here a particular emphasis on the coward's being "without place." (This is given literary emphasis as well: . . . ἀχώριστος περιγίγνεται, καὶ ἐν χοροῖς δ' εἰς τὰς ἐπονειδίστους χώρας ἀπελαύνεται, καὶ μὴν ἐν ὁδοῖς παραχωρητέον αὐτῷ . . ., ix.5.) Moreover, he is without place not just in Sparta but "in Lacedaemon" (ix.4). Lycurgus' contrivance is indeed impressive. For not only would the citizen of Sparta choose to risk a "noble death" (ix.1)

to avoid disgrace and gain a better chance of preservation. Xenophon's conclusion goes farther:

> With such dishonor laid upon the base, I indeed don't at all wonder at the choosing there of death [simply] before a so dishonored and reproachable life. (ix.6)

While the unhappiness prepared by Lycurgus for the base is very clear, Xenophon's conclusion still leaves us wondering what happiness he prepared for the good. Does it consist of the honors opposite to the dishonors mentioned? (Cf. again Chapter iv.) We have long awaited some description of the Spartans' happiness (i.2).

Perhaps Chapter x finally begins to answer this expectation. For it continues the theme of Lycurgus' inducements to practice virtue, but now—in the first part at least—the inducement is more enticing. The first part begins:

> Nobly does Lycurgus seem to me to have legislated also a way by which virtue might be exercised until old age. For by setting the selection for the senate at the end of life he made gentlemanliness not to be neglected even in old age. (x.1)

Oddly, the order of the whole is thus disrupted without a clear reason. For while this reward might be an inducement for all the Spartans, it applies more particularly to those "in old age" or at least is a reward that comes only "at the end of life," whereas in x.4 Xenophon will turn again to a discussion of what applies more directly and constantly to "all."

To continue with the first part: Xenophon declares "admirable also" Lycurgus' endowment of the senate (γεροντία, council of elders) with a grave authority so as to make venerable the old age of these good men. His explanation of it, however, if read literally, is one of the more bewildering passages in Greek literature:

> . . . for, establishing the senators as sovereign over the contest about the soul (i.e. in trials on capital charges) he made old age to be more honored than the vigor of those in their prime. And, as is indeed likely, this contest especially of humans is taken seriously. For noble also are the gymnastic (contests); but these are of bodies, whereas the contest about the senate provides a judgment of good souls. To the extent, then, that the soul is stronger than the body, to that extent also are the contests of the souls more to be taken seriously than those of the bodies. (x.2-3)

The passage has scarcely troubled most commentators at all, for they simply take "this contest" to refer to the contest for admission to the senate, even though the demonstrative would ordinarily refer to "the contest" just mentioned, trial on a capital charge. Why should we think twice about an ambiguity that admits of so simple a resolution? What is

interesting is that the passage does compel us to think twice, for nothing is more natural on a first reading than to understand the trial for one's life as being the contest of humans that is taken with uttermost seriousness—a reading, moreover, that fits the context well insofar as this fact lends gravity and therefore honor to the senate. Having been forced to trouble over this by the sentence that follows ("For noble also . . ."), we may notice in the last sentence Xenophon's use of the plural "the contests." It is difficult to believe that Xenophon could write such a general conclusion about "the contests of the souls" in oblivion of so recent a reference to one momentous kind of contest of the soul, but at the same time it is difficult to understand why Xenophon should here be referring to both kinds of contest. We recall that not long before this Xenophon compared the ephors as "sovereign . . . to put (lawbreakers) in contest about the soul (on trial for their lives)" to "the presidents in the gymnastic contests" (viii.4). Since in Chapter x the comparison is explicitly made to be between contestants for the senate and gymnastic contestants, perhaps we are to take it as a literary inference about the relative status of the ephors and the senators. On the other hand we are compelled to consider the great difference between being judged for admission to the senate (as well as for victory in a gymnastic contest) and being judged for one's very life. The seriousness of a trial on a capital charge increases the honor of those chosen to be judges. But can the competition to become such a judge be nearly so much a concern to a soul, can it make nearly so much difference to a soul as the trial for life itself—at least for those who are in their prime (as opposed to "at the end of life"[22]) and for whom the senatorial contest is still a distant event? Xenophon's general conclusion, then, following the reminder that Spartans in their prime—even rulers—may be put on trial for their lives by the ephors, perhaps alludes to a motivation to practice virtue that would seem still more negative than the unhappiness described in Chapter ix. Such an interpretation might be belied by the conclusion in Chapter ix that the Spartans might well "choose death before a so dishonored and reproachable life." If not more fearsome, however, this punitive power of the ephors constitutes a more direct and tangible threat and applies to much more than cowardice in battle. The happiness awaiting the good Spartans at the end of their lives, then, is the honor of being chosen to judge whether the severest of punishments should be applied in some cases to those who are not good. And this information comes just when we expected to be learning in what way Lycurgus "clearly prepared hap-

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[22] See Ollier's note, *La République*, p. 50.

piness'' not just for those who have continued practicing virtue into their old age but for ''the good'' Spartans in general.

Xenophon's conclusion in x.3 is qualified. It might be interpreted more simply, as it is by one translator: ''Just as'' the soul ''is more important than the body . . .''[23] But Xenophon does write ''To the extent that . . .'' and uses the word ''stronger'' (κρείττων) rather than one that would more usually convey the meaning ''more important'' (as σπουδάζεται or ἀξιοσπουδαστότεροι in this passage). Since this conclusion by the Socratic Xenophon refers to ''contests of the souls'' in general and refers to the relation between soul and body in general, the following translation also comes to mind: ''To the extent, then, that the soul is master over the body, to that extent also are the contests of the souls more to be taken seriously than those of the bodies.''[24] Earlier in this passage Xenophon did not compare ''old age'' to 'the prime of life' nor ''old men'' to 'those in their prime' but made instead a compendious comparison between ''old age'' and ''the vigor of those in their prime'' (x.2); and the passage as a whole suggests an association of ''the soul'' with ''old age'' and of ''the body'' and gymnastic contests with ''those in their prime.'' Perhaps we are to consider that for many humans the soul is likely to become relatively stronger in old age as the body weakens. It may be more than the distance of time separating younger men from the contest for the senate that makes the contest more of interest to those ''in old age'' (x.1). It may also be the greater difficulty of making the soul master over the body in the youth and prime of life that makes such contests—and perhaps even the risk of a trial for one's very life?—a less sure inspiration to virtue for the younger Spartans. In this passage contests of the soul are twice referred to as being of serious concern (σπουδάζεται) or as deserving more serious concern (ἀξιοσπουδαστότεροι). The passage thus complements the two rhetorical questions of Chapter vii concerning wealth and leads us to wonder which of the two, contests of the soul or wealth, is likely to be in fact of more serious concern to the Spartan citizens.

The first part of Chapter x, then, while discussing a notable honor as one positive inducement for the Spartans to practice virtue, seems at the same time to indicate certain limits to the effectiveness of such inducements. This suspicion is borne out by what follows:

> But this, now, of Lycurgus, how is it not greatly admirable?—who, since he learned that wherever those who *wish* care for virtue, they are not sufficient to increase their fatherlands, he made it necessary (ἠνάγκασε) for all to practice all the virtues publicly. (x.4)

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[23] Moore, p. 85.

[24] Cf. in Sturz, s.v. κρείττων, par. 5b.

Xenophon has declared the nobility (or non-ignobility) and admirability of all the institutions under review since the last part of Chapter viii (viii.5; ix.1, 3; x.1, 2); but here he questions (albeit "rhetorically") whether this necessity to practice virtue publicly is admirable.[25] This might explain why the order of the treatise has been disrupted in this chapter and also why Xenophon, so straightforward about the ulterior purposes of many of the other Spartan institutions, seemed to be writing so obscurely in the first part of the chapter. When he proceeds to discuss the first of what seem to be two aspects of this necessity, "the greatest punishments" for those who are "openly neglectful of being as good as possible"—i.e. those who are "base and unmanly"—he introduces this, too, with a question, now about its nobility (x.5-6). He does grant, however, that the necessity for all to practice publicly all the virtues makes it "apt" that Sparta differ from all the cities in virtue just as private individuals who practice it differ in virtue from those who neglect it. (No comparison is made to private individuals who practice it because they *wish* to do so.) It also seems "apt" to Xenophon that Lycurgus imposed the greatest punishments on the base and cowardly.

The discussion of punishments seems to continue anew the explanation of how Lycurgus "clearly prepared . . . unhappiness for the base" (ix.3). What follows, though it is not said to prepare "happiness for the good" or to be admirable or noble, does finally reveal a positive inducement to "all" the Spartans not only to be steadfast in battle but to endure all the labors and deprivations involved in Spartan citizenship:

> And he imposed also the most irresistible necessity to practice every political virtue. For to those completing the lawful (requirements) he made the city their own for all alike, and he did not at all take into account weakness, neither of bodies nor of wealth; but if one should flinch from laboring through the lawful (requirements), that one he ordained not to be thought any longer to be one of the peers. (x.7)

By calling this "the most irresistible necessity" Xenophon indicates that it is a more effective inducement than any of those preceding.[26] It seems to recall especially the advantage that the poor Spartans were earlier said to gain from the community of goods among the citizens (vi.5). We recall also, however, the mediocre extent of that sharing. And we note a subtle difference between the phrase here translated as "those completing (ἐκτελοῦσιν) the lawful" requirements and the phrase Xenophon used in the *Memorabilia* to represent Socrates' definition of aristocracy: "those

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[25] See Strauss, pp. 512-13 ff.

[26] Cf. Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 451-454.

completing (ἐπιτελούντων) the lawful'' requirements (*Mem.* IV.vi.12). The difference is reflected in Xenophon's equating here ''completing the lawful'' with ''laboring through the lawful (τὰ νόμιμα διαπονεῖσθαι)'' and in his choice of the word ''flinch from'' as in iii.3. ''The irresistible necessity'' for the poor Spartans to endure labors and deprivations, in return for a chance to rule and a very modest share of the goods in the city, seems to consist in the fact that their only alternative is to live in even worse poverty and to have no part at all in ruling.

Yet some wealth is needed in order to fulfill the lawful requirements in the first place, for Lycurgus ''did not at all take into account (make allowance for) weakness . . . of wealth.'' At the very least the Spartans must throughout their lives contribute an equal portion to the common mess (ii.5; v.3; vii.3) but they may not farm or ply a trade to supply it (vii.1-2). Perhaps this at last explains the statement in the first chapter that ''. . . the men wish to acquire for their children brothers who share in the clan and in the power but do not make claims on the wealth'' (i.9; cf. iii.3). ''Power'' in that context now appears to mean at least the financial power to subsidize the leisure of these adopted sons (as well as the heirs) to receive the Spartan training and engage in the other Spartan activities. (Such patronage would no doubt increase the step-father's power in turn.)

Xenophon concludes this part of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* with a remark about the antiquity as well as the novelty of Lycurgus' laws. The treatise as a whole began with Xenophon's amazement at Sparta's power and renown. He stated that his examination of the Spartans' practices dispelled that amazement. But about Lycurgus he was still amazed. Here he tells ''what is most amazing of all'': that ''all praise such practices'' even though ''no city at all is willing to imitate them'' (x.8). This wonder is not and perhaps cannot be dispelled.[27]

However true it may be that Chapters i-x explain the power and renown of Sparta, nevertheless Xenophon does go on to discuss the superior military arrangements made by Lycurgus for the Lacedaemonians as a whole. (That the writing no longer centers on the Spartans alone is indicated from the start, in xi.2.) This makes sense inasmuch as the power and renown of Sparta came to light in war, for the Spartans fought their great wars not alone but together with the other Lacedaemonians. But what place does this discussion have under the title, *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*? If the *polity* of the Lacedaemonians is the aristocracy

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[27] See Strauss, pp. 528-31.

of the Spartans, how do the Lacedaemonian military practices bear on that polity?

Xenophon begins by observing that the ephors proclaim which age groups are to be drafted, not only for the cavalry and hoplites but also for the artisans. He gives the result especially of the drafting of the artisans: ". . . so that as many (things) as humans use in the city, of all of these even in the army the Lacedaemonians have a ready abundance" (xi.2). Ollier comments here:

> It was in general the desire of the Greeks on campaign to possess the most commodities possible. But let us not forget that at Sparta the needs of the citizens were, officially at least, quite reduced. One sees therefore what is the import, relatively restrained, of Xenophon's affirmation.[28]

We amend this observation by noting again that here Xenophon has begun referring not merely to Sparta and its citizens but to the Lacedaemonians in general. Moreover, this "import" is enlarged when Xenophon goes on to mention the provision of the instruments needed by the army "in common"; for the only community of goods mentioned otherwise in this treatise was the more permanent community among the Spartans alone (Ch. vi).

Turning to what pertains to "the contest in arms" itself, Xenophon mentions the provisions for the soldiers' appearance: Lycurgus contrived suitable apparel and armor for them all; and the older soldiers were permitted to comb their hair, Lycurgus "believing that they would thus appear greater, freer, and more gorgon-like" (xi.3).

Xenophon then lists the various officers who command at each level in the army and goes on to emphasize the simplicity of "the Laconic order in arms," how easy it is for the troops to learn "this order" (xi.5-6). One difficulty, however, is noted:

> To fight on all the same alongside whoever is at hand, however, even if they be thrown into confusion, *this* order is no longer easy to learn except for those educated by the laws of Lycurgus. (xi.7)

Xenophon then explains in unusual detail the standard procedures for deploying the troops whenever and wherever an enemy might suddenly appear while the Lacedaemonians are on the march (xi.8-10). We might well wonder: "Why . . . so many details, at times very technical and difficult to comprehend for an ordinary reader, on the formations of the Lacedaemonian troops?"[29] The answer may lie in the context. Especially impressive about these details is their completeness: the Lacedaemonians

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[28] Ollier, *La République*, p. 53.
[29] Ollier, *La République*, p. XXVI.

are fully prepared for any encounter with the enemy. Their preparedness appears to be intended precisely to prevent what was mentioned just before, in xi.7: confusion in the ranks. Yet the tactics are introduced as something that "the Lacedaemonians also do most smoothly" (xi.8) and the "also" here seems to refer to what just preceded. If the Lacedaemonians are able smoothly "to fight on all the same alongside whoever is at hand," why are these tactical procedures so important? Looking more closely, we find that the "also" in xi.8 must refer instead to Xenophon's earlier discussion of "the Laconic order in arms, . . . the Laconic order, . . . this order" as something "easy to learn" (xi.5-6). For regarding the ability to maintain order in the midst of confusion he stated that "*this* order is no longer easy to learn except for those educated by the laws of Lycurgus"; and only the *Spartans* (or those who had been on the way to becoming Spartans) were educated by the laws of Lycurgus. The highly standardized tactical maneuvers are necessary because the non-Spartan Lacedaemonians are not so reliable as soldiers.[30]

Chapter xii describes "the way in which Lycurgus believed it necessary to encamp" (xii.1). Xenophon begins with a technical remark on the geometric shape prescribed for the camps. As the purpose here is to artfully secure the army's safety against the external enemy, this information seems to continue in the tenor of the previous chapter. But what follows suddenly reveals, with an openness unusual thus far in the treatise, a grave problem of internal security against the army's own "friends." Xenophon's attention to this occupies a large part of the chapter. Exactly what the problem is, however, is revealed only indirectly, in the precautions taken against the slaves. The slaves evidently wish to steal arms to forcibly liberate themselves, or they wish to run away, and especially might do so during the night.[31] Frustrated in both actions, they might resort to slaying the soldiers individually, given the opportunity. Evidently they do not bear their slavery lightly.

These slaves are probably to be identified in part as the "artisans" who provide the Lacedaemonians in the army with "as many (things) as humans use in the city . . ." (xi.2). Do the Spartans have the same problem at home in Sparta?[32] While the slaves' hostility is likely to be much the same at home as on campaign, the latter removes the normal barriers

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[30] Cf. Herodotus VII.234.

[31] The MSS' reading here is perfectly intelligible, given the context, and does not require the emendations made by modern editors. The reasoning behind these emendations, expressed well by Ollier, only begs the question: ". . . one would be rightly astonished should Xenophon speak solely of this police mission and say nothing of the much more important surveillance of the enemy" (*La République*, p. 62).

[32] Cf. *Hellenica* III.iii.

against revolt and escape;[33] and in the camp the slaves are congregated closely and constantly and would therefore be more able to conspire and act together.

Xenophon next notes that "they change camps frequently, for the sake both of plundering their enemies and of benefiting their friends" (xii.5). Here Ollier's observation is to the point:

> The 'friends,' as in the preceding (xii.2), can designate only the [Lacedaemonian] army on campaign. Xenophon here again shows himself miserly of explanations. He must envisage, without saying it—which is quite in his manner—cases in which the [Lacedaemonians] camp in enemy territory. Harming the enemies therefore consists of pillaging and ravaging around about the camp—this is the sense of σίνεσθαι in the *Cyropaedia* III.iii.15 and V.v.4. But it is clear that it is in the interest of the army not to stay for long in one region thus treated and to transport itself as often as possible into those which are still well provided.[34]

Besides appearing as a coda to the first half of the chapter, then, on the setup of the army camps, this passage recalls another difference between army life and life at home for the Lacedaemonians (see above, on xi.2). Yet since it follows the discussion of the *slaves* as "friends" it occasions some confusion between the Helot slaves and the Lacedaemonian soldiers themselves.

The remainder of Chapter xii, describing the daily routine within the camp, is clearly about the soldiers alone. It begins:

> And gymnastic exercise is proclaimed by the law for all the Lacedaemonians, at least so long as they are on campaign; so that they become grander in themselves and appear freer than the others. (xii.5)

In this, too, lurks a political note. Xenophon's emphatic reference to "*all* the Lacedaemonians" together with the modifier, "at least so long as they are on campaign," alerts us to the fact that when they are *not* on campaign only the Spartans, so far as we have learned, are required to practice gymnastics regularly (iv.6; v.8-9; vii.3-4), and it is their constant devotion to this, in part, that makes them "the free" (vii.1-4). It is likely that on campaign all the Lacedaemonians do indeed "become grander in themselves" because they become physically greater by exercising, whereas they are said to gain (merely) the *appearance* of freer men. This reading is suggested especially in light of Xenophon's earlier discussion of the permitted coiffure for the older soldiers (xi.3), which can only give them the *false* appearance of being "greater" together with the

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[33] Cf. Critias, fr. 37 in Diels and Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1952), II, p. 393.

[34] Ollier, *La République*, p. 64.

possibly (though not necessarily) truthful appearance of being free men. (Thus with xi.3 cf. iv.7.)

While war requires that all of the Lacedaemonian warriors become stronger and therefore grander in themselves and have the appearance of free men, we must wonder whether this is fully consistent with the aristocracy of the Spartans. Although the non-Spartan Lacedaemonians are not slaves in the strict sense, they are not "free" in the sense that that word has had from the beginning of this treatise. They are subjects of the Spartans. If there is open and anxious distrust of the Helot slaves in the camp, there must be also some anxiety, albeit more concealed, about the non-Spartan Lacedaemonians. Although they have not the same desire to escape, their close quarters and their access to and practice in the use of arms could make them even more dangerous than the slaves. The Lacedaemonians and the Spartans may have a common cause both in their fear of foreign enemies and in a common fear of the slaves. But can this suffice to maintain order in the army?

Finally Xenophon summarizes the rest of the soldiers' daily routine after the morning gymnastics. Apropos of the end of the previous chapter the French Colonel (later General) Boucher wrote:

> Xenophon makes that the limit of his explanations; but they are sufficient for addressing all the movements intrinsic to the march, the muster, and to combat—that is to say, to all those that are really necessary to a troop.[35]

Similarly, following the details of the soldiers' camp routine Xenophon himself concludes both chapters together:

> One need not be amazed that I am writing so much; for among the Lacedaemonians least of all would one find omitted in military matters whatever needs attention. (xii.7)

Perhaps he means that this itself is, in general, what Lycurgus contrived "better than the others" for the army (xi.1).

Has *anything* been omitted? We observe that, whereas the military deficiency of the Lacedaemonian soldiers is remedied by tactics, the doubts raised about their political reliability or their loyalty do not seem to have been answered. Insofar as they have become grander in themselves and appear freer during their campaigning, might not the Lacedaemonians "believe it to be illiberal . . . even to seem to fear their rulers" (viii.2)? If the strongest men in Sparta "judged obedience to be a very great good . . . in an army" (viii.3), then what *power* was established over the campaigning army to correspond to the "power" of the ephors in the city

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[35] "La Tactique grecque à l'origine de l'histoire militaire," *Revue des Études Grecques* 25 (1912), p. 311 (quoted by Ollier, *La République*, pp. 61-62).

(viii.3, again)? Lycurgus is given as the ultimate authority for all of the practices in these two chapters (xi.1; xii.1), and some are presented simply as such (xi.3, 4; xii.2, 3). But who gives the actual commands? In the first practice mentioned in Chapter xi it is the ephors who "proclaim by herald" the drafting and supply of the army. Within the ranks, "in the Laconic order the front-rank men are the rulers; . . . to these it is given to lead, to the others it is ordered to follow" (xi.5-6). The maneuvers are described as if occurring automatically whenever the need arises (thus the verbs in xi.8-10). In the camp the gymnastic exercises are "proclaimed by the law" (xii.5); and while the seating for inspection, the breakfasting and the relief of the outposts are heralded by "the first polemarch," the pastimes, relaxation and evening gymnastics occur as if spontaneously and dinner and repose are simply "heralded" (xii.6-7).

Chapters xi-xii thus seem to present the Lacedaemonian army as being nearly self-sufficient, the highest military authority thus far being the first polemarch but he, too, following standard procedures. Mention of the kings almost seems to have been studiously avoided, and no indication has been given that they are needed. It is left to the next chapter to discuss "what power and honor in the army Lycurgus prepared for the king" (xiii.1). Xenophon begins there by noting the provisions by which the king and his polemarchs are given complete leisure to attend to matters of war. Yet it is striking in this chapter that very little seems to be left to the king's discretion. Just as in the preceding chapters with regard to the army in general, many of the king's functions are carried out according to routine procedures, including sacrifices to the gods (xiii. 2-3), deployment of the front lines when battle is imminent (xiii.6), and perhaps—although it is not specified as the king's office—the final, pre-battle slaughter of a goat (xiii.8). Moreover, in this chapter on the king's powers other functions that might otherwise depend on a commander's orders are mentioned as being attended to, apparently as a matter of course (i.e. even without the king's orders), by lesser officers: deployment of reserve divisions behind the front lines (xiii.7; cf. xi.8-10), adornment of bodies and arms (xiii.8-9; cf. xi.3), and exhortation of the troops (xiii.9; cf. xi.4-6).[36] The deployment of the reserve troops is ordered by "the eldest of those round the public (tent)," which most commentators take to mean 'the king's council.' This includes, as Xenophon pauses to inform us, certain diviners, doctors, and aulos-

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[36] Ollier observes that these bits of information are mixed into this chapter "sans grand rapport avec le reste du developpement" (*Le Mirage* I, p. 384); thus also his note on xiii.8 (*La République*, p. 68). Breitenbach observes the correlation with Chapters xi-xii (col. 1751).

players, as well as any "volunteers" present.[37] One commentator guesses that the "eldest" in question "was presumably the senior regimental commander." But it is quite possible that Xenophon intended no such presumption. For, as that same commentator proceeds to remark:

> It is symptomatic of the lack of sophistication of a hoplite battle that it was not felt necessary for the commander-in-chief to have personal control of the disposition of the reserves . . .[38]

Be that as it may, Xenophon's own comment on that particular passage is as follows: "So that of the things needing to be done, nothing is left wanting; for there is nothing that is not looked to beforehand" (xiii.7).

That the king's responsibilities are minimal in these various preparations for battle is subtly noted in xiii.10: whereas in xiii.8 Xenophon named Lycurgus as the contriver of these noble and advantageous procedures, here he emphatically states (γε μήν, τούτου μὲν δή) that the king is the "Lycurgus" of choosing the time and place for encamping.[39] While such a responsibility is not without consequence,[40] it is not one we would expect to be mentioned in this way as a power that particularly distinguishes the king. It proves too much. Besides, Chapter xii has already described the necessary (χρῆναι) *manner* of encamping established by Lycurgus (xii.1). Because the manuscripts' reading is doubtful, we are uncertain whether the remainder of this sentence (in xiii.10) attributes to the king the additional power to send out ambassadors both friendly and hostile or whether it denies this and therefore minimizes his powers yet further.[41] If the manuscripts are correct, there are never-

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[37] In all the MSS the words "those who rule the soldiery" qualify all or at least the last-named (the aulos-players) of the three non-military groups mentioned. Modern editors, following Zeune, supply the word "and" before these words, but in doing so they exchange one anomaly for another, since then, if the text be read literally, one might have an *ordinary* aulos-player (or diviner or healer), if he happened to be the eldest of the council, giving these military commands.

[38] Moore, p. 118.

[39] With Strauss (p. 527 and n. 5) I follow here the reading of the best MSS, although the same point may be made from the reading of the inferior MSS, κύριος ("in authority, sovereign") in place of "Lycurgus."

[40] Cf. *Cyr.* I.vi.16; for an example of the potential tactical importance of this discretion, however, see *Hell.* VI.v.17-18.

[41] As Ollier (*La République*, p. 70) notes in following Weiske's emendation of the MSS' αὖ to οὐ, "μέντοι indicates, indeed, a contrast with what precedes," and this is true especially when it follows μέν (J.D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* [Oxford, 1934], pp. 370, 404, 409). Sturz (s.v. μέν, par. 12a, d) gives many examples of this meaning for μέντοι, both with and without a preceding μέν, yet lists this particular usage in *Lac.* xiii.10 under par. 12i, meaning "besides, likewise, further." This also is a common meaning of μέντοι in Xenophon according to Denniston (pp. 406-407); but the examples he gives of this "progressive" μέντοι answering to μέν (p. 409) are few and do not seem to parallel the

theless indications at hand of the strict limits to such a power.[42] Xenophon gives only one more example of the king's power or honor in the army: "And all begin from the king whenever they wish to effect something" (xiii.10). The impression that this, at least, reflects the king's great power is enhanced by the suggestive use to ἄρχονται, which in addition to "begin" commonly means "are ruled." Yet this power is immediately explained as one of delegation more than of execution or judgment: the king "sends off" to the appropriate officials those wanting justice, money, or to dispose of booty. The next sentence, which concludes the chapter, confirms this:

> With things being effected in this way, no other function remains to the king on campaign than to be priest for the things pertaining to the gods and general for those pertaining to the humans. (xiii.11)

The conclusion therefore begs the question. For while Xenophon related much about the king's sacrificing to the gods, all that we have learned of his functions as general amounts to very little. Perhaps we are ignoring the obvious: that a general's function is primarily to make "higher" strategic decisions, which, being many and varied, are difficult to elaborate but commonly understood—the decision of when and where to seek to engage the enemy, for example. Xenophon would have some such decisions in mind when he writes, in xiii.5: "Whenever the sacrifices are completed the king, summoning all, announces what is to be done." This statement, however, must give us pause. For Xenophon does not write, as translators have rendered it, "gives his orders,"[43] but more precisely: "gives the word (or the news) as to the things to be done" (παραγγέλει τὰ ποιητέα).[44] Both the first part of the sentence and the context in general suggest strongly that the "orders" being given are those that have been decided finally not by the king but by the instruc-

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sense that would be called for here. As for evidence from the context, Ollier's argument from the last sentence of the chapter not only is not certain, since the word ἄλλο ("other") is ambiguous, but is also belied by the immediate context of that sentence. On the other hand, the simple καί ("and") that opens the sentence following the one in question (xiii.10) argues for the reading of Sturz in favor of the MSS. For external evidence: there are Xenophontic examples of kings sending and receiving ambassadors: *Hell.* II.iv.31 (Pausanias), III.iv.11, 25 and IV.v.6, 9 (Agesilaus); whereas there are no examples, to my knowledge, of any historian's specifying that ambassadors were sent or received by the ephors who were present. I venture no positive conclusion from all of this.

[42] The final authority of the ephors over ambassadors and even over the kings is implicit in *Lac.* viii.4. Cf. *Hell.* II.ii.12, 17; III.iv.26. Above all, with II.iv.31, 35 cf. III.v.25.

[43] Thus Ollier; similarly Moore.

[44] One will observe from Sturz's collection of Xenophon's uses of the word παραγγέλλειν that none of them requires anything more than a quite literal translation, even though the contexts of several suggest the giving of original orders.

tions of the gods through the medium of the sacrifices. The important decisions are made finally by the gods.

Having briefly described the sacrifices, the attendance there of all the Lacedaemonian officers (while of the confederate generals only the ones who wish) under the quiet but sobering presence of the ephors, and thereupon the king's delivery of the commands, Xenophon remarks:

> So that, seeing these things, you might suppose the others to be improvisers in military matters but the Lacedaemonians alone to be truly artists in matters of war. (xiii.5)[45]

The priestly functions of the kings are not merely incidental but essential and even central to their functions as commanders of the Lacedaemonian army.

How might one suppose that this makes the Lacedaemonians "truly artists in matters of war"? We recall that divine sanction of the laws was referred to by Xenophon as "among the noblest" of Lycurgus' contrivances for making the citizens willingly obedient (viii.5). And obedience, again, was judged by the strongest men in Sparta to be a very great good in an army as well as in a city and in a household. Since they might understandably have been reluctant to help establish for the kingship powers as great as those of the ephorate, these strongest men might well have desired to secure obedience in the army precisely by limiting its commander's personal responsibility while elevating him as the intermediary of the gods. This may explain why the city's sustenance of "the king and those with him" seems to parallel the king's offering sacrifices "to Zeus the Leader and those with him" (xiii.1-2).[46] Precisely insofar as the soldiers understand the king to be making few decisions merely as a human but rather to be relaying the most important orders as from the gods, they will be more inclined (if either pious or cautious) to remain obedient in the absence of other motives. Another motive is supplied, to be sure—especially for the Spartan officers and perhaps not least of all for the king himself—by the presence of the ephors: ". . . they inspire moderation in *all* . . ." (xiii.5).

In another writing Xenophon remembers no less a judge than Socrates attributing the great power of Sparta in war to the obedience brought about by Lycurgus:

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[45] Ollier (*La Rèpublique*, p. 67) gives a very loose interpretation of this sentence because he understands ταῦτα ("these things") to refer only to the last half of the immediately preceding sentence. But since it occurs here rather than at the end of Chapter xi or xii or after the very next sentences of this chapter (xiii.6-7), we take the statement to refer rather to xiii.2-5 or 3-5.

[46] See Strauss, p. 533.

> "And of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian," said Socrates, "have you learned, that he would have made Sparta no different from the other cities if he had not wrought in it obedience to the laws? Of those ruling in the cities do you not know that the ones who are most responsible for the citizens' obeying the laws, these are the best men, and a city in which the citizens most obey the laws—in peace it carries on best and in war it is irresistible?" (*Mem.* IV.iv.15)[47]

The laws of Lycurgus are admirable in that they inculcate obedience to the laws.

Near the end of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*, however, Xenophon writes in his own name of a change that has taken place:

> But if someone should ask me if still even now the laws of Lycurgus seem to me to remain unmoved, this by Zeus I would no longer boldly say. (xiv.1)

After listing—again emphatically in his own name—four symptoms of this change, stressing in each case the difference between what was "formerly" and what is "now" (xiv.2-5), Xenophon remarks:

> And therefore the Hellenes formerly, going to Lacedaemon, entreated them to take the lead against those who were held to be doing injustice; but now many call one another forth to prevent *them* from ruling in turn. But there is certainly no need to wonder that these blameworthy things have arisen among them, since they are manifestly obedient neither to the god nor to the laws of Lycurgus. (xiv.6-7)

Disobedience of the laws and of the god threatens to destroy the great power and renown achieved by the Spartans under those laws.

This chapter revises most directly the discussion of obedience in Chapter viii. (We would have to say 'contradicts,' since the verbs in viii.1 are in the present tense; but we noted earlier the possibly wry thrust of the words "especially in Sparta.") Only a part of that chapter is revised, however. For in Chapter xiv Xenophon stresses that the *laws* are no longer obeyed but gives not the slightest indication that obedience to the *rulers* has slackened. (According to the *Memorabilia* Socrates praised not obedience simply but obedience to the laws.) Perhaps "the god" is no longer obeyed in that the "Pythian-sanctioned laws" (viii.5) are no longer obeyed, perhaps *vice versa*. In any case, obedience to the rulers was not made to depend, we recall, on the god's sanction.

The corruption described in xiv.2-4 relates more particularly to the strictures against the acquisition of money, described in Chapter vii.

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[47] Both the particular and the general contexts of this remark must be considered, however. It is addressed specifically to the sophist Hippias. See Strauss, pp. 518-20.

> For I know that formerly the Lacedaemonians chose to be together with one another at home, having a modicum (of goods), rather than be harmosts in the cities and, through being flattered, become corrupted. (xiv.2)

But Xenophon's use of the word "chose" is ironic, for shortly thereafter he informs us that "formerly . . . it was not possible to go abroad, in order that the citizens might not be filled with easy living by their foreign hosts" (xiv.4). Not only have the fear and shame associated with the appearance of wealth vanished but there are "now" many more possibilities for acquiring wealth than there had been "formerly," especially through the office of harmost, or provincial governor.

What has happened between "formerly" and "now," what required the Spartans to send out to new places many more harmosts than before, was precisely the emergence of their great power and renown, their victory in the Peloponnesian War and consequently their attempts to establish the empire that many Hellenes are now urging one another to oppose. Success in war has led nearly to the ruin of the Spartan polity. This may explain why Chapter xiv, following xi-xiii, harks back to the end of Chapter x, where Xenophon wrote summarily of the old age and yet novelty of Lycurgus' laws "still even now." Sparta was amazing for the extreme measures by which Lycurgus sought there to repress the private in the name of the public. Yet even in this "incarnation of the political spirit"[48]—or perhaps especially in it—the extreme tension between public virtue and private desires erupted once the citizens were given real opportunities for private gain.[49]

Chapter xv begins:

> I wish also to explain what compacts Lycurgus made for the king with regard to the city; for indeed this rule alone continues just as it was established from the beginning; the other polities one would find changed and still even now changing. (xv.1)

Xenophon comes very close to calling the kingship a polity. The only reason for his not doing so may be that a monarchy can not properly be termed a polity—this being implicit in Socrates' definition of various regimes, according to the *Memorabilia* (IV.vi.12). Since there are compacts between them, the kings are not simply subordinate to the Spartan aristocracy. Does Xenophon mean that in some sense the Lacedaemonians have two regimes?

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[48] Strauss, p. 531. One must consider the improvements Xenophon thought possible in this polity, as evident in his veiled criticisms of Spartan practices throughout this treatise and as sketched in his fictitious polity of the ancient Persians in the *Cyropaedia* (Strauss, *passim*). Yet see note 55 below.

[49] See also W.E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany, N.Y., 1977), pp. 65-75.

While the introduction promises that the chapter will explain these compacts, only two sentences, late in the chapter, seem to do so:

> And they make oaths to one another monthly, the ephors on behalf of the city and the king on behalf of himself. The oath is: for the king, to reign according to the established laws of the city, and for the city, so long as he remains firm in his oath, to render the kingship undisturbed. (xv.7)

The rest of the chapter up to that point lists the king's *honors*, beginning right after the introduction.

> (Lycurgus) set it down that the king, as being (descended) from the god, offer on behalf of the city all the public sacrifices, and that he lead the army wherever the city should send them out. . . . (xv.2)

And after relating the *oaths*, Xenophon concludes: "These, then, are the honors that have been given to the king at home (in Lacedaemon) when living . . ." (xv.8). We might think therefore that the "compacts" comprise the king's receiving extraordinary honors in return for his observing limits to his rule.

But Xenophon rates these honors as

> nothing much surpassing those of private men; for Lycurgus wished neither to induce in the kings a tyrannic mind nor to create in the citizens an envy of their power. (xv.8)

Given what we have learned of the kingship in Chapter xiii, we might well wonder how tyrannic a mind the king could ever come to have; for he seems to "reign" (xv.7) as more a figurehead than a king or even a military commander (the city dictates *where* the army is to be led, too: xv.2). How much power is there for the citizens to envy?

Whatever its limitations, the kingship does hold command over the army outside of the city. While the ephors as a collective body are ultimately of higher authority (xv.2, "the city"; xv.6), the kings exercise individually and under permanent tenure not only the most glorious but also the most strategic functions. Much depends on what questions are put to the gods (xiii.1 and 3-5). What is more, the kings hold authority not merely over the Spartans and through them over the Lacedaemonians but over all the Lacedaemonians directly. In the encomium of the King Agesilaus, Xenophon indicates again the connection between kingly moderation and the duration of their rule in Lacedaemon, although this time perhaps with some exaggeration (appropriate in an encomium):

> Moreover, it is meet to praise in common his fatherland and his race in this respect: For never did the city, envying their being honored foremost, attempt to destroy their rule, and never did the kings reach for more than was according to the terms on which they received the kingship from the

> beginning. Therefore there appears no other rule that has lasted unbroken, neither democracy nor oligarchy nor tyranny nor kingship; but this alone remains a continuous kingship. (*Ages.* i.4)

As in the present writing, we are induced to wonder: What is it that makes the Lacedaemonian kings respect the limits of their powers and honors, even though the powers be potentially great and the honors "foremost"? If even the foremost honors are mediocre and if the kings are denied substantial power within the city itself, is it mere chance that no soul of more lofty ambition has received the kingship and used the power it carries especially in the army to aggrandize his place in the city, even at some risk of losing this mediocrity and notwithstanding their monthly oaths?[50]

It is as if in answer to some such question that, following his comment on this mediocrity and the reason for it, Xenophon concludes this final chapter of the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* by writing:

> But the honors that have been given to the king when he has died—in this way the laws of Lycurgus wish to show that they have honored foremost the kings of the Lacedaemonians not as humans but as heroes. (xv.9)

As has often been observed, the last words form nearly two full lines of solemn spondaic hexameter. The kings are heroes because they are descended from Heracles and thus from none other than Zeus himself (xv.2; *Ages.* i.2). Those who have honor from the gods[51] as well as present reverence and future worship from humans will less likely feel the sting of restrained ambition while on earth. They can afford to be magnanimous.

Lycurgus also intended the mediocrity of the kings' earthly honors to avoid arousing the envy of the citizens. Such envy is likely to be aroused in Sparta especially inasmuch as in this polity the citizens are raised to yearn for honor and therefore for ruling offices. All other offices for which the citizens are eligible seem to have been restricted to short terms: At least in the case of several high military and political offices, including the ephorate, the term is just one year.[52] Moreover, several passages in the *Hellenica* suggest that many of the highest offices, again including the ephorate, regularly change hands each year.[53] This would prevent any

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[50] Cf. Paul Anthony Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement," Diss. Yale University 1977, pp. 10-17.

[51] See also Ollier's note on xv.5, Πύθιοι (*La République*, p. 72).

[52] E.g. viii.4 (τὸ ἔτος); *Hell.* I.ii.1; iii.1; v.1; vi.1; II.i.10; iii.1, 9-10; III.iv.20.

[53] See the references in note 52. One noteworthy exception to this is perhaps significant precisely as an exception: *Hell.* III.ii.6 (cf. III.i.5-8). Another exception, V.i.13, is more clearly contrary to the law (per II.i.7), although Xenophon is silent about it in that case. See also H.D. Westlake, "Re-election to the Ephorate?" in *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 17 (1976), 343-52.

one citizen's holding the same office for a number of years in succession. The reasons for these restrictions are not difficult to discern: If a whole class of men is driven to practice virtue for the sake of honor, their virtue must be rewarded with honors; yet there is a limited number of honorific offices. What is more, in any regime where the rule of law prevails, and therefore especially in what we might call the exemplary case of Lycurgus' Sparta, any position that would enable an ambitious soul to acquire extensive power and influence would in the worst case open the way to tyrannic revolutions, and in the best case would likely undermine humble obedience to the laws and to the lawful rulers.

That this constant rotation should apply as much to high military commands as to political offices can hardly be surprising since the former would be especially cherished and more dangerous in such a military regime as Sparta's. It is still less surprising that ordinary citizens should be excluded from the highest military command over all the Lacedaemonians. As we are told more directly in the *Agesilaus*, the kings inherit their authority from their fathers, hold it until they die (or are removed by the city), and bequeath it to their sons (or brothers) in turn.

Xenophon's apparent admiration for the longevity of the kingship in Sparta, as expressed both in the *Agesilaus* and in the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*, is very reminiscent—or shall we say 'prominiscent'?—of his observations introducing the *Cyropaedia* (I.i.1-6). Apropos of Xenophon's remarking there on the relative ease with which humans rule over domestic beasts as compared with the extreme difficulty of human rule over other humans, the following comment has been made:

> Whereas members of herds, who are satisfied with the satisfaction of their bodily desires, have no interest in ruling, human beings are constantly competing for rule. That the conflict is constant would seem, on the basis of the reflection presented in I.i.1-2, to be the result of the absence in the case of human rule over human beings of such a clear superiority of rulers to ruled as is present in the case of herdsmen and their herds.[54]

Returning to the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians*, in xv.2 we learn the rationale for the king's offering on behalf of the city all the public sacrifices: the kings are descended from the god. Xenophon does not seem to extend this rationale to the king's leading the army (*ibidem*), but this would be fully in keeping with the chief function there of the king as the army's intermediary with the gods. Beyond rendering the kings more satisfied with their status in the city than they might be otherwise, the attribution of divinity to them provides also a very simple and seemingly clear criterion for determining who shall possess permanently the foremost

[54] C. Bruell, "Xenophon's *Education of Cyrus*," Diss. University of Chicago 1969, p. 3.

personal honors in the city as well as the highest human power in the campaigning army. It precludes any lawful means for ambitious men of humbler origins to rise to such pre-eminence, while giving an impressive countenance of justice to this exclusion. And the completeness of the military arrangements described in Chapters xi-xiii may well be intended above all to circumvent the usual need of more dynamic leaders chosen rather for their prudence.

The decline of the laws of Lycurgus was caused by Lacedaemonian successes in war. The kings were the highest military commanders. Do certain kings, then—or does a certain king—bear some responsibility for that corruption? And does the kingship survive the corrupted Spartan polity for this very reason?[55] As Strauss observed:

> Xenophon shows that the power of the Spartan kings is limited to the functions of priests and of leaders of the army: whereas the king has "power and honor" in time of war, he enjoys only "honors" in time of peace (cf. xiii.1 and 10 f. with xv.8). The Spartan king is thus induced by the very constitution to prefer war to peace. . . .[56]

When Xenophon declared in the beginning of Chapter xiv that the laws of Lycurgus are no longer obeyed, he affirmed it with his only in this treatise: "by Zeus!" Zeus, we repeat, was held to be the forefather of the Lacedaemonian kings.

At the same time, we are also compelled to wonder about the Lacedaemonians' success in war. Are not the restraints on the ambitions of ordinary citizens also restraints against the flowering of great military talents? Might not the restriction of the kingship to the eldest sons of former kings result in military disaster? Xenophon discreetly points to this problem in the *Agesilaus* when, having lauded the impeccable heredity of this king and the long duration of the kingship in this city, he remarks: "But indeed, that he also, before he began to rule, seemed to be *worthy* (ἄξιος) of the kingship, there are the following signs. . . ." (i.5) Blood descent, even if supposed to be from Zeus himself, evidently does not ensure kingly virtue.

To answer these questions would require an "historical" investigation, which the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* does not supply, of their victory in the Peloponnesian War, their establishment of an empire, and the wars waged to expand and defend that empire. This is precisely what Xenophon narrates in the *Hellenica*.

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[55] Cf. the *Cyropaedia* and the interpretation of it by Bruell.

[56] Strauss, p. 525 n. 6.

But we learn in the *Hellenica* that it was not any king who led the Lacedaemonians to victory in the Peloponnesian War. It was the admiral Lysander. This was a naval victory in a naval war. Despite its promise to explain the great power of Sparta, the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* contains not one word about arrangements for naval warfare or admirals. The navy and the admiralty were not established by Lycurgus but were rather brought to prominence by the new military exigencies of the Peloponnesian War. While the "practices of the Spartans" do explain how so small a city could come to lead or dominate the alliance that emerged victorious over the Athenian empire, the laws of Lycurgus did not produce that victory and in fact were at odds with the means required to win the war. For unlike the hoplite warfare traditionally waged by the Lacedaemonians, naval warfare finally required both un-Spartan means—ships, light-armed troops and sailors, and money to acquire ships and pay the troops and sailors—and a commander with the un-Spartan knowledge of how to acquire and use them well. Thus, although the Peloponnesian War made the Spartans begin to pay attention to naval warfare, Spartan admirals were for many years unable to manage these things shrewdly. It was finally the unconventional Lysander who succeeded in this. But in doing so he transformed what had been an office of ambiguous status in Sparta into one that Aristotle could call "nearly another kingship."[57]

It was Lysander, moreover, who laid the groundwork of the Spartans' empire after his victory at Aegospotami, and who brought an immense sum of money into Sparta from the spoils of the war and from the treasury of his Asian sponsor, Cyrus. The Spartans evidently accepted both the money and the empire.[58] But the rulers probably were not delighted with Lysander's unusual, unlawful stature.

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[57] *Politics* 1271a. Lotze observes that "by far most of the thirty-two admirals recorded in Beloch's list are known to us only in this function" (p. 13). What is more, the six exceptions to this mentioned by Lotze are all admirals who held the office *after* Lysander.

[58] Cf. Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979), pp. 56-60.

CHAPTER FIVE

LYSANDER AND THE ATHENIAN CIVIL WAR (*HELLENICA* II.iii.11-II.iv)

Whereas the event narrated in *Hellenica* II.ii.23 appeared to conclude the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians according to the express designation of Thucydides (V.26), Xenophon seems to suggest that the ominous return of Lysander to Sparta is the truer conclusion of that war; for his account of that homecoming is followed by an annalistic ending according to the style of Thucydides (*Hell.* II.iii.9-10). Even if this passage be rejected on suspicion of its being an interpolation by a later hand, the event itself, the return home of the last of the warring troops and the victorious commander, seems to common sense to put the final period to the narrative of the war. But this expectation, too, is belied when Xenophon proceeds straightway, again without editorial comment, with words implying that there can be no separating the events by which Thucydides defined the end of a distinct "motion" in human affairs from the events caused by those events: "Now the Thirty were chosen as soon as (ἐπεὶ τάχιστα) the Long Walls and those around the Peiraeus had been torn down. . . ." (iii.11; cf. again Thuc. V.26.1.) Thus the Athenian sequel begins just where the concluding events of the war began (iii.2-3). Xenophon perhaps indicates in this way that one can understand the war apart from its consequences as little as Thucydides could have begun his own writing at the beginning of Book II (and we might add: as little as one could justly end an account of the Second World War at the surrender of Germany and Japan).

While the concluding narrative of the war had to do mainly with Lysander's activities before leaving Athens, in Samos, and returning to Sparta (iii.1-10), the sequel focuses on the rise and fall of the Thirty oligarchs[1] in Athens (iii.11-iv.43). But we soon find that Lysander has an important part in the latter, too, not only in having effected their appointment as legislators but also in supporting their tyrannic ambitions and in nearly providing for their victory over the people. Apart from whatever other purpose Xenophon's narration of the oligarchy and civil war in Athens might have (perhaps as part of a general treatment of Athenian politics together with I.iv.8-20, v.16-17, vii.1-35 and other

[1] They are usually called the Thirty *tyrants*, but I have tried to reflect Xenophon's implicit suggestion that their rule at first was more aristocratic and then degenerated into tyranny. "Oligarchy" is a neutral term (see e.g., II.iii.47-48).

Athenian passages in the first two books), it may also exemplify both the behavior and the difficult position of Lysander vis-à-vis the Spartan authorities in his support of the oligarchies he helped to establish in many other of the Greek cities besides Samos (cf. III.iv.2, v.13).[2]

Lysander assists the oligarchs on two occasions. The first is not long after their appointment, just at their turning from the popularly accepted murder of the sycophants toward more tyrannic designs (II.iii.12-13). At this time they still conceal their design even from Lysander, telling him that they need a garrison "just, of course (δή), until they should put the scoundrels out of the way and establish the regime . . ." (iii.13). Lysander uses his influence (exactly how, we are not told) to obtain this garrison and in addition, although it was apparently not requested, a Spartan harmost over Athens (iii.14).

The oligarchs immediately begin to put this force to nefarious uses:

> . . . they arrested whom they wished, no longer those who were scoundrels and of little worth but already those who they thought least tolerated being brushed aside and who, making any attempt to act in opposition, would obtain the most associates. (iii.14)

They soon learn, however, that this is only increasing the numbers and organization of their enemies, and so begin to apply their principles more consistently by employing the Spartan garrison along with their trusted accomplices to disarm all but their newly appointed body of Three Thousand "partners" (iii.17-20). Some of the worst excesses that follow are occasioned by their need for money to give to the garrison (iii.21—merely for its "support" or "victualing," per iii.13?). When the last remaining barrier to those domestic excesses, Theramenes, has been eliminated (iii.22-56) and the tyrants have exiled large numbers from the city, the Laconian garrison is sent out with some of the Athenian cavalry to guard against plundering raids by the exiles who hold the fortress of Phyle; caught in a surprise attack by Thrasybulus, more than 120 of the hoplites are slain (II.iv.1-7). The Thirty thereupon employ a ruse to seize and bind the Eleusinians one by one in order to have that town as a refuge if necessary. To secure the complicity of the Three Thousand in the murder of these Eleusinians, i.e. to insure their loyalty through fear of common punishment, the tyrants frighten the reluctant into voting for

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[2] Gaston Colin compares Xenophon's narrative in these chapters with the accounts of Aristotle (in the *Constitution of the Athenians*), Diodorus, and others, and finds Xenophon sadly wanting in plausibility as a meticulous chronicler: *Xénophon historien d'après le livre II des* Helléniques (*hiver 406-405 à 401-0*) (Paris, 1933). But once again we ask, Did Xenophon intend to be a chronicler? Colin makes some useful observations about the structure of Xenophon's narrative (e.g., p. 43) but passes many judgments against his factual reliability without analyzing that structure in depth.

this mass murder by forcing them to vote openly in the Odeon, half of which is filled with the Laconian garrison under arms (iv.8-10). Finally, the garrison is taken to fight along with them against the multitude assembled in the Peiraeus, where once again they are defeated (on the hill Munichia, iv. 10-19).

Thus the tyrants' every step except the elimination of Theramenes depended on the soldiers procured for them by Lysander. Still, these uses of the soldiers were apparently not intended by Lysander, from whom, as we saw, the tyrants concealed their designs. He might have intended merely to support the rule of the best men of Athens as they sought to re-establish the regime of "the ancestral laws" by getting out from under foot "the scoundrels" who came to flourish under the democracy. He had the harmost Kallibios sent without the request of the Thirty perhaps to see to it that the garrison be used properly or at least so that it might remain under control of himself or of the ephors. Can he be blamed if, going beyond their promise to θρέφειν ("victual") the requested garrison, these tyrants ἐθεράπευον πάσῃ θεραπείᾳ ("served with every service") the harmost so that, corrupted, he served their purposes (iii.14)?

Following that first battle in the Peiraeus (iv.10-19), and owing in part to the speech of Kleocritus just after the battle (iv.20-22), the Three Thousand were divided among themselves.

> For those who had done anything violent and were afraid spoke strenuously that it was necessary not to yield to those in the Peiraeus; but those who were confident of having done no injustice both reckoned to themselves and taught the others that they had no need of these evils, and they said it was necessary not to obey the Thirty nor to leave it to them to destroy the city. And in the end they voted to depose them (the Thirty) and to choose others. And they chose ten, one from each tribe. (iv.23)

This compromise, however, does not end their dilemma, for there remains the question of what they are to do about "those in the Peiraeus." Because they are still divided on this they are "much disturbed and distrustful of one another," and therefore the newly elected Ten are driven to "keep a careful watch over them with (the aid of) the cavalry commanders" (iv.24). The cavalry are kept together at night in the Odeon along with their horses and now armed also with shields,

> and through distrust they patrolled along the walls from evening onward with their shields and toward dawn with their horses, always fearing lest some of those from the Peiraeus should fall upon them. (iv.24)

Xenophon's brevity here perhaps requires comment. Brownson remarks on this patrolling by the cavalry: "In their 'distrust of one another' they

sought by this means to prevent desertions to Peiraeus."[3] This point seems to have been missed by most other commentators; the oligarchs are guarding not only against "those from the Peiraeus" but also against their own associates among the Three Thousand. In other words, the newly elected Ten show no inclination to pursue or permit reconciliation with the democrats; they still abide by the policy urged strenuously by "those who had done anything violent and were afraid."[4]

Guarding against their own associates is necessary in order to maintain that policy, and that policy is perhaps necessary following their imprudence in taking an active part in the unjust and violent rule of the Thirty. But as their isolation narrows, the military situation of these oligarchs only worsens. Xenophon contrasts this situation with that of the democrats in the Peiraeus, whose promise of benefits in the city even to foreigners is helping to increase still more their ever growing numbers, while those numbers include ever more "hoplites" (many with newly fashioned arms of wood or of wicker) and "even cavalry, about seventy" (iv.25). The spirits of these men, already raised by the victory on Munichia, become all the more exultant (μέγα ἐφρόνουν) as they make successful foraging raids outside the Peiraeus and even begin to attack the very wall of the city (iv.25, 27). The cavalry from the city merely capture plunderers on occasion and do some mischief to the phalanx of those in the Peiraeus, while no others go out from the city under arms. Yet the possibilities for reconciliation are all but closed off by the cavalry commander Lysimachus (cf. iv.8), who, to the vexation even of his own men, slaughters some Athenians of the deme Aexone who were going to their farms for supplies (iv.26).

All in all, then, the tyrannic character of the Athenian oligarchy appears to have changed very little when the second appeal is made to the Spartans for help "on the ground that the demos had revolted from the Lacedaemonians" (iv.28). This time the appeal is not said to be made specifically to Lysander (cf. iii.13); nevertheless, it is Lysander who responds to their call. And while Xenophon specifies that ambassadors were sent by both "the Thirty from Eleusis and those in the catalogue from the city," he gives no indication that Lysander heeds the appeal of only the latter—quite the contrary:

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[3] C.L. Brownson, ed. and trans., *Hellenica* Books I-V by Xenophon (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), note on iv. 24; thus also Paul Anthony Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement," Diss. Yale University 1977, p. 212 and notes 113 and 114. No other commentators even pause to remark on this particular passage, an omission which is unusual since the meaning is both somewhat shocking and not immediately obvious.

[4] Cf. Aristotle, *Constitution of the Athenians* 38.1-2. See Rahe, pp. 210-211.

> . . . Lysander, calculating that it was possible to take quickly those in the Peiraeus by siege both by land and by sea, assisted in getting a hundred talents loaned to them and in getting himself sent out as harmost on land and Libys, his brother, as admiral. And Lysander, going out to Eleusis, collected many Peloponnesian hoplites; while the admiral guarded by sea in order that no supplies should sail in to them, so that quickly those in the city were once again exultant (μέγα ἐφρόνουν) about Lysander. (iv.28-29)

Lysander makes Eleusis his base. This second occasion of his assistance to the Athenian oligarchs, then, leaves no doubt of his willingness to support a regime that has turned from all semblance of aristocracy not only to oligarchic tyranny but to a tyranny egregiously deficient in prudence and one which, because of this imprudence, could not survive but for Lysander's assistance. With that assistance, the tyrants have every prospect of succeeding.

It is now possible to review with more clarity Lysander's intentions from the very beginning of his support of the oligarchy at Athens. For throughout the narrative on the siege of Athens in II.ii his intentions had remained obscure. After more than three months of more or less constant, direct contact with Theramenes, whom he was "detaining" (according to Theramenes), Lysander had "bid him go to Lacedaemon; for (, he said,) he was not in authority over what he was asked by him, but rather the ephors were" (II.ii.17). But Theramenes had been "the first among those who were joining to dissolve the demos" in the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred several years before (Thucydides VIII.68.4; *Hell.* II.iii.30, 45); and later, in his "apology," he professed to be always a supporter of government by gentlemen: ". . . to organize the regime with those capable of doing service both with horses and with shields—earlier I held this to be best and now I do not change" (iii.48). In that same speech, moreover, Theramenes attested to his participation, as one of the Thirty, in establishing the Council, appointing officials, and bringing the sycophants to trial, oligarchic actions that went beyond the official mandate of their own election (II.iii.38; cf. iii.2, 11-12, 14-15). Since Lysander had so much opportunity to converse with Theramenes and since Lysander was so instrumental in securing the election of the Thirty (beyond the mandate of the official terms of peace), we can only conclude that even *before* the Athenian surrender he intended the establishment of an oligarchy there. Perhaps Theramenes persuaded him that to establish a moderate regime would be more in the interests of Sparta than to destroy the Athenian people altogether and give the remains of the city over to its "ancient citizens"—as Lysander did later at Samos and as the radical oligarch Aristoteles might not have been dissuading him from doing at Athens (ii.18; iii.13 and 46). For it was

Theramenes who would later say: ". . . I saw the Lacedaemonians wishing to preserve us not for *this* reason, so that, becoming few, we would be unable to benefit them at all; for it was possible for them, if they wanted this, to leave no one at all by pressing us with famine for a little while longer" (iii.41). Whether Lysander himself agreed and helped, through his special envoys to the ephors (ii.18), to effect this in the final peace terms, or whether his hand was simply forced by the limitations of his authority, still remains ambiguous, although the two men apparently agreed that some form of oligarchy should be established at Athens. In sending Aristoteles in particular along with the Lacedaemonian envoys, however, Lysander's purpose can only have been to secure in the peace terms the return of such exiles as Aristoteles himself, who, unlike Theramenes, was evidently under the personal protection of Lysander and therefore obliged personally to him. (Theramenes would not have urged the recall of his former political enemies among the Four Hundred, as he was the leader of the moderate group responsible for their exile in the first place: Thucydides VIII.89-98; *Hell.* II.iii.30 and especially 46, where Aristoteles is named.)[5] While there is considerable ambiguity here concerning Lysander's interest in what is good for Sparta simply, there is much less ambiguity concerning Lysander's desire to establish his own friends or "clients" in power at Athens.[6]

Although Aristoteles was one of the two sent to Lysander to obtain the Lacedaemonian garrison for the Thirty's tyrannic designs (iii.13), we have seen that Lysander's support appeared to be intended for aristocratic rather than tyrannic ends. But when he later comes to the rescue of the undisguised and now foundering tyranny, Lysander supports in effect their wholly unambiguous rejection of Theramenes and of the policy that Theramenes very plausibly argued to be in the interests of Sparta. For not only have many good men been killed or driven from the city, but there has been a steady dwindling of the numbers, even among those remaining in the city, who would be favorably disposed to the Spartans and would be willing and able to wage war in alliance with them. It is perhaps as a mark of the ignominious situation to which the oligarchs have been reduced that Xenophon apologetically includes the anecdote about the non-chivalrous means devised by an engineer within the city for hindering the approach of the enemy's siege machines (iv.27). This anecdote is recounted just before the second mission sent to Sparta for assistance.

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[5] Thus Rahe, p. 103. I do not understand Lotze's implicit argument to the contrary: *Lysander und der peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin, 1964), p. 43. Cf. J.A.R. Munro, "Theramenes against Lysander," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1938), 18-26.

[6] Cf. Charles D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979), pp. 47-53.

It appears, therefore, that in rescuing this narrowing circle Lysander acts contrary to the public advantage of Sparta, notwithstanding the oligarchs' pretext "that the demos had revolted from the Lacedaemonians" (iv.28). As his intentions are clearer than they were during the earlier siege of Athens, so is his authority greater than it was then; for he is now effectively in control of both the land and the naval forces and has the apparent support of the ephors, who must recently have given their approval to his designs.

As before, however, he is overshadowed by higher authorities in Sparta:

> As matters were proceeding thus, Pausanias the King, having become envious of Lysander that if he should accomplish this he would win high esteem and at the same time would make Athens his own, persuades three of the ephors and leads out an army. (iv.29)

After encamping in the Halipedum, Pausanias' first action is to send ambassadors to those in the Peiraeus and bid them "go off their own (homes)" (ἀπιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν, iv.31). This request might seem rather odd, since these people have no homes, having been deprived of them by the oligarchs. But in the end this is just what Pausanias effects by his reconciliation of the two parties, that on each side they should "go off to their own (homes)," except for the Thirty, the Eleven (marshals), and the Ten oligarchs of the Peiraeus (iv.38). He thereby brings about a just resolution of the Athenian civil war, according to the traditional understanding of justice as lawful possession of whatever one has acquired by making or buying (*Cyr.* I.iii.16-17). What is more, this resolution seems to refute in deed what the Boeotians and Corinthians judged to be the Spartans' motive in sending this army to Athens, i.e. "that the Lacedaemonians wished to make the Athenians' country their own sure possession (οἰκείαν καὶ πιστήν)" (iv.30). For unless one have new reason to trust in firm leadership and gratitude from the Athenian demos, the solution most advantageous to Sparta would be to re-establish a moderate aristocracy (II.iii.45 together with 41; iv.23).

The apparent justice of Pausanias' policy in both of these aspects, however, is vitiated by the private motives governing *his* actions, too. The only motive mentioned by Xenophon for Pausanias' undertaking the expedition in the first place is personal envy of Lysander. And no other reason is given for his being well disposed to the demos (iv.31, 35). We are given no indication that it is no longer feasible to re-establish a moderate aristocracy or that Pausanias disagrees in principle with such an alternative.

Still, the final decision to effect a reconciliation according to the judgment of Pausanias is made not by Pausanias but by the ephors, both

those present with him and the others in Sparta, as well as by the Spartan assembly (iv.36, 38). This decision is made despite the appeal made by the oligarchs still officially in authority in Athens:

> . . . "they give over both the walls that they have and themselves, too, to the Lacedaemonians, to do with them whatever they wish; and they said they deem it right for those in the Peiraeus, if they say they are friends to the Lacedaemonians, to give over the Peiraeus and Munichia." (iv.37)

As soon as the fifteen representatives from Sparta have effected the peace with Pausanias' assistance, he disperses the army (iv.39). This time Lysander has no means of influencing subsequent actions in Athens. His "clients" have been banished or have fled for refuge to Eleusis, and he is most likely without authority to remain there with his hoplites once Pausanias orders the army dispersed.

Lysander rose to eminence toward the end of the Peloponnesian War by virtue of his extraordinary command of the naval forces allied against Athens. His command was extraordinary in two senses: he commanded more ably, more prudently than had any Spartan admiral before him and indeed than most Athenian commanders might have done; yet his *authority* to command, granted by the Spartans because of his superior abilities, was nevertheless of ambiguous status in Sparta and in fact contravened the Spartan law pertaining to the office of admiral. Despite the ambiguity of his position and although his authority was in any case inferior to that of the ephors, Lysander attempted to translate his power as victorious military commander into an unprecedented personal power over many of the cities that previously had been under the Athenian empire and had been liberated from that empire directly or indirectly by Lysander himself. He maintained his hold on these cities by establishing oligarchies friendly to him personally and owing their continuance to the garrisons that he left behind.[7] The first test of his designs was in Athens itself, and there his designs collapsed within a brief time. In contrast to the earlier siege of Athens, when Lysander's naval presence overshadowed the presence of the two kings—so much so that Pausanias quietly left the scene without Xenophon's even giving notice of it—this time it is Lysander who fades from our view. Pausanias succeeds in wresting control of the situation from Lysander and sponsors a political solution that completely loosens Lysander's hold on the city. He is able to do so not only because Lysander's policies have had disastrous results there. The larger difference between the two Peloponnesian sieges of

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[7] See Rahe, pp. 106-109; H.W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire (405-371 B.C.)," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 50 (1930), pp. 46-52.

Athens is that in the second Lysander no longer commands the massive, well-disciplined, newly victorious fleet whose sailors had been well paid not by the Spartans but by Cyrus through the sole agency of Lysander himself, who had had complete control of those funds. Once the Peloponnesian War had been won and Lysander had disbanded the fleet and returned to Sparta, his military talents were no longer necessary to Sparta and the real basis of his influence was lost.[8] Even if Pausanias had pursued the same policy of supporting the tyrants at Athens, he might still have supplanted Lysander in the conduct of this siege. For even if it were still very difficult with a land army to conquer the Athenians in the Peiraeus, only a minimal naval force was ever needed to blockade the city by sea once the Athenian fleet had been destroyed.[9]

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[8] This is not to say that his influence itself was destroyed: even before his actions in III.iii and iv, it is likely that the aid supplied to Cyrus in III.i.1 and to the Greek cities of Asia Minor in III.i.4 was especially Lysander's doing. (Thus R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire," *Classical Philology* 43 [1948], pp. 154, 156.)

[9] Thus Rahe, pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER SIX

LYSANDER AND AGESILAUS IN ASIA (*HELLENICA* III.iii-iv)

After two long chapters in which we hear almost nothing of Lysander (*Hell.* III.i-ii), we next find him supporting the bid of Agesilaus against Leotychides for the inheritance of Agis' kingship (III.iii.3). Xenophon's very brief account of this episode suggests that Lysander was intrumental not only in removing what was apparently the only serious challenge to Agesilaus' own eligibility but also in turning that very challenge around so as to give new weight to the evidence presented by Agesilaus impugning Leotychides' legitimacy. But in this passage Xenophon gives no indication of what private stake Lysander himself might have in this. Did he do it simply out of friendship for Agesilaus or concern for the public good?

Not long afterwards, the Spartans and their allies having received intelligence of a massive fleet being assembled in Phoenicia by Tissaphernes and the Persian King, Lysander persuades Agesilaus to undertake a large expedition against them. This time, however, a motive is supplied. For after giving Lysander's calculations about the prospects for this campaign's success, which lead to his persuading Agesilaus, Xenophon continues:

> Also, besides this calculation, he himself wished to go out with him so that together with Agesilaus he might again establish the decarchies that had been established by him in the cities but had been overthrown through the ephors, who announced the ancestral polities. (III.iv.2)

Thus Xenophon mentions as if in passing what must be to the reader a revelation of no little importance. For until now we have not even been told that Lysander had established these decarchies in so many cities—this was said only of Samos (II.iii.7), though perhaps also, obliquely, of Lampsacus (II.ii.1) and the cities in Lesbos (II.ii.5)—much less that the ephors had disestablished them. Did the liberation of the cities from these regimes somehow follow the liberation of the Athenians from the oligarchic tyranny of the Thirty? In this perplexity we are induced to look for enlightenment in the narrative of the preceding Spartan expedition to Asia, sent to defend the Ionian cities from Tissaphernes (III.i.3-ii.20). For shortly, in describing the circumstances of Lysander's brief enjoyment of prominence on the second expedition, Xenophon will write: " . . . the polities in the cities being in a state of convulsion, and neither

democracy still being there, as in the time of the Athenians, nor decarchy, as in the time of Lysander . . ." (III.iv.7). This statement of the political condition of these cities appears to be in direct contrast to a passage in the earlier narrative, where Xenophon wrote of Derkylidas: "Looking over the cities he saw that in other respects they were doing fine . . ." (III.ii.11). And between that and the present passage we find a probable cause for the ephors' liberating "announcement": Xenophon's account of that first expedition ended with Derkylidas' procuring, through a happy combination of cleverness and luck, a truce and prospective peace with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the final ratification of this peace to be decided by the Lacedaemonians in Sparta and by the Persian King. The tentative terms of the peace were that the King should allow the Greek cities to be autonomous provided that the Greek army should depart from the country and the Lacedaemonian harmosts depart from the cities (III.ii.20). As Underhill observes, "Xenophon has entirely omitted to say what were the results of these negotiations...."[1] But we surmise that at that time the Spartans had no sufficient motives to maintain active support of those harmosts. Given the example of the Thirty in Athens, we may doubt the ability of the decarchies to survive on their own without strong support from Spartan harmosts even if the ephors had *not* decreed their overthrow.[2] Whatever influence Lysander may still have had in the city at that time, it evidently was not enough in itself to sustain his "empire" in Asia Minor. His decline had gone well beyond his being overruled by Pausanias and the ephors in his support of the Thirty (II.iv.28-39).

Xenophon's omission of the results of the earlier peace negotiations leaves other questions, too. In particular, we do not know why those negotiations seem to be utterly ignored when Tissaphernes and Agesilaus communicate at the beginning of the latter's new expedition. This silence seems all the more strange as one of Agesilaus' three representatives sent to exchange the new oaths with Tissaphernes is Derkylidas himself. Was the earlier truce broken by one of the parties to it? Were the terms of peace not accepted by either the Persian King or the Spartan authorities? These questions are of no little moment. Unanswered, they leave major gaps in our understanding of the exact reasons for the expedition con-

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[1] G.E. Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900), note on III.ii.20. Cf. R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire," *Classical Philology* 43 (1948), p. 152. The arguments against Smith by A. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," *Phoenix* 25 (1971), pp. 206-216, and P.A. Rahe, "Lysander and the Spartan Settlement," Diss. Yale University 1977, p. 274 n. 142, are too conjectural to be persuasive. Cf. C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1979), pp. 102-104.

[2] Thus Hamilton, pp. 128-129, who generously attributes the suggestion to Underhill.

ducted by Agesilaus, and thus gaps in our understanding of both the prudence and the justice of this expedition. For the public purposes of the Spartans must have been quite different from the private purposes of Lysander. And what of Agesilaus' purposes? Conjecture would be improper, since Xenophon seems to give so little ground for reasonable conjecture. But precisely if there *are* serious questions here, why would Xenophon leave his narrative so enigmatic?

It would be irresponsible of us to conclude hastily that this is evidence of Xenophon's incompetence as an historian. We should consider, for example, whether Xenophon has other purposes for writing, purposes to which these questions of prudence and justice might not pertain. But there is another possibility, too, one that becomes evident if we pause to consider that Xenophon not only narrates these events but was in fact a participant in them. In III.ii.7 Xenophon quotes "the leader of the Cyreians" as this leader delivered a curt retort to the Spartans' mixed praise and blame of all the soldiers present. There Underhill, following other commentators, notes that this was "probably Xenophon, since we know from the Anab. VII.viii.23 that he had himself conducted the Cyreians to Thibron. Moreover it seems to have been his habit to suppress his own name: cp. III.i.2 note; iv.20." In iv.20 Xenophon will write that, the first year of Agesilaus' campaign having passed, the thirty Spartiates accompanying him were succeeded by others, from among whom Agesilaus appointed new chief officers, including one Herippidas to command over "the Cyreians." Underhill there notes: "Herippidas seems to have succeeded Xenophon himself in their command, cp. III.ii.7. Xenophon however remained in attendance upon Agesilaus and accompanied him on his return march at least as far as Coronea: Anab. V.iii.6; Plut. Ages. 18." If Xenophon was a high-ranking officer in both of these Asian campaigns and if he was for the remainder of his life much beholden to the Spartans and to Agesilaus in particular, then it would not be unreasonable to make at least one conjecture as to why Xenophon might wish to skirt questions of prudence and justice when writing of these Spartan campaigns against the barbarians.

The mere possibility of this conjecture requires that we examine what evidence *is* given. The only pertinent incident falling between the two expeditions in Xenophon's narrative is the report carried to the Spartans by a certain Herodas, a Syracusan, that the Persian King and Tissaphernes were equipping a massive fleet (III.iv.1). Since this passage comes just where we would expect instead some statement on the outcome of Derkylidas' earlier truce and tentative peace proposals with Tissaphernes, it thereby renders all the louder Xenophon's silence on the matter. The report of the new fleet might in itself be taken by the Greeks

as good grounds not to conclude a peace. It does in fact occasion their second expedition under Agesilaus. What intentions lay behind this naval armament?

After his temporary truce with Derkylidas, Tissaphernes could, with a minimum of spying, have ascertained that the Greek forces were in fact much weaker than he had thought (III.ii.16-18). He could then have chosen to move against them. Indeed, the fact that Tissaphernes swears to another truce with that same Derkylidas—now a representative of Agesilaus—and straightway proceeds to break it by sending for a large army from the King to reinforce his own (III.iv.5-6) indicates that he could have done precisely the same *before* Agesilaus came with a larger Peloponnesian army. But while Derkylidas' presence in the making of the second truce is somewhat puzzling, owing to Xenophon's parsimony with even major detail, it is at least highly unlikely that *he* would be sent to exchange oaths with Tissaphernes if *either* of them had broken the truce they had previously made with each other. Why did Tissaphernes not, apparently, break that earlier truce? Did he remain diffident—whether he obtained better intelligence on Derkylidas' forces or no—about facing *any* Greek army with a Persian army however large? But if so, then why does he break the second truce when a much more formidable Greek army has been assembled in his territory?—Or was the equipping of a large fleet of ships a direct violation of the first truce? Did the Persians intend somehow to remove the hoplite army from Asia by waging war at sea?[3] This is the most plausible explanation. But the only certain conclusion we can draw from this line of inquiry seems to be that Xenophon provides no conclusive anwers.

Again, what Xenophon does provide is merely a brief account of how the report of this new fleet induced the Spartans to send the second expedition. We therefore look more closely to see what the passage *does* tell us.

> . . . a certain Herodas, a Syracusan, being in Phoenicia with a certain shipowner and seeing Phoenician triremes—some sailing in from elsewhere, some already there with full complement, and some still being equipped—and having heard, besides, also this, that they were to become three hundred in number, embarked on the first boat heading for Hellas and reported to the Lacedaemonians that the King and Tissaphernes were preparing this expedition; but as to whither (it was bound) he said that he knew nothing. The Lacedaemonians being all aflutter and bringing the allies together and taking counsel as to what it was necessary to do, Lysander, thinking that in their fleet the Hellenes would be much superior and as for the land army reckoning that the one that marched inland with

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[3] See Underhill's note on III.iv.1.

> Cyrus had returned safely, persuades Agesilaus to promise, if they would give him thirty of the Spartiates, as many as two thousand of the newly enfranchised and as many as six thousand as the contingent of the allies, to make a campaign into Asia. (III.iv.1-2)

That the fleet was being prepared by the Persian King and Tissaphernes for an expedition seems to be a conjecture of Herodas' own making, for Xenophon tells in detail what Herodas saw and heard, and it did not include this. And Xenophon goes to the trouble of specifying that Herodas professed ignorance as to the destination of the supposed expedition. This is not to impugn the prudent caution of the Greeks in assuming, as they evidently do, that it will be against Greece, even if Herodas' was their only intelligence on the matter. For to what other purpose might such a massive fleet be put? There seems to be some *justice*, then, in the *Spartans'* apparent disregard of the earlier peace proposals. This justification is amplified in Xenophon's encomium of Agesilaus: there the report bears no doubts about the Persian *King's* intentions to use the fleet "against the Hellenes," and Agesilaus' promise is not "to make a campaign into Asia" but

> to cross over into Asia and to attempt to make peace, or, if the barbarian should wish to wage war, to keep him too busy to campaign against the Hellenes. (*Ages.* i.6-7)

The *Agesilaus* is thus both less complete and more complete than the *Hellenica* in this respect. (For what it is worth, we note that the *Agesilaus* gains plausibility in this matter by not having to present the pre-history of Agesilaus' expedition, i.e. the expedition of Thibron and Derkylidas.) There is yet another, more direct contradiction between them: whereas the *Hellenica* has Agesilaus requesting and obtaining "thirty of the Spartiates, as many as two thousand of the newly enfranchised," the *Agesilaus* has him requesting (and obtaining?) "fifty of the Spartiates [according to most of the manuscripts], three thousand newly enfranchised [according to all the MSS] . . . ." Since we may see many other instances of inflation (both by overstatements and by discreet silences) in the *Agesilaus* relative to the *Hellenica*, and since we should expect that it is more likely the encomium (*Ages.* i.1; x.3) doing the inflating than the *Hellenica* doing any deflating, we conclude that the justice of this second Spartan expedition is at least questionable.

When Agesilaus arrives in Ephesus,

> first of all Tissaphernes sent and asked him what it was that he wanted in coming. And he said, "For the cities in Asia, too, to be autonomous just as the cities in our part of Hellas." (III.iv.5; cf. *Ages.* i.10)

Agesilaus' answer bears no little irony, in light of our knowledge of

Lysander's intentions for these cities. It should also surprise us. Unlike the narrative preceding and justifying the earlier expedition under Thibron and Derkylidas (III.i.3; also ii.12), Xenophon has not recorded any recent complaints by these cities to Sparta nor has he otherwise indicated that Tissaphernes has been harassing or even threatening them. What is more, Agesilaus does not even *mention* the fleet in Phoenicia, about whose size and purposes he should by this time have been able to learn with more certainty. In fact, the entire narrative about Agesilaus' Asian expedition (III.iv and V.i) passes without a single further reference to this Persian fleet. This silence is emphasized by a brief and surprising reference to a Spartan-led navy at the end of this chapter (III.iv.27-29)—but about this, too, we hear nothing more in this narrative. Only when Agesilaus has proceeded all the way to Boeotia on his homeward march will Xenophon refer to a naval battle, one that has just taken place at that time (and the terse account of it mentions an "*Hellenic*" fleet under Conon as fighting *against* the Spartan fleet: IV.iii.10-12). These references suffice to indicate that Agesilaus' presence in Asia with a hoplite army did not prevent, perhaps did not even hinder the operation of the Persian fleet.

These observations lead to what might have been our first question: What prudence is there in sending a hoplite army into Asia as a response to an impending naval expedition against Greece? What strategic purpose is to be served by this? How will a land campaign in Asia "keep the King too busy to campaign against the Hellenes" at *sea*? We find in the *Agesilaus*, beyond the apparent exaggeration (by comparison with *Hell.* III.iv.1) that the Persian King's fleet was *reported* to be intended for use against the Hellenes, the (apparently) still bigger exaggeration that there was also a large *land* army being gathered for the same purpose (*Ages.* i.6). For nothing is said of this in the *Hellenica*. When Xenophon writes in *Hell.* III.iv.6 and *Ages.* i.11 that, contravening his oath, Tissaphernes "sent for a large army from the King in addition to that which he had before," the latter seems to refer to nothing more than the army that Tissaphernes had earlier been using against Derkylidas (III.ii.15).

We are not told of any naval preparation by the Spartans specifically intended to counter the armament reported by Herodas. Xenophon has not reported any Spartan naval activity since telling of their assistance to Cyrus in his march against the King (III.i.1). When he relates, at the end of III.iv, that Agesilaus was given command over "the navy, too," he tells nothing of its activity prior to that time and summarizes the ensuing ventures of Peisander, the new admiral appointed by Agesilaus, with uttermost terseness: "And Peisander went off and engaged in things naval" (ἀπελθὼν τὰ ναυτικὰ ἔπραττεν, III.iv.29). We would expect to learn

more, since Xenophon gave the Spartans' reason for investing Agesilaus with control over the fleet: that they wished thereby to strengthen both the land army and the fleet by having them work together. But, to repeat, we learn nothing more of Peisander until he is killed in a naval battle *after* Agesilaus has re-entered Greece. As if to emphasize this silence, Xenophon indicates that when Agesilaus is in Paphlagonia and has need of a trireme, he has to man one himself and send it off under a Lacedaemonian specially appointed for the task (IV.i.15).

We conclude that in sending the second hoplite expedition into Asia under Agesilaus the Spartans act without certainty as to the intentions behind the reported naval armament in Phoenicia and at any rate with means not well suited to counter this apparent threat to the safety of Greece. While we were given quite explicity *Lysander's* motives for prompting this expedition, the intentions of the Spartans and of Agesilaus are quite obscured.

Following his account of Agesilaus' promise in the encomium (*Ages.* i.7, quoted above) Xenophon writes:

> Straightaway, then, many altogether admired this itself, his desiring, since the Persian came over against Hellas before, to go over in turn against him, and also his choosing to do battle with him by going out against him rather than awaiting him, as well as his wishing to wage war spending the (wealth) of *that* man rather than the (wealth) of the Hellenes, but it was judged noblest of all to establish the contest (to be) not about Hellas but about Asia. (*Ages.* i.8)

These admired ambitions should give us some pause. There is a beautiful ascent in this presentation of them, marked explicitly in that the last mentioned "was judged noblest of all": the ascent is from the desire of national revenge, to prudent recognition of the need for a preventive strike against an impending danger, to a clever design of making the imperialist aggressor pay for the war which will prevent his imperialist aggression, and finally to a glorious inversion of the imperialist designs, to turn the threatened Persian empire over Greece into a Greek empire over Persia!—But "the Persian" (ὁ Πέρσης . . . αὐτόν) against whom Agesilaus would seek vengeance "came over against Hellas" some three or four generations earlier. And the necessity for a preventive strike of the kind planned by Agesilaus is open to question for the reasons given earlier. The two ambitions that follow, then, begin to appear less noble.

Xenophon seemed to give Agesilaus' promise as the first praiseworthy action of his kingship. For he had just introduced what comprises fully half of the whole encomium (Chapters ii-iii) by writing:

> As for what he accomplished (or 'did,' διεπράξατο) in the kingship, now I shall relate that; for from his works (τῶν ἔργων) his character, too, will most nobly, I think, be evident. (*Ages.* i.6)

And his conclusion of this first incident by writing, "*Straightaway, then,* many altogether admired this itself . . ." (i.8) suggests that this is the first such deed.[4] But Xenophon proceeds immediately in i.9 as follows:

> Now when he took the armament and sailed out, how might one more clearly show how he commanded than by narrating the very things that he did (ἔπραξεν)?

Perhaps it is thus brought to our attention that Agesilaus' ambitious promise and the intentions believed to be behind that promise did not constitute a deed, even if they were noble and admirable. There may be less clarity about Agesilaus' invisible intentions—i.e. less clarity in his words—than there is in his actual deeds. It is possible, then, that the "many" have misunderstood his ambitions because they do not see them clearly.

The conclusion from the "first action (πρᾶξις) *in Asia*" (i.10) begins, "To me, then, this is the first noble thing he seems to have accomplished (διαπράξασθαι) . . ." (*Ages.* i.12). From only this much we could *not* conclude with much confidence that the ambitions that "many admired" were not admirable in Xenophon's estimation; for not only might our reading of these words be too subtle—Xenophon could simply have meant 'the first noble thing *in Asia*' in i.12—but also we have just observed that the account of Agesilaus' ambitions in i.7-8 is not a narration of any *deed.* There will be less subtlety later; for when Xenophon is about to tell of Agesilaus' remarkable self-restraint in heeding the ephors' command that he return from Asia to assist in a more domestic Greek war, it is introduced in the following way: "Now here, too, it *deserves* (ἄξιον) admiring *exceedingly* in him . . ." (*Ages.* i.36). As narrator, then, Xenophon expresses unambiguous admiration for Agesilaus' *ending* this expedition in words which suggest that Xenophon was not among the "many" who admired his undertaking it in the first place.[5]

Returning to the *Hellenica*, we notice now that one incident has been omitted from the *Agesilaus* even though it sheds some interesting light on this king's character and on his intentions for this expedition (cf. *Ages.* i.6, quoted above): After making the customary sacrifices for an expedition (III.iv.3—cf. *Lac.* xiii.2-3) and issuing commands for the assembling of the various contingents,

> he himself wished to go to sacrifice in Aulis, the very place where Agamemnon offered sacrifice when he was sailing to Troy. But when he got there the Boeotarchs, on learning that he was sacrificing, sent horsemen and told

[4] Thus F.G. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonteum* (Leipzig, 1801), s.v. εὐθύς, par. 2, end.

[5] Cf. also *Ages.* i.24—"he seemed (ἔδοξε) to act admirably"—as well as i.17 (ἐδόκει, ἔδοξε).

> him not to do the rest of the sacrificing, and they flung from the altar the victims they found already sacrificed. He, calling the gods to witness and full of anger, embarked on his trireme and sailed away. (III.iv.4)

As it is wholly omitted from the encomium, we assume Xenophon's judgment to be that the affair does not reflect admirable ambitions on Agesilaus' part by any standard (i.e. even the opinion of "many").

But what of the *Spartans'* intentions in approving the expedition? We note that, although in III.iv.2 the Lacedaemonians bring together their allies to take counsel as to what should be done, in iv.3 it is solely "the Lacedaemonians" who "give Agesilaus just what he requested as well as food for a six-month." If not accidental, this implies that the allies did not have a real say in the final decision. It might also imply that the Spartans had a special reason of their own for choosing this particular expedient against the supposed danger. Indeed, we do not have to go far to find such a reason. Apart from the king himself and the thirty Spartiates being sent, the entire contingent from Sparta consists of two thousand "Neodamodes" or "newly-enfranchised" (Helots). In the chapter just preceding this one, the Neodamodes as a class were numbered among the potential supporters of the coup against the Spartans being plotted by Cinadon and a few others. "For wherever any talk about the Spartans arose among them," said the informant, referring to the four lower classes in Lacedaemon, "none was able to hide (the fact that) not without pleasure would he eat them even raw" (III.iii.6).

This lengthy examination of the obscure causes behind the second Spartan expedition against Asia leads to the conclusion that there is a remarkable harmony of interest in such an expedition for Lysander and the Spartans alike and perhaps also for Agesilaus, and that this harmony is probably not accidental. It was Lysander who conceived and prompted it, including the number of Neodamodes to be drafted. While the Spartans might be loath to put Lysander in command of it, he must have been aware that at that time they would jump at the chance of ridding themselves at least temporarily of two thousand men dangerous to the regime. And it now appears likely that Lysander supported Agesilaus' bid for the kingship not only because he was a friend but because Lysander saw in him an ambitious soul who could further Lysander's own designs in just such a way as this.

Once in Asia, Lysander soon seems to be accomplishing exactly what he had hoped.

> As Agesilaus was passing the time in quiet and leisure in Ephesus: since the polities in the cities were in a state of convulsion, and neither democracy still being there, as in the time of the Athenians, nor decarchy, as in the time of Lysander, since all knew Lysander they beset him, requesting that

> he obtain from Agesilaus what they needed; and because of this a massive crowd was always following and courting him . . . (III.iv.7)

Although he does not enjoy the commanding authority he had exercised either as admiral during the Peloponnesian War or as harmost in the civil war at Athens, he might think he has found an acceptable compromise in a situation that permits him to enjoy much of the same power and glory while conceding superior authority to a king who is, so to speak, his own protégé.

But Lysander's enjoyment of this glory is as short-lived as his command as harmost in Athens. For the passage quoted above continues:

> so that Agesilaus appeared a private man, Lysander the king. Now, that this enraged Agesilaus, too, he showed later; the other thirty (Spartans), though, because of their envy did not keep silent, but said to Agesilaus that Lysander was behaving unlawfully in conducting himself more importantly than the kingship. . . . (iv.7-8)[6]

It is indeed much the same as it was before with Pausanias (II.iv.29). Wholly irrespective of any differences of political opinion that might excite opposition to his policies and *therefore* uneasiness about his prestige, Lysander's stature excites a keen envy both in the new king, by law his superior, and in the Spartan citizens, by law his equals. This is so even though Lysander as well as his "courtiers" recognize the superior authority to be in Agesilaus. The Spartan citizens regard as unlawful not just actions that are specifically outlawed—of which, by Xenophon's account, Lysander cannot be accused here—but "conduct" that breaches even if only in appearance (or perhaps: *especially* in appearance) the equality among citizens and collective subordination to certain authorities provided for by the Spartan laws.

Agesilaus diminishes Lysander's stature by denying the requests of those Asian Greeks who had won Lysander's support. "Distressed by the dishonor," Lysander confronts Agesilaus directly. In his delightful fashion Xenophon (presumably) reduces their conversation to its bare bones (III.iv.9). Lysander reproaches Agesilaus with the reason why he had expected to fare better under this king: Agesilaus is supposed to be his friend.[7] Especially since Agesilaus might not *have* the kingship had it not been for Lysander's support, Lysander might reasonably expect him to be content to share the royal power with this friend and sponsor.

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[6] Agesilaus' rage (ἔμηνε) at the glory's being stolen by one who is talented but under his authority is perhaps an ironic (and comic) reminder of the epic dispute (also in Asia) between Achilles and the king whom Agesilaus emulates. (Cf. on III.iv.4, above.)

[7] Here we have come to the most obvious reason for Xenophon's writing so gingerly about Lysander in the *Hellenica*.

Agesilaus' answer is disarmingly blunt, and it is made possible because Lysander introduced claims of friendship. If Lysander wished to use his status as friend and sponsor as a means of turning the authority of the kingship to his own advantage, to increase his own power at the *expense* of that kingship, then his claims in the name of friendship are questionable.

Agesilaus' answer might exonerate him from Lysander's charge of ingratitude. Lysander is not convinced—"Well, perhaps what you are doing is more apt than what I did," he says—but it is easy enough for him to see the difficulty that will remain in any case. Whether Agesilaus owes his kingship to Lysander's support or not, once he has it his pride, backed by the laws of Sparta, cannot abide his being overshadowed in honor, especially while he commands a campaign outside of Sparta. (Thus Agesilaus' answer began with an oath "by Zeus!"—his ancestor and king of the gods.) Agesilaus' answer also suggested a new alternative for Lysander: ". . . but as for those who aggrandize me, if I should not know how to honor them in return, I would be ashamed." But Lysander speaks openly of the difficulty of his remaining there in the king's shadow: he would "be ashamed having no power with you . . . ." He thus reveals more directly than Xenophon had done earlier as narrator (in iv.2) his most private expectations of power and honor in this expedition.[8]

Still, Lysander is no Achilles. He has yielded to Agesilaus' charge and proposes a specific form for the compromise: ". . . dispatch me somewhere. For wherever I may be, I shall try to be of opportune use to you." Agesilaus agrees and sends him to the Hellespont.

There Lysander gives a clear indication of how greatly he can aggrandize Agesilaus.

> . . . Lysander, perceiving that Spithridates the Persian is being demeaned in something by Pharnabazus, talks with him and persuades him to defect with his children, the wealth he had about him and horsemen, about two hundred. And he left the rest in Cyzicus, but embarking him and his son he came bringing them to Agesilaus. And seeing this, Agesilaus was pleased at the deed and straightaway inquired about the lands and the rule of Pharnabazus. (iv.10)

What, then, does Agesilaus do for his friend to "honor him in return"? Xenophon is silent. The narrative shifts immediately to the war with

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[8] Some translators render his words ἀδυνατῶν παρὰ σοί as "by having no influence with you" (thus C.L. Brownson [Cambridge, Mass., 1947] and Rev. Henry Dale [London, 1893]), but παρά here may well be intentionally ambiguous, meaning either "influence *with* you" or "power *next to* you" (thus Jean Hatzfeld's *la honte de rester inactif auprès de toi*, [Paris, 1936]).

Tissaphernes. We do not hear that Lysander was sent anywhere else where he might accomplish more of such boons for Agesilaus. Instead, the next we hear of Lysander is of his sailing off homeward with the other twenty-nine Spartans when what was apparently intended to be a one-year term has expired (iv.20).—But we note something odd there, too. The departing thirty are identified with Lysander as the central figure, their successors with Herippidas. Xenophon's words certainly *suggest* that all the successors are just now arriving: "the thirty with Lysander sailed off homeward, and the successors to them, those with Herippidas, were at hand." Underhill, however, takes note: Herippidas was present with Agesilaus a year earlier (iv.6) and we shall find him still there a full year *later* (IV.ii.8). Underhill provides a plausible resolution of our confusion: perhaps Herippidas "accompanied Agesilaus during the first and third years only in a private capacity."[9] But from this, of course, we are driven to wonder why Agesilaus' friend Lysander neither accompanied him during the second and third years in *any* capacity nor was employed by him elsewhere, at least not according to Xenophon's account. After Lysander has sailed off homeward his very name no longer appears in this first chapter of Agesilaus' expedition to Asia—or anywhere else in connection with Agesilaus, for that matter. Herippidas is more the man after Agesilaus' own heart.

Soon another of Xenophon's silences even more loudly calls our attention to Lysander's absence. At the end of this chapter Agesilaus is instructed by the Spartan "authorities" to take control also of the navy "and to appoint as admiral whomsoever he might wish" (iv.27). Perhaps the words are not to be taken too literally either by Agesilaus or by us, for perhaps the legal disqualification of those who have already been admiral (II.i.7) is understood to apply as a matter of course. But we have already seen the Spartan authorities themselves circumventing this law once to put Lysander in command of the navy a second time (*ibidem*), so that nothing prevents Agesilaus from doing the same now. This now would be a perfect opportunity for Agesilaus at once to honor Lysander for his earlier service and to put him in a position to do him much greater service. It might even be just the position Lysander had in mind for himself when he first prompted this expedition ("thinking that . . . in their navy the Hellenes would be much superior . . ." iv.2). Nevertheless, Agesilaus "appointed Peisander, his wife's brother, as admiral, a man loving honor and stout of spirit but more [or 'rather'] inexperienced at making preparations as needed" (iv.29).

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9 Underhill, note on III.iv.20.

Lysander's feat in winning over Spithridates, while of advantage to Agesilaus (if there was to be war with Pharnabazus) and manifestly to his pleasure, might have given him pause. For it could indicate that, if let loose in Asia as Agesilaus' agent, Lysander might conquer extensively by himself even without an army or navy. Perhaps Agesilaus could not find any hint of a cause for actual alarm in Lysander's feat; for perhaps there is only an accidental similarity in Xenophon's narrative between Spithridates' "being demeaned" (ἐλαττούμενον, iv.10) by Pharnabazus and the "diminishing" (μειοῦν, iv.9) of Lysander by Agesilaus. But in any case, while Lysander's action did "aggrandize" Agesilaus in that it advanced his design to overthrow the Persian King, this and other such actions would not necessarily make Agesilaus himself "appear greater" (cf. μείζους φαίνεσθαι, iv.9), which may be what he really meant by "aggrandize" (αὔξοντας, *ibidem*).

It may thus be more understandable why Agesilaus' promise to "honor in return" one who has aggrandized him goes unfulfilled and why we hear nothing to indicate that Agesilaus was ashamed at this. Still, it is not surprising that their earlier quarrel and the seeming reconcilation are almost etirely omitted from the encomium *Agesilaus*.[10]

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[10] Cf. H.D. Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*," in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), pp. 221-222. This is not the place to consider Xenophon's ironic *tacit* use there of the affair as shedding some further light on Agesilaus' character. (The affair is referred to obliquely in *Ages.* iii.3.)

CHAPTER SEVEN

LYSANDER'S DEATH IN BOEOTIA (*HELLENICA* III.v)

Lysander's last appearance in the *Hellenica* is as a leader in the first of several Spartan invasions of Boeotia. He is not mentioned as an instigator of this campaign (although his part in establishing the harmosts and especially the decarchies in the various cities, as well as his part in prompting Agesilaus' campaign against the Persian King, are among the causes of the new Greek alliance against Sparta: III.v.12-14).[1] We therefore limit our examination here to his military command in this Boeotian campaign.

Lysander is sent out by the ephors to collect the Phocian, Oetaean, Heracleot, Malian and Aenianian troops together and lead them to Haliartus. But he is not to have the chief command of this campaign: for "there also Pausanias, who was to be the leader, agreed to be present on a said day with the Lacedaemonians and the other Peloponnesians" (v.6). While Pausanias is offering the customary sacrifices and waiting in Tegea for the Peloponnesian troops to be assembled (v.7), Lysander wastes no time, but "did the other things, those commanded, and in addition effected the revolt of the Orchomenians from the Thebans" (v.6). While Pausanias is marching to Boeotia with the Peloponnesian army,

> Lysander, leading the army from the Phocians and Orchomenus and the places thereabouts, was in Haliartus before Pausanias. Having come, he did not keep still and wait for the army from Lacedaemon, but with the men he had he went up to the wall of the Haliartians. And at first he tried to persuade them to revolt and become autonomous; but when some of the Thebans, being within the wall, prevented them, he made an attack against the wall. The Thebans, hearing this, came running to the rescue, both hoplites and cavalry. Now, which it is—whether they fell upon Lysander unawares or whether even perceiving them coming on he awaited them as if he were (expecting) to be the victor—is not evident; but this at any rate

[1] Cf. Plutarch, *Lysander* 27-28. Scholars have taken Xenophon's account of the outbreak of the Corinthian War both too much and not enough at face value, never considering 1) the significance of the fact that Timocrates' mission was justified by what Xenophon shows to be the flagrantly unjust ambitions of Agesilaus in Asia (III.iv.25-26; v.1; and IV.i *passim*—but note especially IV.i.41); and 2) that Xenophon might have understood the arguments made by the Thebans (according to his report of them in III.v.10-15) to be weighty. (Thus, among others, S. Perlman, "The Causes and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War," *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 14 [1964], especially pp. 71-72, and C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* [Ithaca, N.Y., 1979], pp. 182, 192-208.)

> is clear, that the battle took place beside the wall; and a trophy stands at the gates of the Haliartians. When, upon Lysander's dying, the others were fleeing to the mountain, the Thebans pursued vigorously. (v.17-19)

After Lysander's death, all is turmoil and indecision. The Thebans' pursuit uphill becomes a Theban flight downhill. Although disheartened at this, the next day they are in higher spirits again upon perceiving that the Phocians and all the others had fled homeward during the night. But then they are thrown again into fearful silence and dejection at the appearance of Pausanias with the army from Lacedaemon. But then they are put in still higher spirits on the following day when the Athenians arrive and order ranks with them and Pausanias does not advance or give battle (v.20-22).

After reckoning their prospects for victory as being dim, Pausanias and his officers decide to retrieve their dead under a truce, and they gladly accept the Thebans' stipulation that the Peloponnesians depart from the country. The Thebans, now full of hubris, treat the disheartened Lacedaemonians with much indignity as the latter proceed homeward (v.23-24).

> Thus was this army of the Lacedaemonians disbanded. But Pausanias, when he arrived home, was put to judgment for (penalty of) death. On being accused that he had arrived later at Haliartus than Lysander, having agreed to be present on the same day; that not by battle but under truce he attempted to retrieve the corpses; that having taken the demos of the Athenians in the Peiraeus he let them go; and besides all this not being present at the trial, (sentence of) death was adjudged against him. And he fled to Tegea, and he died there of sickness. . . . (v.24-25)

Pausanias is held responsible for Lysander's death in that he "arrived late" or "later" (ὑστερήσειεν) at Haliartus. Yet this is merely an accusation that is not answered in any way by Pausanias. (His failure to retrieve the corpses by force of arms and the indignity suffered thereupon by the Lacedaemonian army may be a sufficient explanation for his failure to appear at the trial.) But Xenophon himself had stated that it was *Lysander* who "was beforehand in arriving" (ἔφθη τὸν Παυσανίαν ἐν τῷ Ἁλιάρτῳ γενόμενος—words which might also be ambiguous but suggest some haste on his part—and "having come, he did not keep still and wait for the army from Lacedaemon . . ." (v.17-18). Xenophon shows some surprise that Lysander exposed himself so close to the city's walls. He must have been either lacking in foresight or over-bold.

Everything we have read in the *Hellenica* of Lysander as a military strategist suggests strongly that he was not one who would be caught by surprise. He was nothing if not superbly cautious, ever aware of the enemy's strength and disposition and shrewd in taking advantage of *their*

lapses of caution; and he was quite capable of shunning an engagement if the advantage were not on his side (I.v.12-15; II.i.15-28). But in this case "he did not keep still and wait for the army from Lacedaemon." Xenophon gives us to suspect that Lysander acted here with uncharacteristic rashness and therefore to wonder about the cause of it. We do not have far to look for a likely cause: Once Pausanias arrived he, the king, "was to be the leader" (v.6). Remembering what had happened in the siege of the Athenian demos in the Peiraeus (II.iv.29-39), Lysander unnecessarily risked his own death and a defeat for Sparta in a rush to achieve some victory before Pausanias should arrive to take from him all chance of great glory.[2]

Lysander's death left Pausanias in a most unenviable plight. His officers agreed with him that the honorable course would be suicidal and so they accept an ignominious truce. But in Sparta the harshest blame for this ignominy will be laid against him.

Pausanias is now blamed also for having earlier given Athens back to the Athenian people, even though the ephors themselves had apparently approved of this action at the time (II.iv.35-38). This resolution of the civil war there had loosened Sparta's hold over the Athenians, and thus enabled the latter to come now to the Thebans' aid (III.v.22).

The Athenians join this war against the Spartans in the hope of reviving their empire (v.2, 10). But their hopes were made possible only by the hatred that the Spartans had excited among the Greeks by their imperial policies after the Peloponnesian War (v.10-15). And Lysander has been presented as the most active proponent of those policies.[3] Once the Spartans were launched on this imperial course, actions which might otherwise have been simply non-imperial and just came to redound to their harm. When Pausanias is punished for his benevolent resolution of the Athenian civil war, what looks like simple anger over the ignominious retreat from Boeotia in fact shows a hardening of the Spartans' choice of pursuing the way of Lysander.[4]

—And yet Lysander now is dead: there was no place for Lysander himself in this pursuit.

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[2] Thus H.D. Westlake, "Individuals in Xenophon, *Hellenica*," in *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester, 1969), pp. 222-223, although he does not credit Xenophon with the observation.

[3] R.E. Smith points out that the harmosts and the decarchies established by Lysander (complained of specifically by the Thebans in their speech, III.v.13), had not necessarily been removed from cities other than in Asia Minor: with III.iv.2 cf. III.ii.20 ("Lysander and the Spartan Empire," *Classical Philology* 43 [1948], pp. 152-153).

[4] Cf. Smith, p. 156; Hamilton, pp. 206-208.

If Lysander's leadership, necessary for the Spartans' victory in the Peloponnesian War, became dispensible after that naval victory was won, we now wonder: Can the new Spartan *imperialism* succeed without him or someone like him? Xenophon does not indicate that the first invasion of Boeotia would certainly have succeeded under Lysander's full command nor that it would have failed even in happier circumstances under Pausanias' command. But the narrative of Agesilaus' Asian exploits, which Xenophon now resumes (IV.i.1), does include a tacit commentary on the consequences of Lysander's absence. In particular, two incidents concerning the men Agesilaus promoted instead of Lysander (following their quarrel in III.iv) appear as sequels to that whole affair.

Some time after Lysander induced Spithridates to defect from Pharnabazus (III.iv.10), Spithridates in turn brought Otys, King of the Paphlagonians, over to Agesilaus' side along with a large force of cavalry and peltasts—this, too, being much to Agesilaus' desire (IV.i.2-3). Not long afterward, however, both Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, on the grounds

> that they had been wronged and dishonored, packed up and went off during the night to Ariaeus at Sardis . . . . To Agesilaus, nothing that occurred on the expedition was more distressing than the desertion of Spithridates, Megabates, and the Paphlagonians. (IV.i.27-28)

That desertion is caused by the high-handed action, born of a crude excess of ambition, of one Spartan: Herippidas.[5]

The second sequel is the naval defeat and death of Peisander reported just after Agesilaus crosses over into Boeotia on his return march from Asia (IV.iii.10-12).[6] "Also told was the way in which the naval battle occurred." This is the first such narration since Xenophon's telling of the battle at Aegospotami. Here only a terse account of the battle is given according to the report of the unnamed messenger. Let us paraphrase slightly in listing the particulars reported: The two fleets "sail against each other"—i.e. neither shuns the engagement—off the coast of Asia Minor; the enemy are ranged in two lines, with the Athenian Conon and his Hellenic fleet drawn up in order (τετάχθαι) in the front line; the Spartan admiral having drawn up his fleet in order in a line opposite the enemy (ἀντιπαραταξαμένου), his ships prove to be manifestly much fewer

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[5] We note that Herippidas is nevertheless honored by Agesilaus after this: IV.ii.8.

[6] Some commentators are confused by Xenophon's writing in iii.10 of "*the* naval battle" since there has been no previous reference to it: thus Underhill, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford, 1900); Büchsenschütz, ed., *Griechische Geschichte* by Xenophon, 7th ed. (Leipzig, 1908); and Manatt, ed., *Hellenica* by Xenophon (Boston, 1897). But might not this usage be merely proleptic, as also τὸ πάθος in IV.v.7?

in number than the Greek fleet under Conon; nevertheless, Peisander engages the enemy; (even before the battle begins) the allies in his left wing take flight (φεύγειν); his trireme suffers some ramming (ἐμβολάς) and is forced to the land, where he dies fighting on his ship; "and the others, as many as were thrust onto the land, abandoning the ships, saved themselves in whatever way they were able (by fleeing) into Cnidus." To drive the point with our diametrically unXenophontic want of finesse: It would be difficult to imagine how a battle could bear any more correspondence in description, in nearly every particular, to the last naval battle described *before* the one at Aegospotami: at the Arginusae (I.vi.29-33). (Even one of the circumstantial differences, the presence of Conon as commander of the Greek contingent of the enemy, bears a direct reminder of the circumstances of that earlier battle: I.vi.15-26, 38.) And we now observe a certain likeness between the very characters of Peisander—"a man loving honor and stout of spirit but rather inexperienced at making preparations as necessary" (III.iv.29)—and *Callicratidas*!

It was just after the replacement of Lysander by Callicratidas as admiral that Lysander's friends had spread their warning in Asia about the Spartans' customary failure to appoint and especially to retain competent admirals, "and that because of this they risked suffering some ill" (I.vi.4). After Callicratidas' death and defeat the Spartans prudently departed from their lawful custom, made Lysander admiral again (*de facto*), and thereby gained the victory in their war against the Athenians. For this later expedition against the Persian King one of the two ingredients for success, according to the calculations of Lysander, was the great superiority of the Hellenic fleet to be expected on their side (III.iv.2). Now, in IV.iii.11-12, we learn that an Hellenic fleet is fighting alongside the Phoenician fleet under Pharnabazus. Xenophon has not told us, but we might now infer, that this is one reason for the Spartans' conferring on Agesilaus an unprecedented power to coordinate the land and naval forces in Asia.[7] While Lysander evidently did not anticipate this new naval alliance against Sparta, he might have been able to oppose it successfully had he been appointed admiral once again. Xenophon's silence about the Spartans' problems at sea both before and after the appointment of Peisander is perhaps a literary reflection of an almost willful inattention—first by the Spartans and then by Agesilaus himself—to naval exigencies. (Cf. IV.ii-vii with IV.viii-V.i.)

After the brief account of Peisander's defeat, Xenophon continues:

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[7] See Underhill's note on III.iv.28.

> Now Agesilaus, on learning this, at first bore it hard; but when he considered that most of his army was such as would gladly take part if good things should come about, but if he should see any difficulty, it was not necessary to share it with them, thereupon he changed and said that Peisander was reported dead but that he had been victorious in the naval battle. And as he said this he offered a sacrifice of oxen as for good news and sent around portions of the sacrificial victims to many, so that when a skirmish occurred with the enemy, Agesilaus' men won by the word that the Lacedaemonians were victorious in the naval battle. (IV.iii.13-14)

This incident seems quite trivial. It is merely a "skirmish" that has been won as a result of Agesilaus' ruse; and his troops will have learned the truth before the important encounter in Boeotia narrated next (IV.iii.15 ff.). What is Xenophon's purpose in including it here as a stratagem to which Agesilaus resorts following the Spartan naval defeat?

Just as Peisander's defeat is reminiscent of Callicratidas' at the Arginusae, so the ruse of Agesilaus bears a striking resemblance to the one employed by Eteonicus immediately following Callicratidas' defeat (I.vi.36-38). Agesilaus' troops—to say nothing of the sailors who escaped to Cnidus after Peisander's death—are of doubtful loyalty, much as were Eteonicus' troops on Chios (II.i.1-5). Xenophon's narrative quietly makes us wonder: Is there another Lysander on the horizon? What will become of the Spartans' imperial designs under Agesilaus?[8]

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[8] That ruse of Agesilaus, too, is omitted from the encomium.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Xenophon's writings are radical in the demands they make of the reader. Plato and Thucydides, whose works may be equally in need of interpretation to reveal their meaning, nevertheless arouse on every page a keen awareness that the wisdom being pursued is universal and profound, and thus awe-inspiring. Xenophon's prose is unpretentious to the point of seeming shallow, graceful perhaps but uninspired (except in rare moments) and uninspiring, without any universal vision, even without any consistent plan or purpose. And so, while Plato and Thucydides continue to be read avidly even when not with great care, the failure to appreciate Xenophon's method almost results in his not being read at all when his graceful style is out of fashion.

What Thomas Hobbes said of Thucydides may be said also of Xenophon:

> He filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, and ordereth them with that judgment, and with such perspicuity and efficacy expresseth himself, that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh his auditor a spectator. . . . So that look how much a man of understanding might have added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their proceedings, and familiar with the men and business of the time: so much almost may he profit now, by attentive reading of the same here written. He may from the narrations draw out lessons to himself, and of himself be able to trace the drifts and counsels of the actors to their seat.[1]

Xenophon carries this principle of historiography even farther by presenting what appears to be a much more disjointed narrative description of human characters and events, compelling the attentive reader to look for the connections among them much as that reader would have to do in seeking to understand the characters and events of his own times.

This difference in Xenophon's *style* might also be a reflection of a difference from Thucydides' *understanding* of human affairs. Here we borrow from Leo Strauss:

> . . . The *Hellenica* is the only book ever written which begins with the expression "Thereafter." The absence of a normal beginning, and in particular of a proem stating the author's intention, is the beginning of the troubles that the book causes the reader. It is usually not observed that within the limits of the grammatically possible the same book also ends with

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[1] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. Molesworth (London, 1843), VIII, p. viii.

> "thereafter": "After the battle there was still greater disorder and confusion in Greece than before. Now let the writing be mine up to this point. As for what happened thereafter, perhaps another will care for it." If we read the first two or more pages of the book in the light of its ending, we may be inclined to think that according to Xenophon there is always confusion in the affairs of men, that what we call "history" is a sequence of states of greater or lesser confusion, and that therefore the historian can begin and end his work more or less at the points most convenient to him. . . . At first glance, the view according to which "the historical process" consists of confusion followed by confusion differs wholly from Thucydides' view. According to Thucydides, it seems that the historian's beginning and end is imposed on him by the beginning and the end of a grand movement or motion, such as the Peloponnesian War; the unity of Thucydides' history imitates the unity of that war. . . .[2]

However, as Strauss proceeds to suggest, Xenophon's narrative shows order being imposed on human affairs by individual human orderers.[3] The most brilliant one appears at the very beginning of the *Hellenica*. But Alcibiades was soon cashiered by the Athenians. (We suspect now that this forms a crucial part of a thematic development in the Athenian passages of Books I-II.) On the Spartan side, Callicratidas managed to keep his own fleet well-ordered despite his refusal to compromise his Spartan contempt for barbarian aid, but his refusal to compromise the Spartan sense of honor in battle nearly brought the fleet to ruin. Lysander makes both compromises, the first so as to order his fleet in a way more gratifying and inspiring to his troops and to the burdened allies, and the second so as to await a condition of *dis*order among the enemy. By a lengthy series of subtle contrasts, Xenophon's narrative shows not only the qualities and methods of an unsuccessful and a successful naval commander, but also why it is particularly a classic Spartan who is unsuccessful, why a Spartan who is not merely extraordinary but unorthodox, who has not been thoroughly molded by the laws of Lycurgus, succeeds in winning this naval war.

But it is more than his strategies that are at odds with Spartan ways. The ambiguity of his political status, like his great merit as an admiral, is comparable to that of Alcibiades among the Athenians. What the jealous sovereignty of the Athenian demos was to Alcibiades,[4] the strict hierarchy of lawful (and jealous) authority in Sparta was to Lysander.

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[2] "Greek Historians," *Review of Metaphysics* 21 (1968), pp. 661-662.

[3] We have not even begun here to consider what, in Xenophon's view, is owing to the gods.

[4] Cf. Michael Palmer, "Alcibiades and the Question of Tyranny in Thucydides," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XV:1 (March, 1982). See also Michael Palmer, "Love of Glory and the Common Good," *The American Political Science Review* 76 (1982), pp. 825-836.

In the *Polity of the Lacedaemonians* Xenophon describes the Spartan institutions, indicating—often with surprising frankness—the roundabout methods of many of the laws of Lycurgus, how these laws achieved desired moral and political results by very indirect means. If followed closely throughout the treatise, these discussions prove to be steps in a more complex and logical progression of thought from chapter to chapter than is immediately evident to the reader.

Sparta more than any other city in Greece was ruled by law. The foremost goal of its laws was to maintain the strict rule of law. They were designed to repress the natural, private desires and passions so as to make the citizens wholly public beings who would be ever mindful of the two chief guardians of lawful public behavior: powerful rulers and the watchful eyes of their peers. This molding of private individuals into creatures of the law made Sparta the ancient exemplar of a community.

This community extended only to the Spartan citizens, however, who together ruled the other Lacedaemonians as subjects and slaves. Xenophon suggests that in fact the true purpose of the Spartan discipline was to maintain that political domination so as to protect the wealth of those Spartans who did possess riches, the poor Spartans being motivated to endure this discipline by the promise of a basic subsistence and a share in the honors of ruling (as well as by fear of punishment and dishonor).

Most political and military offices were of limited tenure so as to limit private ambitions and keep strong the habit of obedience. But because the hostility of the non-Spartan Lacedaemonians and Helot slaves was especially dangerous to the Spartan aristocracy in times of war, and in order to render the highest military office less susceptible to being used by men of dangerous ambition, Lycurgus' laws gave the command over foreign campaigns to two hereditary kingships, the kings' sacred functions (as both high priests and blood descendants of Heracles) being conspicuous and their ambitions restrained both by the ephors' power and by the promise of divine honors after death.

This means of supplying military leadership could work only so long as the Lacedaemonians as a whole remained the undisputed masters of hoplite warfare and could fight their wars on land. Once compelled to wage war at sea, or once faced with formidable opposition on land, they could no longer dispense with the need for leadership of a more artful kind than could be expected from hereditary monarchs. Yet in the methods of such a masterful orderer as Lysander lurked a corruption of the austere moral discipline of the Spartan polity as well as a subversion of the Spartan hierarchy of authority. He obtained enthusiastic service from his own troops and the allies, not by reminding them of their moral duty and common political cause or by asserting his legal authority to

command, but by appealing to their private desires for wealth and power.

The steps from a defensive victory to empire are few and easy, and the motivations to lead their country in that direction are strong for those who are responsible for the victory and powerful among troops and allies but without a high place in their own polity. And empire provides further opportunities for many citizens to indulge their private desires for wealth and power. The Spartan authorities were powerful enough to suppress the personal designs of Lysander. But the Spartan citizens remained highly susceptible to the temptations of empire because their education to virtue was not an education to true virtue. Xenophon's examination of the practices and affairs of the Spartans therefore invites a consideration of possible reforms in that education so as to make the citizens more immune to such temptations. It may in fact be an invitation and a useful introduction to his other writings. For he presents his reflections about possible reforms of Sparta in the opening chapters of the *Cyropaedia*.[5] He also presents, in the *Memorabilia,* Socrates' examinations of political rule and of justice and the other virtues. Xenophon's writings on Sparta therefore prove to be of much more than antiquarian interest to us. They represent in themselves a penetrating theoretical investigation and serve as a point of departure for deeper inquiry about moral and political life.

At this point in the *Hellenica* we wonder next about the character and actions of Agesilaus, the Spartan king whom we might have expected to work for a restoration of traditional Spartan ways but who instead took Lysander's place and led the city deeper into what would become a brief, unhappy experience of empire.

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[5] We cite again, in particular, *Cyr.* I.ii.6-7 and vi.27-34.

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